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ABSTRACT 
The thesis expounds, analyzes, and evaluates Adolf Reinach's 
philosophical work and his role in the development of early phenomenology. 
Reinach's ontological and epistemological assumptions are clarified through 
an analysis of his theories of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and 
judgments, first developed by Reinach in reference to judgments and 
subsequently utilized in his analysis of ethical and legal questions. 
A critical exposition and evaluation of his legal philosophy focuses 
attention on the analysis of "social acts", "determinations", and the 
distinctions between the moral and legal spheres. It is found that 
Reinach's philosophical position can be adequately understood and 
evaluated only as a w~ole. Confusions in the literature dealing with 
Reinach's legal philosophy indeed appear to have arisen precisely through 
lack of attention to its theoretical structure. Arguments are presented 
for various qualifications and extensions of Reinach's position. An annotated 
bibliography and the first English translation of excerpts from Reinach's 
unpublished manuscripts are provided. 
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SOMMAIRE 
La th~se interprets t analyse et evalue 1' oeuvre philosophique· 
d'Adolf Reinach et son r8le dans le d6veloppement de la jeune phenomenologie. 
Lea suppositions ontologiques et 6pistemologiques de Reinach sont elucid6es 
a travers une analyse de ses theories des etats de choses, de l'intentionalite' 
et des jugements, d 'abord develow'es par Reinach pour les jugements et 
subs6quemment utilisees dans son analyse de problemes lthique et juridique. 
/ Une analyse et une evaluation de sa philosophie juridique se concentrent 
sur l'analyse des "aetas sociaux", "determinations", et les distinctions 
entre les spheres morale et juridique. On constate que la position, 
philosophique de Reinach ne peut 3tre convenablement comprise qu'en etant 
consideree comma un tout. Precis~ment, il semble que la confusion dans les 
ecrits consacres k Reinach vienne d'un manque d'attention A la structure 
theorique. On presente des arguments pour ,qualifier et prolonger.la• position 
de Reinach. On y trouve egalement une bibliographie annot~e et la premi~re 
traduction anglaise d'extraits des manuscripts inedits de Reinach. 
PREFACE 
Adolf Reinach, whose articles· contain some of the clearest and 
most thorough analyses from the early period of phenomenology, was a 
central figure in the development of this philosophical movement. He 
has been referred to as "the phenomenologist among phendmenologists, 11 
"the phenomenologist in itself and as such" (Hedwig Conrad-Martius), 1 
2 
and as the "evil demon" of phenomenology (H. L. Van Breda), . all super-
latives of a sort which indicate that Reinach is a figure to be reckoned 
with in phenomenology. 
Reinach's academic and philosophic work was done within the span 
of remarkably few years. He received the doctorate in 1905 four years 
after entering university at the age of seventeen and qualified for 
appointment as a lecturer, four years later, in 1909. Four years sub-
sequent to this, in 1913, his magnum opus in legal philosophy, "Die 
apriorischen Grundlagen des bUrgerlichen Rechtes, 11 was published. By 
the end of 1917 Reinach was dead. He was a gifted thinker, whose work 
is of intrinsic philosophic interest quite apart from its relation to 
the development of phenomenology and whose early death may be regarded 
as a profound loss to philosophy. 3 
1Foreward, Adolf Reinach, Was ist Ph~nomenologie? (Munich: K~sel, 
1951), p. 7. 
2
oral communication, April, 1969. 
3 The reader may wish to refer to Appendix IV, for an English trans-
.lation of the memorial article by Edmund Husserl, 11Adolf Reinach," 
Kantstudien, XXIII (1919), 147-49, which contains Husserl's assessment 
of Reinach's philosophic work. 
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Reinach's work is virtually inaccessible to the English-speaking 
philosopher. Herbert Spiegelberg's book, The Phenomenological Movement: 
A Historical Introductio~, offers in a brief sketch the only introductio~ 
to Reinach's philosophic work as a whole available in English. The 1914 
lecture nUber Phlinomenologie, !r of w':lich there are two English translations, 
is the only piece of writing by Reinach which has been published in 
English. The section on Reinach in John Oesterreicher's book, Walls are 
Crumbling, deals primarily with Reinach's religious thought and, due to 
Oesterreicher's generous use of conjecture, is of dubious critical value. 
In German publications there has been, by comparison, far more 
discussion and criticism of Reinach's work, particularly of his legal 
philosophy. Reinach's legal philosophy has also been discussed in French, 
Spanish, and Italian publications. Alexander von Baeyer's dissertation 
(1969) provided the most complete bibliography and resume of criticism 
of Reinach's work available up to that time, although once again emphasis 
was placed on his legal philosophy. 
The following dissertation is designed to provide the English-
speaking philosophic community with a critical introduction to Adolf 
Reinach's work. An account of critical reaction to Reinach's work and of 
research influenced by it is aiso given. It is hoped that this disserta-
tion may thus serve as a useful study and research tool . 
. The "Historical Introduction" gives a fuller view of Reinach' s 
academic life than has been available previously and should help the 
reader to understand why Reinach's impact on the development of early 
phenomenology was so much greater than might have been expected from the 
short duration (five years) of his teaching career and his young age 
0 (thirty-four years) at the time of his death. 
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Chapter I, "Philosophical Introduction," sketches the broad out-
lines of the relationships between the work of Husserl and Reinach, 
attempts to present Reinach's general view of the nature and task of 
phenomenology and then introduces the specialized problem with which 
the central chapters are concerned--the interplay of Reinach's theories 
of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and judgments. This is not only 
a thread sustained throughout Reinach's writings, but also a problem in 
the theory of knowledge whose significance in the early GHttingen 
phenom~nology is analogous to that of Husserl's theory of constitution 
in the Ideen and subsequent writings. 
Chapter II, "States-of-Affairs," sketches the development of the 
use of the term 11states-of-affairs" and then discusses·Reinach's theory 
of states-of-affairs and the problems generated or left unresolved by 
that theory. 
Chapter III, "Intentionality," and Chapter IV, "Judgments and 
Propositions," also develop their topics historically and critically. 
The last section of Chapter IV attempts to clarify some of the questions 
arising from Chapters II-IV. It is asked whether states-of-affairs are 
"!!.priori," and whether the fundamental assumption that the structure 
of thought and language correspond to the structure of objectivity is 
defensible. 
Chapter V is concerned with Reinach's legal philosophy. Section 
A is devoted primarily to a description of his legal philosophy. The 
range of critical reaction to Reinach's legal philosophy in the litera-
ture is indicated in the notes. Section B examines Reinach's method 
for concrete analysis of problems in philosophy of law. Reinach's analysis 
c of the distinction between the moral and legal spheres, the analysis of 
V 
"social acts," the analysis of 11promises," and the analysis of positive 
Law as the product of 11determinations 11 or "enactments" (Bestimmungen), 
are the principal subjects. The comparison of Reinach's analysis of 
"social acts" with the "linguistic analytic" treatment of performatives, 
linguistic and non-linguistic, may contribute to dialogue between 
practitioners of the phenomenological and analytic approaches. Section 
C attempts to evaluate the significance of the threefold theoretic 
structure of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and judgments, considered 
in the previous chapters, for Reinach's legal philosophy and ethics. The 
controversy over synthetic and analytic judgments is discussed. Section 
D contains an assessment of the over-all strong and weak points of 
Reinach's legal philosophy. 
Chapter VI, "General Evaluation of Reinach's Work," attempts to 
identify what is of present interest and lasting value in Reinach's work. 
Appendix I, an evaluation and comparison of the two English 
translations of Reinach's 1914 Marburg lecture, "tiber Ph1'nomenologie, 11 
is offered to the English-speaking reader as an aid in reading these 
translations. Appendices II and III contain English translations based 
on the Nachlass of the unpublished Reinach piece, "On the Phenomenology 
of Premonitions" (Zur Ph.\lnomenologie .£.'=.!. Ahnungen), and of the two un-
published sections of his fragment on the philosophy of religion. Edmund 
Husserl's memorial article, "Adolf Reinach, 11 (Kantstudien, XXIII (1919), 
147-49) is given in an English translation, also for the first time, in 
Appendix IV. 
The key sources for this work are, of course, the published philo-
0 
sophic work of Reinach and the unpublished Reinach Nachlass. The 
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University of GHttingen retains no Reinach letters or manuscripts although 
the Archives .there do include his 11Lebenslauf" among the records concern-
ing Reinach's Habilitation (process of qualifying for the rank of lecturer). 
This "Lebenslauf" contains a useful biography, particularly in respect to 
his academic training. 
Dr. E. Ave-Lallemant, Munich, kindly provided me with access to 
numerous relevant materials in his personal possession. These include a 
copy of the Reinach Nachlass, letters written by Reinach to Theodor 
Conrad (Nachlass T. Conrad), untranscribed notes of Reinach lectures 
taken by Margrete Ortmann (Hamburg), an account of the early period of 
phenomenology by Theodor Conrad (Nachlass T. Conrad), and the Protokolle 
of the GHttinger Philosophische Gesellschaft for the winter semester 
1912/13. Dr. E. Ave-Lallemant also allowed me to read the early sections 
of his own manuscript, "Ph~nomenologie und Realitlit," which provide a 
valuable addition to the discussion of the history of the early phenomena-
logical period. 
The Reinach Nachlass (for details see bibliography) contains only 
notes and short essays from the World War I period. All other notes, 
letters, and papers were destroyed by his wife, Anna Reinach, before her 
emigration from Germany prior to World War II. It should be regarded as 
possible, however, that some materials may still exist in the possession 
of Reinach's personal friends or their heirs and may eventually be given 
to appropriate libraries and archives. 
I wish to thank Miss Corinna Delkeskamp, Mag. phil., University of 
Bonn, and Dr. H. G, Senger, University of Cologne, for their insightful 
and painstaking help in the correction of the translations in the 
Appendices; Professor Manfred Moritz, Lund University, and Dr. Alexander 
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von Baeyer, Stuttgart, for sending me copies of their unpublished work; 
Professor Herbert Spiegelberg, Washington University, St. Louis, for 
his encouragement; Giovanna Fox, Montreal, for her assistance in trans-
lating sections of Norberto Bobbio's L 1 indirizzo fenomenologico nella 
filosofia sociale ~ giuridica; Professor H. L. Van Breda, Louvain, whose 
remarks first directed my attention to Reinach's work; and Professor 
Raymond Klibansky, who not only recognized the potential of the subject 
for a dissertation and suggested that I pursue it, but also provided me 
with patient and thoughtful guidance throughout the period of the 
preparation of the manuscript. 
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Historical Introduction 
Adolf Reinach, a son of the manufacturerWilhelm Reinach, was bofn 
on December 23, 1883 in Mainz. The family was Jewish. Reinach lived and 
studied in }~inz until he entered university in Munich in the Fall of 
1901. In Munich he studied philosophy and psychology under the direction 
of Theodor Lipps.l Reinach studied in Berlin during the summer semester 
of 1903. 2 
In 1902 and 1903 the Akademisch-Psychologischer Verein, a club 
organized by older students of Lipps and led primarily by Johannes 
Daubert3 and Alexander Pf~nder4, became the forum in Munich for discussion 
of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen.s Lipps unsuccessfully defended his 
own work before the club and the result was a stampede of Lipps' students 
1The psychologist whose work is important both in itself as it 
develops the art of descriptive psychology and for the understanding of 
the formulation of Husserl's attack in the Logische Untersuchungen on 
"logical psychologism" (the doctrine whereby laws of logic are based on 
psychological laws). 
2Adolf Reinach, "Lebenslauf", copied by Dr. Alexander von Baeyer 
from University (Ggttingen) records concerning Reinach's Habilitation;--
cited henceforth as "Lebenslauf". 
3Johannes Daubert was an older student of Lipps who never finished 
his formal studies and though he wrote manuscripts and saved them, 
published noth Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: 
! Historical Introduction, Phaenomenologica, Vols. V and VI (2nd ed.; The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhof£, 1965), p. 171;--cited henceforth as Spiegelberg, PM. 
4see Spiegelberg, PM, pp. 173-192. 
5Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (2 vo1s. ; Halle: Max 
Niemeyer, 1900-1901),--cited henceforth as LU1. 
Logische Untersuchungen (I, II.l, 3tn ed.; 11.2, 4th ed.; Tlibingen: 
Max Niemeyer, 1968), Reprinted from the 2n~ edition;--cited henceforth as 
LU2. 
Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay (2 vols.; London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul);--cited henceforth as LI. 
1 
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to a closer study of Husserl's work. 1 In January of 1904 Reinach reported 
to Theodor Conrad that he was working exclusively on Husserl. 2 Reinach 
and Alfred Schwenninger had been among the first to follow Daubert into . 
study of the Logische Untersuchungen. Theodor Conrad then took the Logische 
!Jntersuchungen up at Reinach's suggestion and under its influence soon 
transferred his attention from physics and mathematics to philosophy. 3 
During the summer semester of 1904 Husserl himself spoke before the club 
in Munich. 4 
On December 20, 1904, Reinach received the doctorate in philosophy 
under Theodor Lipps, his secondary subjects (Nebenf~cher) being criminal 
law and history.s His dissertation6 was concerned with the concept of 
cause in criminal law and though it is not at all noteworthy for any 
application of phenomenological methods (but rather belongs squarely in 
the Lipps tradition), it demonstrates the same attention to detail and 
clarity of description characteristic of Reinach's later work. 
1 . Spiegelberg, PM, p. 171. 
2Adolf Reinach, Letter to Theodor Conrad, dated January 22, 1904, in 
"Letters to Theodor Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius," Untranscribed, 
Nachlass T. Conrad, in the possession of Dr. E. Ave-Lallemant, Munich. 
Letters from this group will henceforth be referred to as: Letter(s) AR to 
TC, date(s). 
3Eberhard Ave-Lallemant, "Phlinomenologie and Realittit," Author's 
typewritten manuscript, p. 33; (Comment based on oral reports of Alfred 
Schwenninger and Theodor Conrad);--Manuscript cited henceforth as: 
Ave-Lallemant, PR. 
4spiegelberg, PM, p. 172 and p. 174. S"Lebenslauf". 
6Adolf Reinach, 
(Leipzig: Barth, 1905). 
" Uber den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht 
3 
The !!first secession" of the Lipps students,·as it has been 
called,l took place during the summer semester of 1905. Reinach, Daubert, 
Schwenninger, and Dr. Weinmann were among this first group. 2 Husserl gave 
lectures during this semester on the theory of judgments and the general 
history of philosophy. 3 Theodor Conrad recalled that the reaction of the 
Munich students to the Husserl they found in G~ttingen was that of 
astonishment; his position differed in important points from that of the 
Husserl whose work they had studied in Munich.4 
Reinach's personal reaction is best seen in the following excerpts 
from a letter to Theodor Conrad during this period: 
.... I am very satisfied with the stay in Ggttingen. I have already 
written to you how nice Husserl is to us. My scientific expectations 
have been more than met ... I cannot assert that my philosophic 
convictions have undergone any fundamental changes. Long before 
GHttingen I had indeed already, like all of us, been pointed in a 
different direction by Husserl, Natorp, Kant, Plato; all that I 
have experienced since our separation could only strengthen me 
in that. The most beneficial thing Husserl can provide is the 
cautious and thorough method. Daubert has that in common with him; 
and exactly in this respect I feel myself a bit a sinner. 
In the beginning I had great yearning for Lipps and J:1unich. 
Everything in GHttingen was so strange and new; and the desire to 
work was lacking completely. That luckily soon changed ... We Munichers 
meet together often ... two to three times a week Husserl brings us 
together ... 
Next semester I come back to Munich. My heart has been of 
course very undecided: on the one side Husserl, on the other Lipps, 
you, Geiger, Munich. And the issue has been decided by Juris-
prudence. I must spend at least three semesters in Munich before 
1Av~-Lallemant, PR, p. 34, n.3 (oral report of Alfred Schwenninger); 
and, Gerda Walther, Zum anderen Ufer: Vom Marxismus und Atheismus zum 
Christentum (Remagen: Otto Reichl, 1960), p. 379. 
2Ave-Lallemant, Ibid., 3Ibid. , n. 4. 
4Theodor Conrad, "An die Mlinchner Phi:lnomenologengruppe von 1953-54," 
(Bericht), typewritten, Nachlass T. Conrad in the possession of Dr. E. Ave-
Lallemant, Munich, p. 4;--cited henceforth as: T. Conrad, Bericht. 
c 
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my examinations; but I must take my examinations soon, so that· 
as fast as possible I can tell a few law students in a lecture 
that there can be no poorer thing on earth than a lawyer who is 
merely a lawyer .. l 
In preparation for the state examination in law Reinach returned 
to Munich in the Fall of 1905 and remained there until the Fall of 1906 when 
" 2 he went to Tubingen. The practical aim of gaining a means of livelihood 
more dependable than philosophy, rather than solely the desire to master a 
single science in preparation for philosophic work, 3 probably motivated 
him to complete his legal studies. While in TUbingen Reinach clearly 
longed to return to the study of philosophy and to be with the Munich 
philosophical circle. 4 
In June 1907, after the state law examination, Reinach went again 
to study in Gbttingen, the semester then being half over.s It was during 
1Mit dem Ggttinger Aufenthalt bin ich sehr zufrieden. Wie nett 
Hus~erl mit uns ist, habe ich Ihnen schon geschrieben. Meine 
wissenschaftlichen Erwartungen sind mehr als erfllllt warden ... Dass meine 
" " philos. Uberzeugungen irgendwie fundamentale Veranderungen erlitten 
h~tten, kann ich nicht behaupten. Lange vor Ggttingen war ich ja schon 
von Husserl, Natorp, Kant, Plato aus, wie wir alle, in eine andere Richtung 
gewiesen warden; alles, .was ich seit unserer Trennung erfahren habe, 
konnte mich darin nur bestMrken. Das Heilsamste, was Husserl geben kann, 
ist die vorsichtige und grUndliche Arbeitsweise. Die hat Daubert mit ihm 
gemein;. und gerade in diesem Punkt £Uhle ich mich ein wenig als sUnder. 
Nach Lipps und Munchen hatte ich am Anfang grosse Sehnsucht. Alles 
in Ggttingen war so fremd und neu; und Arbeitslust fehlte Uberhaupt. 
Das hat sich dann glUcklicher Weise bald geMndert ... Wir MUnchner kommen 
hier viel zusammen... zwei- bis dreimal in der l\foche vereinigt uns Husserl. 
Im nMchsten Semester komme ich wieder nach MUnchen. Mein Herz hat 
allerdings sehr geschwankt: Auf der einen Seite Husserl, auf der anderen 
Lipps, Sie, Geiger, MUnchen. Und den Ausschlag gegeben hat die 
Jurisprudenz. Ich muss mindestens drei Semester vor meinen Examen in 
MUnchen verbringen; mein Examen aber muss ich bald machen, schon damit 
ich mSglichst schnell ein paar juristischen Studenten vortragen kann, class 
es kein Urmeres Ding auf Erden geben kann, als einen Juristen, der nur 
Jurist ist .... 11 Letter AR to TC, June 10, 1905. 
2
"Lebens lauf". 3"Lebenslauf". 
4Letters AR to TC, late 1906 or early 1907 to Munich, and April 
23, 1907 to G8ttingen. 
S"Lebenslauf". 
5 
this summer semester that the split between the GHttingen and Munich views 
of phenomenology to which Conrad referred in his Bericht 1 first became 
clear. 2 Husserl delivered five lectures from April 26th to May 2nd which· 
introduced the phenomenological reduction, the pure phenomenon, a variety 
of types of immanence and transcendence, and the theory of constitution. 3 
Both this further development in Husserl's work beyond the stage of the 
Logische Untersuchungen and the relative isolation of the Munich group 
before this semester probably contributed to the dismay of the "immigrant" 
students. 4 The situation was such that Reinach wrote to Conrad in the 
Fall of 1907 in the following vein: 
... I should tell you about Daubert? ... I have told him much 
about GHttingen and he was very much in agreement about all our 
problems, especially our attitude towards Husserl. He is of the 
opinion--which lies completely in your direction--, that one can 
really doubt, whether real phenomenology, as one pursued it in 
Munich, has its root with Husserl. 
He is not adverse to Husserl's plan to edit treatises. Only 
he much fears all too great dissensions 5 
1 See above, p. 3. 2Ave-Lallemant, PR, p. 42. 
3Edmund Husserl, Die Idee der Ph~nomenologie, FUn£ Vorlesungen (1907), 
ed. by Wal ter Biemel, Vol. II of Husserliana, ed. by H. L. Van Breda (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), --cited henceforth as Idee .. The Idea £!.. 
Phenomenology, trans. by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970),--cited henceforth as Idea. 
4rt was at the end of this semester that the satirical 
"Phaenor!lenologenlied", was composed by Alfred van Sybel. See, Alwin Diemer, 
Edmund Husserl: Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner PhMnomenologie 
(Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Rain, 1956), p. 38. 
5
" ... Von Daubert soll ich Ihnen erz~hlen? ... Ich habe ihm viel von 
G8ttingen erz~hlt und er war mit all unseren Problemen sehr einverstanden, 
besonders mit unserer Stellungnahme zu Husserl. Er meint - was ganz in 
Ihrer Richtlinie liegt - , class man eigentlich bezweifeln k8nne, ob die 
eigentliche Ph~nomenologie, wie man sie in MUnchen betreibe, bei Husserl 
ihre Wurzel habe. Dem Plane Husserls, Abhandlungen herauszugeben, ist er 
nicht abgeneigt. Nur fUrchtet er sehr all zu grosse Unstimmigkeiten .... 11 
Letter AR to TC, Munich to Bergzabern. 
6 
Wilhelm Schapp, from the perspective of having been a student 
11 in Gottingen as early as 1905, speaks of the "Invasion from Munich" in 
1907. The Munich group clearly made their presence \vell felt and Schapp 
speaks of discussions taking place with them day and night. To him they 
seemed "far more advanced" than the Ggttingen students and seemed to lack 
the latter's "unquestioning belief. 11 Schapp remembers Reinach to have 
criticized Husserl for his turn towards the Neo-Kantian position of the 
:t-1arburg School. 1 
Theodor Conrad recalls that the Munich students of Lipps had welcomed 
the methods directed to the objective by Husserl in the Logische Untersuchungen 
rather than any particular doctrine or his concern with phenomenology as a 
science. 2 The phenomenological reduction thus met with opposition insofar 
as it was seen as leading toward entanglement with problems of the theory 
of knowledge and its subjective basis, and away from a direct approach to 
the objective.3 
It is not clear whether Reinach shared Conrad's attitude toward 
problems in the theory of knowledge. His Lebenslauf for the Habilitation 
emphasizes that his studies with Husserl were in logic and the theory of 
knowledge. This question will be brought up later in connection with 
Reinach' s philosophic writings. At this point, one needs primarily to 
understand the desire of many of the former students of Lipps and early 
students of phenomenology to "get on" with the business of description of 
essences rather than to be drawn or "side-tracked" into criticism of the 
epistemological basis for such research, particularly since this criticism 
~ilhelm Schapp, "Erinnerungen an Husserl", in Edmund Husserl 
1859-1959: Recueil commemoratif publie ~!'occasion du centenaire de la 
naissance du philosophe. Phaenomenologica, Vol. IV (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1959), p. 20; --cited henceforth as Wm. Schapp, "Husserl". 
2T.Conrad, Bericht, p. 3. 3Ibid., p. 5. 
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appeared to mary of these students as a reversal to the subjectivism, and 
even psychologism, from which they had been granted a reprieve by the 
Logische Untersuchungen. 
The G8ttinger Philosophische Gesellschaft1 was formed at this time 
and led at first by Theodor Conrad. Problems in philosophy of language and 
judgments were among the main topics initially discussed. Conrad 2 and Schapp 
report that the first topic taken up in the Ggttingen discussions was that of 
the connection of word and meaning, concept and object (Gegenstand), Schapp 
being under the impression that these discussions were but continuations of 
those begun in Munich. 3 Theodor Conrad recalled that the object-state of 
affairs (Gegenstand-Sachverhalt) problematic (a topic of debate previously 
in the Munich Lipps seminar) involved the attempt to determine the unique 
sphere of the object-state of affairs as opposed to that of judgments. 4 Thus 
h 11 • t e Gott~nger Philosophische Gesellschaft, involving many former Lipps 
students, with their particular topics of interest and reading of the Logische 
Untersuchungen, was a new and potent force in the group'of students forming 
around Husserl at this time. 5 
1The precise date when this name was adopted is unclear. Professor 
Spiegelberg gives 1910 as the year when the meetings became formalized (PM, 
p. 170), while Theodor Conrad uses the name as though it referred back to--
1907 (see T. Conrad, Bericht, p. 6). 
2T. Conrad, Bericht, p. 6 . 
. 
3wm. Schapp, "Husserl", p. 21. It is probable that Theodor Conrad 1 s 
"Sprachphilosophische Untersuchungen," I. Teil, Archiv fUr gesamte Psychologie, 
XIX (1910), 395-474, is representative of some of these early discussions. 
Reinach's "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils", MUnchener Philosophische 
Abhandlungen (Lipps-Festscrift), (Leipz : Barth, 1911), 196-254, contributes 
to discussion of the Gegenstand-Sachverhalt problematic mentioned above. 
4T. Conrad, Bericht, p. 6. 
5The only written record of these meetings known still to exist is 
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Reinach qualified for the position of lecturer (Privatdozent) in 
" the university in Gottingen in 1909 with a work entitled ''Wesen und Systematik 
des Urteils."1 This work itself is no longer extant, but the comments made 
on it by Edmund Husserl, Baumann, and G. E. MUller, and retained in the 
Archives of the University of G8ttingen, indicate that its theses correspond 
to those of the first part of the "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" 
(1911). 2 
The years 1911-13 were marked by a steady flow of publications of 
works by Reinach. "Kants Auffassung des Rumeschen Problems" (1911) 3 and "Die 
obersten Regeln der VernunftschlUsse bei Kant" (1911) 4 are in part articles 
on historical problems, but approach these problems by means of an investi-
ion of the relations of the ~ priori, the necessary and the universal, 
to states-of-affairs (Sachverhalte) and concepts. "Zur Theorie des negativen 
Urteils (1911) 5 develops a theory of negative and positive judgments as 
the Protokolle for the winter semester, 1912/13. In this semester they were 
led by Jean Rering and the subject was the VI Untersuchungen. See: "Protokolle 
der G8ttinger Philosophischen Gesellschaft", winter semester 1912/13, Untrans-
cribed notes taken by Margrete Ortmann, Hamburg. In the personal possession of 
Dr. E. Ave-Lallemant, Munich. 
Edith Stein comments that when she first came to Ggttingen for the 
summer semester 1913 the original founders of the Gesellschaft no longer 
participated, including Jean Hering who had returned home to Strasbourg to 
study for his Staatsexamen; Aus ~ Leben einer jUdischen Familie (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1965), p. 171;--cited henceforth as: Edith Stein, Leben. 
1
"Lebenslauf". 
2A1exander von Baeyer, "Adolf Reinachs Ph~nomenologie: Untersuchungen 
zum Verh~1tnis von ph~nomenologischer Forschung und Geschichtlichkeit," 
Dissertation, Faculty of Philosophy, Univers Bern, (Munich: Mikrokopie, 
1969), p. 145, n. 12. 
3zeitschrift flir Philosophie und phi1osophische Kritik, CXLI (1911), 
176-209. Reprinted in the Gesammelte Schriften (HaEe: Max Niemeyer, 1921);--
cited henceforth as it appears in the Gesammelte Schriften, as KAH,GS. 
4Kantstudien, XVI (1911), 214-233. Reprinted in the Gesammelte 
Schriften (Ha11e: Max Niemeyer, 1921);--cited henceforth as it appears in the 
latter as: RVK,GS. 
5MUnchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (Lipps-Festschrift), (Leipzig: 
Earth, 1911), 196-254. Reprinted in the Gesammelte .Schriften (Halle: Max 
Niemeyer, 1921); cited hereafter as it appears in the latter as NU,GS. 
11convictions" and "assertions" about states-of-affairs (Sachverhalte). 
In the course of the article Reinach 1 s theories of states-of-affairs 
(Sachverhalte) and intentionality are also developed. "Die Uberlegung; 
ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung" (1912) 1 is of significance for 
J.t,gal philosophy and ethics in its demonstration of the complex nature 
9 
of reflection and the quite diverse implications of reflection in various 
situations. The immediate context for this discussion was the use by 
German law of the time of reflection or premeditation as a criterion for 
distinguishing murder and man-slaughter. "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des 
bUrgerlichen Rechtes'' (1913) 2 has as its central thesis the notion that there 
are a priori3 legal truths which are presupposed by positive law. This is 
the best known and most widely discussed of Reinach's works. 
Husserl's Ideen I, which like Reinach's "Die apriorischen Grundlagen 
11 des burgerlichen Rechtes" appeared in 1913 in the first volume of the new 
Jahrbuch flir Philosophie und ph~nomenologische Forschung,4 created a storm 
of protest among the GHttingen students. Edith Stein recollected that the 
"young phenontenologists" then in GHttingen were "all realists" and could not 
follow Husserl in this development which seemed to them a turn backwards to 
idealism. 5 At first thought it may appear surpising that Ideen I came as such 
lzeitschrift flir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, CXLVIII (1912), 
181-196, CXLIX (1913), 30-58. Reprinted in the Gesammelte Schriften (Halle: 
11 Max Niemeyer, 1921); --cited henceforth as UB,GS. 
2Jahrbuch flir Philosophie und ph~nomenologische Forschung, I (1913), 
685-847. Reprinted in the Gesammelte Schriften (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921);--
cited henceforth as it appears in the latter as aGbR,GS. 
3~ priori not in the Kantian sense, but rather due to essential connec-
tions (Wesenszusammenh~nge) which entail an ontological universality and necessity. 
4The plan to prepare a publication of articles 
above p. 5, last sentence of quote from Letter AR to TC. 
the original co-editors. 
SEdith Stein, Leben, p. 174. 
was an old one. See 
Reinach was one of 
0 
10 
a shock to many of Husserl's students. Roman Ingarden provided some 
explanation for their reaction in his account of lectures given by Husserl 
preceding the publication of Ideen I. Ingarden remembers the lectures on 
logic to have concealed Husserl's long dissatisfaction with the point of 
view of the Logische Untersuchungen, and given the impression that it was 
only necessary 11 to set forth the structure of the single logical object-
1 ivities, which was not yet accomplished in the Logische Untersuchungen." 
Husserl's lectures in 1911 on ethics and value theory were based on those 
of the winter semester, 1908/09. 2 The seminars and lectures were virtually 
the only source for a student to find out what Husserl had been thinking 
since the Logische Untersuchungen3 and Ingarden notes that these were too 
hard for the average student. 4 Nor were Husserl's lectures or seminars 
accessible to one who had not already been introduced to phenomenology and we 
may assume that such an introduction, until 1913, would have consisted of 
reading the Logische Untersuchungen and talking with advanced students, many 
of whom were active in the Philosophische Gesellschaft. Moreover, Ingarden 
asserts that there was a "realistic tone" to Husserl's lectures and seminars, 
even the lecture in the summer semester, 1913, on "Nature and Mind", which 
was projected as the core of Ideen 11. 5 
Meanwhile Reinach had also been giving lectures and exercises with 
a "realistic tone" in which.Jean Hering, Alexander Koyre, Hedwig Conrad-
Martius, Edith Stein, Rudolf Clemens, Hans Lipps, and Alex Rosenblum, either 
had taken or were taking part. 6 The Philosophische Gesellschaft continued 
1Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden: Mit Erl~uterungen und 
Erinnerungen an Husserl, ed. by Roman Ingarden, Phaenomenologica, Vol. XXV 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 108. 
2Ibid. , p. 110. 
Srbid. , p. 113. 
3
rbid. , p. 112. 
6Ibid, , p. 113. 
4. 
Ibid. , p. 111. 
-c 
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to provide a forum for "realistic phenomenology." 
Roman Ingarden made the following comments about Adolf Reinach as 
a teacher: 
When I think back on the G8ttingen study years, I cannot leave 
the figure and effect of Adolf Reinach unmentioned. His short 
teaching activity indeed had lasting impact, for in the last years 
before the First World War the young phenomenologists rallied 
around him. He was a good teacher and above all the brilliant 
leader of the philosophical exercises. In the "Exercises for 
Advanced Students" he himself always outlined a central problem 
which was then worked on in the course of the school year. The 
most interesting and instructive seminar in the last year of his 
activity was dedicated to the problems of movement. The formu-
lations of the problems he gave were clear and sharp, the answers 
he gave to the participants in the exercises were clearly, pre-
cisely, and briefly expressed, the refutations with which he 
defended his position were striking, he knew how to present 
examples which were vivid and convincing. And what was especially 
valuable was the fact that he had the capability to immediately 
understand and place in the correct context of the problem our 
often awkwardly formulated questions or assertions. The course 
of the discussions was left to the participants, Reinach himself 
functioning apparently simply as the custodian so that one did 
not go astray. But he was actually the heart of the joint 
work, the active mind, opening up in a creative attitude new ways 
and aspects of research, who never lost his activity, his grip 
in difficult situations, his presence of mind. Thus one was 
brought through him to the attitude of creative philosophizing and 
one could rejoice in participating in the development of a new 
philosophy, though one was in fact merely a philosophizing child. 1 
1 •~enn ich an die G8ttinger Studienjahre zUruckdenke, so kann ich die 
Gestalt und die Wirkung Adolf Reinachs nicht unerw~hnt lassen. Seine kurze 
Lehrt~tigkeit hatte doch dauerhafte Wirkungen gehabt, da sich urn ihn in 
den letzten Jahren vor dem ersten Weltkriege die jungen Ph~nomenologen 
scharten. Er war ein guter Lehrer u. vor allem gl~nzender Leiter der 
philosophischen Dbungen. In den "Ubungen fUr Fortgeschrittene" hat er stets 
selbst ein Zentralproblem entworfen, an dem dann im Laufe des Schuljahres 
gearbeitet wurde. Das interessanteste u. lehrreichste Seminar war in dem 
letzten Jahre seiner T~tigkeit den Problemen der Bewegung gewidmet. Klar 
u. scharf waren die von ihm gegebenen Problemformulierungen, klarn pr~zis 
u. kurz gefasst waren die Antworten, die er den Teilnehmern der "Ubungen" 
gab, schlagend waren die ZurUckweisungen, mit denen er seinen Standpunkt 
verteidigte, lebendig u. Uberzeugend die Beispiele,die er anzufUhren 
wusste. Und was besonders kostbar war, war der Umstand, dass er die 
F~higkeit hat.te, unsere oft ungeschickt formulierten Fragen oder Behauptungen 
c 
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This view of Reinach is supplemented by Edith Stein's comment that Reinach 
-v;as Husserl' s right hand and the "connecting link" (Bindeglied) between Husserl 
aDd the students, because Reinach was an excellent judge of others while 
Husserl was quite helpless in this respect. A friend had advised her that 
Gl! • f when one cane to ott1ngen one went first to Reinach, who then took care o 
h . 1 everyt Lng. 
Three volumes of notes made by Margrete Ortmann from Reinach's 
lectures indicate a traditional range of subjects. The lecture on Kant, 
winter semester, 1910/11, dealt with various works. In the winter semester, 
1911/12, there was a lecture on "Freedom of the Will" in which the problem 
was dealt with historically, as well as exercises on Descartes. The notes 
on his "Introduction to Philosophy" (summer semester, 1913) are perhaps of 
the most interest in relation to phenomenology. The topics discussed were: 
a) inner and outer perception, b) problems in constitution of objects with 
reference to Plato, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Schopenhauer, 
sofort richtig zu verstehen u. in den richtigen Problemzusammenhang 
hineinzustellen. Der Gang der Diskussionen war den Teilnehmern Uberlassen, 
Reinach selbst fungierte anscheinend bloss als der Hilter, dass man nicht 
auf Abwege geriet. Im Grunde aber war er das Herz der gemeinsamen Arbeit, 
der lebendige, gerade in sch8pferischer Einstellung neue Forschungswege und 
Aspekte ergffnende Geist, der seine Aktivit~t, sein Zugreifen in schwierigen 
Situationen, seine Geistesgegenwart nie verlor. So war man durch ihn in die 
Einstellung schgpferischen Philosophierens gebracht u. man konnte sich der 
Teilnahme am Werden einer neuen Philosophie erfreuen, so sehr man doch in 
\.Jirklichkeit ein philosophierendes Kind war." Ibid, pp. 113-114. Reinach' s 
notes for the "exercises for advanced students" on movement, mentioned here 
by Ingarden, formed the basis of the work on movement in the Gesammelte 
(Halle: Niemeyer, 1921)--(henceforth referred to. as: GS). Edith 
Stein, who participated in these exercises and later edited the;-for the 
GS, found Reinach's notes to be worked out in far greater detail than she 
had anticipated from the spontaneous appearance of his delivery of them. 
1Edith Stein, Leben, p. 172. 
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c) judgments and knowledge (up to the Neo-Kantians), d) logic, e) eth~cs. 
In January, 1914, Reinach gave a lecture in Marburg entitled 
11 Uber Ph~nomeno1ogie11 in which he chose to demonstrate the phenomenologica1 
method rather than give a discursive definition of phenomenology. 2 This 
lecture must have been short and lively and the brilliance of the published 
version gives the reader some clue of Reinach's talents as lecturer. It 
differs from his work designed expressly for publication in that it takes 
up a great diversity of phenomena in rapid order rather than focusing on a 
few related ones and analyzing in greater and greater detail. 
With the beginning of World War I much changed. Reinach need not 
have gone into the army, at least initially when younger people were avail-
able, but promptly enlisted as a volunteer and trained in Mainz. He had 
11 planned to use the influence of General von Grundell (retired, who had come 
to study phenomenology in Ggttingen) to gain entrance into the Army if his 
age had kept him out. 3 His subsequent disillusionment with the war is 
characterized by his reference in May 1916 to the war as "this monstrous 
event". 4 
Reinach remained active in editorial work on the Jahrbuch during the 
war . His ability to understand and interact well with others, which had 
11 
shown itself in Gottingen, remained. In misunderstandings between former 
1Adolf Reinach, Lectures on Introduction !£ Philosophy, summer 
semester 1913 (3 vols.), on Kant, winter semester 1910/11 (1 vol.), on Freedom 
of Will and Exercises on Descartes, winter semester 1911/12 (1 vol.), 
according to untranscribed notes taken by Margrete Ortmann, Hamburg. In 
the possession of Dr. E. Ave-Lallemant, Munich. 
2First printed in GS (1921), reprinted as "Was ist Ph1'nomenologie?" 
11 (Munich: Kosel, 1951). 
3Edith Stein, Leben, p. 213. 
4Letter AR to Anna Reinach, May 23, 1916, GS xxxvii. 
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students and colleagues he functioned as a peacemaker, his main expressed 
concern being less for personal differences than for the fate of 
1 phenomenology. 
During the war his attention turned to the philosophy of religion. 
B~r birth Jewish, Reinach received a Protestant baptism during a visit home 
2 from the front. The letters to Anna Reinach, his wife, and the selection 
from his fragments concerning the philosophy of religion, "Das Absolute", 
printed in the Gesammelte Schriften, give some idea of the direction this 
work might have taken. 3 There are in addition two unpublished sections 
from "BruchstUck einer religionsphilosophischen Ausfllhrung" dealing with the 
"Structure of Experience" and "Sceptical Reflections", and a small 
4 
collection of notes. Reinach's continuing interest in the theory of 
knowledge is demonstrat.ed in the well-written but unpublished two-page piece 
11 
entitled "Zur Phanomenologie der Ahnungen" (On the Phenomenology of 
5 Premonitions) dated July 1916 in Embagneux. 
Husserl, in the Nachruf in the Kantstudien after Reinach's death 
November 16, 19~7, remarked at length on the high quality and fundamental 
nature of the research published by Reinach. 6 A memorial address delivered 
1 
Letters AR to TC and H. Conrad-Martius, November 5 and September 
10, 1915. 
2Spiegelberg, PM, p. 172 3cs, Einleitung, xxviii-xxxvii. 
4
"Aufzeichnungen, 26 Juli 1916-3 Oktober 1917": including "Zur 
" . 11 Phanomenologie der Ahnungen," 11Bruchstuck einer religionsphilosophischen 
AusfUhrung, 11 and "Notizen". Typewritten manuscript compiled by AnnaReinach 
from Reinach's papers, Nachlass Adolf Reinach. An English translation of the 
two unpublished sections from the "BrUchstuck" is made available for the 
first time below in Appendix Ill. 
5Ibid., An English translation of "Zur Ph~nomenologie der Ahnungen" 
is made available for the first time below in Appendix II. 
6Kantstudien, XXIII (1919), 147-149. See Appendix IV below for a 
translation of this article. 
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11 in Gottingen December 31, 1917, remarks that Reinach could see clearly 
1 I·Jhere others saw only "thin threads like from spider webs". In the 
analysis of a thing or concept he could: 
see into its finest winkles and richest depths, and a wealth 
of thoughtful and observations of life flowed through 
this intuition of essences. Such evenings were always 
highpoints in the life of our Gesellschaft, for everyone an 
edifying no less than exhausting pleasure. 'The beginning of 
Philosophy is wonder.' These words of Plato, which he used 
to like to quote, then truly came to pass.2 
l"See1enworte zum Ged1'chtnis Ado1£ Reinachs", Nemorial address 
delivered 31 December 1917 in the name of the Ggttinger Graeca. Typewritten 
manuscript from Nach1ass Hedwig Conrad-Nartius, Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, 
Munich. 
2 
"in seine feinsten Falten und reichsten Tiefen sehen, und diese 
11 " Hesensschau war durchstromt von einer Fulle nacndenklicher und tiefer 
Lebensbeobachtung. Solche Abende waren immer Hohepunkte im Leben unserer 
11 Gesellschaft, fur alle ein ebenso erhebender wie anstrengender Genuss, 'Der 
Anfang der Philosophie ist das Staunen.' Dieses Hort Platos, das er gern 
zu zitieren pflegte, wurde dann zu wahrem Ereignis." Ibid. 
Chapter I 
Philosophical Introduction 
a) Husserl and Reinach. 
There are numerous points of explicit reference and affinity 
between the six investigations of the Logische Untersuchungen, which 
introduced phenomenology to Reinach, and Reinach's own writings. Central 
in general importance for Reinach's work are: 1) Husserl's use of a 
general procedure of investigation in which a zig-zag pattern of analytic 
clarification, systemization, analytic clarification, etc., dominates, 
thus establishing a precedent for the analysis and clarification of 
concepts as well as the analysis and clarification of essences and 
essential or ~priori laws, later adopted by Reinach and other phenomen-
ologists as a procedural method, 2) development of a priori laws (such 
laws had first been discovered by Carl Stumpf) 1 as the objective grounds 
for a systemization of essences, and 3) the introduction in the Sixth 
Investigation of many of the specific topics later investigated in 
greater detail by Reinach in his treatise, "Zur Theorie des negativen 
Urteils 11 • 
Husserl's lectures on internal time-consciousness, 2 given first 
in 1905 and then amended from 1905 to 1910, are of interest in connection 
with Reinach's studies on movement. 3 The lectures Husserl gave on axiology 
111, II, pp. 435-442. 
2
vorlesungen zur Ph~nomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Edited 
by Martin Heidegger (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1928). 
3'' Uber das Wesen der Bewegung," in the Gesammelte Schriften (Halle: 
Max Niemeyer, 1921). (Henceforth cited as WB,GS). 
- 16 -
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are of importance for both the legal and ethical philosophy of Reinach. 
The 1907 lectures on the "Idea of Phenomenology" were greeted with dismay 
by Husserl' s students a·nd Reinach' s letter to Theodor Conrad, quoted above, 1 
indicates that he felt Husserl had taken an abrupt turn in his development 
of phenomenology. There is, however, no clear evidence that Reinach 
repudiated either Husserl's introduction of the phenomenological reduction 
or his increasing attention to analysis of the processes of consciousness. 
In these, as in all other issues of interpretation, Reinach must be allowed 
to speak for himself through his writings. It is not acceptable simply to 
repeat comments which have been made about Reinach's position on such 
issues; there has been a strong tendency among critics simply to assert 
the existence of a yawning gulf between the position of Reinach and that 
of the Ideen and then to use Reinach as either an ally or as a straw-man. 
It is clear from the quotation below, as also from the Third and Fourth 
studies of the Logische Untersuchungen where the notion of eidetic sciences 
is developed, and from the comments in the Ideen about "regional ontologies 11 , 2 
that throughout this period Husserl continued to regard the study of the 
general essences of objectivities of any kind as phenomenological. 
What it means, that objectivity is, and manifests itself 
cognitively as so being, must precisely become evident purely 
from consciousness itself, and thereby it must become completely 
understandable. And for this is required a study of conscious-
ness in its entirety, since according to all its forms it 
enters into possible cognitive functions. To the extent, however, 
that every consciousness is 'consciousness-of', the essential 
study of consciousness includes also that of consciousness-
meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such. To study any 
kind of objectivity whatever according to its general essence 
(a study that can pursue interests fa'r removed from those of 
1 
See above, p. 5. 
2 Ideen I, pp. 37-38, p. 166. 
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knowledge theory and the investigation of consciousness) means 
to concern oneself with objectivity's modes of givenness and 
to exhaust its essential content in the processes of 'clarifica-
tion' proper to it. Even if the orientation is not that which 
is directed towards the kinds of consciousness and an essential 
investigation of them, still the method of clarification is 
such that even here reflection on the modes of being intended 
and of being given cannot be avoided. In any case, however, 
the clarification of all fundamental kinds of objectivities is 
for its part indispensable for the essential analysis of 
consciousness, and as a result is included in it, but primarily 
in an epistemological analysis, that finds its task precisely 
in the investigation of correlations. Consequently we include 
all such studies, even though relatively they are to be 
distinguished, under the title 'phenomenological'. 1 
In concluding these general comments on the relationships between 
the work of Husserl and Reinach particular attention should be given to the 
fundamental aspects of consciousness which Husserl identifies in the passage 
quoted above as subjects for study. In this context Husserl speaks of 
"consciousness-meaning," "consciousness-objectivity," and "an epistemological 
analysis, that finds its task precisely in the investigation of correlations." 
In other contexts Husserl stated the basic problem for investigation in 
different terminology with different emphases, but the problem in its 
starkest form--the nature of the relationship between consciousness and 
being--remains the same. The problems of the relationship of states-of-
affairs, propositions, and intentionality, Reinach's treatment of which is 
given detailed attention in the central chapters of this dissertation, are 
aspects of this fundamental problematic of the relationship between 
consciousness and being. 
1
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," Logos, I (1910-11), 
289-341. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," trans. and ed. by Quentin 
Lauer, in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, Harper Torchbooks 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965, pp. 69-147) pp. 90-91; --cited henceforth 
as PRS. 
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b) Reinach on phenomenology. 
1 The lecture given by Reinach on phenomenology in Marburg in 1914 
is perhaps the best introduction available to Reinach's particular phenomena-
logical position. As there is an acceptable published English translation2 
there is no need here for a lengthy explanation of its contents. Certain 
key theoretical points, however, may be identified. 
Reinach regarded phenomenology not as a system of statements and 
truths but primarily as a method of philosophizing. The aim in the face of 
any philosophic problem was to learn to see the essential characteristics of 
the subject rather than to circumscribe it in definitions. Analysis of 
the meaning of words and concepts was only a first step towards this 
analysis of the essences of the things themselves. Analysis of essences 
was in turn regarded as only a means to the discovery of essential laws. 
Essential laws, unlike any facts or factual connections about which sensible 
perception gives us information, were, according to Reinach, ~ priori and 
thus one of the most important subjects in philosophy. Reinach found the 
sphere of the ~ priori to have been subjectivized and arbitrarily restricted 
to a few areas in the past. He, by contrast, regarded the ~priori as 
objective. 3 Knowledge of final~ priori connections was to be grounded on 
the intuition of these a priori connections themselves. 
1Adolf Reinach, "Dber Ph~nomenologie," in the Gesammelte Schriften 
(Halle: Ma~ Niemeyer, 1921), pp. 378-405. Reprinted as Was ist PhMnomenologie? 
(Munich: Kosel, 1951). Cited henceforth, as it appears in the Gesammelte 
11 Schriften as UP,GS. 
2Dallas Willard, "Concerning Phenomenology," Personalist, L (1969), 
194-221. See below, Appendix I, for an evaluation of the two English trans-
lations of this lecture. 
3 See pp. 40-58, 76-81, 89-94, 116-21, 145-49, 176-239 below, on the 
ontological use of the term "~priori". 
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c) The central problem: the relationship of states-of-affairs, intentionality, 
and judgments. 
Phenomenology, though somewhat less so in its later developments, 
i-s open to the charges of being epistemologically naive, of lacking adequate 
criteria for a priori and eidetic judgments, and of having for the most 
part neglected the demand for a critique of evidence. These charges are 
~.,rell founded. It is not the case, however, that this situation arose from 
a simple disregard of the problems of the theory of knowledge. Husserl 
certainly cannot be said to have overlooked their significance; he returned 
repeatedly to questions concerning the possibility, grounds, limits, and 
nature of knowledge, of experience, and therefore of the relationship of 
consciousness and being. One of the key motivations for the gradual 
development of his phenomenology seems indeed to have been dissatisfaction 
with each of his attempts to dissolve these problems, 
The delight of at least some students in the phenomenology of 
volume I of the Logische Untersuchungen seemed to lie in large part in the 
release it provided from "subjectivism" and the presumed lack of need for 
1 further concern with questions of the theory of knowledge. In Reinach's 
writings, however, the questions of the relationship between consciousness 
and being, subjectivity and objectivity, acts of knowing, the formulations 
of knowledge, and the nature of the evidence for them, are fundamental. 
Reinach's theoretical approach to these questions, which focused on knowing, 
judgments, and the states-of-affairs to which they intentionally refer, 
was not identical with that of Husserl, but it is clear that they both 
regarded these questions seriously. 
1see above, p. 6 and T. Conrad, Bericht. 
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States-of-affairs were that which Reinach regarded as ~priori 
in the primary and characteristic sense, that to which judgments and 
a.cts of knowing intentionally refer, and that which is to be evident. In 
examining the relationship of Reinach's theories of states-of-affairs, 
judgments, and intentionality, we thus will be both examining the grounds. 
of Reinach's analyses of specific topics and examining one approach, 
within the context of early phenomenology, to the problems of the 
relationship of consciousness and being. 
There are a few points in Reinach's writings where the elements 
of states-of-affairs and propositions appear to be confounded although 
Reinach himself emphasized the importance of distinguishing the spheres 
of. the antic and the logical. One of our tasks will be to identify such 
points of confusion and to evaluate their significance. Fundamental to 
Reinach's theoretical position is the "correspondence" of concepts and 
objects, and of the structure or "necessary ordering connections" of 
language and objectivity. In one instance Reinach claims that conditions 
of correspondence between judgments and objectivity are required in order 
for an intentional act to occur. The implications and meaning of this 
statement are problematic, and thus reaffirm the need to question the 
nature of ordered relations of essences and of meaningful propositions, 
as well as the adequacy of the criteria for evidence and self-givenness. 
Whether intentionality, as discussed by Reinach, can perform the function 
required by his theories of states-of-affairs and judgments must also be 
considered. In all these questions the tendency to circular forms of argu-
mentation must be, at the very least, recognized, if it cannot be avoided by 
c 
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c an adequate grounding of the argument. 
If we assume we can "know" a greater or lesser circle of "reality" 
and/or "objectivity", then in order to explain what we mean by "know" we 
must clarify the nature of the objectivity which we claim to "know", "how" 
vJe kno\v it, and what relation the "structure" of our modes of thought and 
expression bear to the "structure" of objectivity. The first criterion 
used to evaluate and interpret Reinach's work is that of compatibility 
and consistency. This was one of Reinach's own working criteria and it 
is this which makes inevitable the fundamental circularity found in his 
position, and to some degree, in all non-sceptical philosophy. The 
second criterion is that of evidence--regarded by Reinach, as by many 
others, as a means of breaking out of circular argumentation. At some 
point, quite apart from the question whether his theories form a well-
functioning, integrated explication of the relationship of consciousness 
and being, in respect to those aspects of the relationship with which his 
work is concerned, it will be necessary to examine the evidence for what 
Reinach takes to be self-given and his notion of evidence itself. 
Within the context of the analysis in the following chapters of 
Reinach's theories of states-of-affairs, judgments, and intentionality, 
attention will be given to the problems of the ~ priori, evidence, the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the notion of the 
structure of language as reflecting that of objectivity and/or vice/versa, 
and the roles of intentionality. At numerous points comparisons with 
linguistic analysis will be of interest, as will comparisons with other 
phenomenological and pre-phenomenological theories. The implications of 
Reinach's theoretical position are to be examined as they appear in the 
23 
analysis of specific topics in his writings, in the work of those he 
influenced, and in extrapolations which will attempt to retain the spirit 
of Reinach's intention. It is states-of-affairs, regarded by Reinach as 
the intentional correlates of acts of knowing and of all judgments and as 
that which is a priori in the primary sense, which will be the focus of 
the next and first systematic chapter. 
c 
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States-of-Affairs 
a) The term 11 states-of-affairs" (Sachverhalte). 
The fundamental philosophic assumptions on which Reinach bases 
his theory of states-of-affairs and the adequacy of that theory are the 
central subjects of this chapter. The questions in response to which 
Reinach's theory of states-of-affairs was developed, as well as significant 
aspects of the theory itself, emerge from the philosophic context created 
by the work and mutual influence of Brentano, Meinong, Mally, Ameseder, 
Stump£, and Husserl. A question common to all these philosophers 
concerned the nature and status of the referents of judgments. The terms 
"states-of-affairs", 110bjektiv", 11Dass-S1:tze", and "judgment-content" were 
all u~ed in their diverse formulations of the problem. Distinct ontological 
and epistemological assumptions accompanied these terminological differences. 
Study of this terminology and the philosophic context within which its use 
developed should aid in the clarification of Reinach's own terminology and 
fundamental assumptions. We shall therefore set forth a brief sketch of 
those aspects of the work of Brentano, Stump£, Meinong, and Husserl, relevant 
to Reinach's use of the term "states-of-affairs" (Sachverhalte). 
In 1874 Brentano regarded the representation (Vorstellung) of 
objects as the fundamental mental act. 1 A judgment was said to be the act of 
"accepting" or "rejecting" not a proposition, fact, or states-of-affairs, 
1Franz Brentano, Psychologie ~ empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: 
Duncker und Humblot, 1874), I, p. 104;--cited hereafter as PVES. 
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but an object presented in a representation. 1 Brentano continued to adhere 
to this basic position, although the precise sense of "object" underwent 
reinterpretations closely related to developments in his theory of 
2 judgments. 
In 1889 Brentano argued in support of the correspondence theory of 
truth in a modified form, 3 having found that in the case of true negative 
judgments there was no correspondence in the traditional sense between the 
judgment and reality. 4 Likewise the theory appeared inadequate for judg-
ments not applying to things as such. 5 Brentano therefore took "entity" to 
signify any thing (res) or non-thing. It is this s of Brentano's 
thought which is most closely related to the work of Stump£, Meinong, and 
Husserl. 
Brentano's letters and essays after 1900, however, reject this 
position on the correspondence theory and tha inclusion of irrealia, states-
of-affairs, and objectives among "entities". Things, realia, objects in 
the strong sense, were now affirmed as the ultimate referents of all 
1Ibid., p. 266, p. 276, pp. 288-89. Franz Brentano, Vom Ursprung 
sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1889), p. 16;--cited 
hereafter as VUSE. 
2carl Stump£ claimed that Brentano had asserted in his logic 
lectures in the 1870's that a specific judgment-content corresponds to the 
judgment, is to be distinguished from the content (Materie) of representa-
.tion, and is expressed in "Dass-S~tze" ("that"-propositions), or in 
"substantivierten Infinitiv~ Stump£ remarks that Berhard Bolzano had 
spoken of the "Satz -sich" in the same sense. Carl Stump£, 
"Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen," Abhandlungen der preussischen 
Akademie Wissenschaften, IV (1906), p. 29; --cited hereafter as "EupF"). 
See also, and the Evident, ed. R.M. Chisholm (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Pau , 1966), p. 21;--cited hereafter as TE); trans. of Brentano's 
Wahrheit und Evidenz, ed. Oskar Kraus (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1930). 
p. 18. See Chapter IV below on Brentano's theory of judgments. 
4Ibid. , p. 19 5 
' p. 20. 
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conscious acts. Thus in a letter (March, 1901) to Anton Marty, Brentano 
asserts for example: "there is nothing universal in the things: the so-
l 
called universal, as such, is only in the one who is thinking." And 
later: a name, in the logical sense, is a name only if it denotes some-
2 3 
thing. Likewise: "only things ... can be thought." 
In the cases of the "non-being of a golden mountain," the 
"impossibility of a round square", Brentano now found that: "we are here 
confronted only with a figure of speech, which leads to the fiction of 
new beings and which so deceives us with respect to our psychological 
activities that we believe we are judging affirmatively when in fact we 
are denying something."4 These and related questions to which we will 
refer in later chapters formed the focus for much debate between Brentano 
and his former students, and for much of Reinach's work on states-of-
affairs and the theory of judgments. 
As early as 1888, earl Stumpf--like Meinong and Husserl, a former 
student of Brentano--acknowledged a role in the theory of judgments for 
states-of-affairs as the contents to which our acts of judgment refer. 5 
These states-of-affairs were to serve a logical function intermediary 
between the phenomenon judged and the act of judging. Stump£ regarded 
them as logically dependent on acts of judging though they were to be 
distinguished from the act of judging as such. States-of-affairs, like 
all other "formations" (Gebilde) such as concepts, Inbegriffe, and values, 
all of which were subjects for the neutral pre-science "eidology", were 
1 
TE, p. 64 
1~From a letter 
p. 84 and pp. 111-113, 
speech. 
5
"EupF", p. 30. 
2 3 
Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p. 67. 
to Anton Marty, 2 Sept. 1906, Ibid., p. 83. See below, 
for notes on Brentano's analysis of these figures of 
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said td be formed or deduced (in the sense of erschlossen) by the mind, 
1 
rather than given to it. Thus all Gebilde are said to be logically 
dependent on psychic functions. Yet. as the content of an actual judgment -
a state-of-affairs could be real, though only because of the immediately 
2 
knowable facticity of the functions of which it was the content. 
Appearances and functions, however, were immediately given to the 
3 
mind. Therefore, appearances (Erscheinungen)--whether primary, those 
given to us in immediate sense experience, or secondary, those whose 
images occur in our memory--were said by Stump£ to have real objective 
correlates that were logically independent from psychic functions. 4 
In these respects Stumpf's position retained a strong affinity with that 
of Brentano, who by this period refused to recognize any sort of 
independent "reality" for "fictious entities". 
Stump£ recognized, as did Brentano, that individuals are always 
des~ribed by means of general concepts, but then proceeded to distinguish 
objectivity and reality, using a wider sense for the former as all that 
about which we think and talk. Thus all "formations" (Gebilde), including 
concepts and states-of-affairs, although "logically dependent on psychic 
functions", are "objective" in Stumpf's sense. Stump£ emphasizes that 
his position does not coincide with Platonism, for in his sense objectivity 
" . 5 (GegenstandlichkeLt) does not always amount to reality. The sphere of 
beings (Seienden) was regarded as extending beyond that of independent 
real entities and including any object (Gegenstand) of a true judgment. 6 
1Ibid., pp. 30-32 and Carl Stump£, "Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaft," 
Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, V (1906), pp. 
32-33: --cited hereafter as "ZEdW". 
211ZEdW", p. 32. 
5 Ibid., pp. 5-10. 
3rbid., p. 5. 
6 Ibid., p. 83. 
4 
"EupF", p. 32. 
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1 
"Phenomenology" was for Stump£ the first of the "neutral pre-
sciences 11 • Its task was the study of the appearances and their immanent 
structural laws (immanente Strukturgesetze). The laws of the structure 
of appearances were independent from those of the psychic and were said to 
stand there before us as something objective (Objektiv) that we have only 
to recognize and describe (not produce or construct). Stumpf's emphasis 
on the laws of the structure of appearances is similar in tone to Reinach's 
. 2 
emphasis on essentLal structural laws. 
But it is in "eidology", not phenomenology, that states-of-affairs, 
and all other "formations" (Gebilde), are to be studied by Stump£. States-
of-affairs are logical entities dependent on psychic functions, yet 
objective in Stumpf's sense and real insofar as they are the content of 
an actual judgment. The structural laws of states-of-affairs are said to 
3 govern the sequence and conclusions of acts of judgment. Stump£ 
emphasizes that the structural laws of states-of-affairs are not the 
result of any psychological necessity. The rules governing premises and 
conclusions are thus not causal laws of psychological processes, but 
structural laws of states-of-affairs to which a logical necessity pertains. 
The third neutral pre-science was the "doctrine of relations" 
(Verh~ltnislehre), the study of the relational concepts (Verh~ltnishegriffe). 
Relational concepts--distinct from appearances and functions, but not mental 
creations or constructions--are given in and with appearances and functions 
4 
or formed, deduced (in the sense of erschlossen), from these. Stump£--
1For the history of 
Spiegelberg, PM, pp. 1-19. 
Husserl' s seealso 11 ZEdW 11 
' ' 
211ZEdW" 28 30 ' pp. - . 
the use of the term "phenomenology", see 
For Stumpf's use of it as compared with 
p. 35. 
3 4 
Ibid., p. 33, p. 50. Ibid. , p. 37. 
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like Husserl and Reinach--regarded the use of induction to obtain ~priori 
laws from empirical matters-of-fact as impossible. The distinction 
between contingent individual matters-of-fact (empirical) and necessary 
1 ~priori laws of essence is common to all three --Stump£, in fact, in 
his study of the structural laws of phenomena had first discovered some 
2 
of the favorite examples of material ~ priori essential laws. 
The work of Alexius Meinong points in yet another direction. 
Meinong distinguished two modes of being: existence and subsistence 
(bestehen). Existence was the mode of being of beings (particular, 
actual, things--Soseienden) such as "this piece of paper". Subsistence 
3 
was the mode of being of essences or of the characteristics of beings. 
The referents of judgments and assumptions were said to be not actual 
4 
beings but subsistent or non-subsistent "objectives" (Objektive). 
Objectives were ideal objects and therefore (like numbers) 5 were without 
6 
"having" being in the narrower sense, i.e., existing. From Rudolf 
Ameseder, Meinong adopted the following way of expressing the distinct 
nature of objectives: They had being (in the wide sense) and were being, 
while objects merely had being. 7 This turn of phrase has not been of much 
help, however, in clarifying the nature of objectives. 8 
1 Ibid. , pp. 51-52 
2 . 
See above, p. 16, nt. 1. 
3" Uber Annahmen (Leipzig: J, A. Barth, 2nd ed., 1910), pp. 71-80;--
cited henceforth as UA2. Bestehen has been translated as "subsistence" for 
lack of a better English equivalent. The sense of the term is clarified 
through use in the following pages. "Sub.sistence" in any case never 
implies existential being. "Existence" and "subsistence" are distinct modes 
of being. 
4Ibid., p. 44, p. 46. 5rbid., p. 63, p. 74. 
6
rbid. , p. 72 7 . Ib~d.' p. 61. 
Bsee below, p.56, nt. 1, for notes on Reinach's comments on this 
manner of speaking. 
The assertion of the independence of being and being-so-and-so 
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(Sein and Sosein) , however, did allow Meinong to assert the subsistence 
of objectives such as the "non-being of the round square", the "round 
square" being a non-existing object, 2 and the non-subsistence of 
objectives such as the ''blackness of this particular piece of (white) 
paper". The subsistence of an objective is independent from the existence 
of its object. Both types of objectives are of significance for the 
analysis of negative judgments and their referents; they were the means 
by which Meinong could explain how non-existent objects could serve as 
objects for judgments about their non-existence. 
One motive for distinguishing between the object as existing and 
the essence or nature of the object as subsisting was to provide some 
kind of ontological status for the objective correlates of all our thoughts. 
"Being directed to something" (auf etwas Gerichtetsein) was said to be the 
characteristic of the psychological. The referents of representations and 
of judgments and assumptions were objects and objectives, respectively, 
Meinong--a realist but not a reist--was not willing to follow in the 
steps of Brentano, Nor was his position what we will call the "agnostic" 
ontological position of Stump£ who regarded universals, values, concepts, 
and states-of -affairs, all "formations" (Gebilde), as logically dependent 
on psychic functions and, in a curious circular argument, "real" insofar 
1Principle due to Ernst Mally, "Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie 
des Messens", in Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, ed. 
Alexius Meinong, (Leipzig: J .A. Earth, 1904). See also Alexius Meinong, 
"Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie", in Ibid., pp. 1-50; trans. Isaac 
Levi et al. as "The Theory of Objects", in Rea:Iism and the Background of 
Phenomenology, ed. R. M. Chisholm, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 
1960, pp. 76-117). 
2 See Ibid., pp. 9-11 regarding the controversy about "false" and 
"impossible" objectives and its relation to Russell's theory of descriptions. 
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as they were the content of a 11 true11 judgment. 
The two types of objectives above, corresponding to the non-existent 
objects, "this black piece of white paper" and !!the round square", involve 
two distinct issues: the existence of objects and the relation of attri-
butes to their objects. A third type of objective would be that involving 
a relation between two or more objects. These three types of objectives, 
if subsistent, correspond to ontological connections of increasingly 
"higher order". Meinong does in fact speak in this manner and regards the 
primitive founding level as consisting of all the real objects, the 
higher levels, ideal, as successively founded first on the real objects 
and then on one another--a hierarchic order. 
Reinach's principal criticism of Meinong's concept of the Objektiv 
was that it contained in a yet undistinguished form both the concepts of 
1 proposition (Satz) and state-of-affairs (Sachverhalt), Meinong's use 
of the terms "true" and "false" in reference to objectives was understand-
able to Reinach only as a result of this confusion of propositions and 
2 
states-of-affairs. Meinong's reference to the proposition as an 
Objektiv formulated in words3 was in Reinach',s view insufficient. 4 In 
spite of these points and the many others on which Reinach differed with 
Meinong's position, the work of the latter was of major significance for 
Reinach's treatment of states-of-affairs. It was indeed in opposition 
to Meinong (and to Brentano and Husserl in part) that Reinach's theories 
of states-of-affairs, propositions, and judgments seem to have taken form. 5 
1NU S 82 ' Q_, p. . 
2 
Ibid., p. 85. 311 UAz, p. lOO. 4 NU,GS, p. 82. 
5" " Uber emotionale Prasentation (1917/ may in turn have been influenced 
by the developments in the notion of WertfJhlen and Wertverhalte by Husserl, 
Scheler, etc .. Dignitive and Desiderative, like Objektive, bear strong 
similarities to states-of-affairs. 
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Chapters Ill and IV will refer to Meinong's position on intentionality, 
evidence and judgments. 
States-of-affairs were among the objective referents to be studied 
by what Husserl, in the Logische Untersuchungen, called formal ontology. 
Like Meinong's objectives, Husserl's states-of-affairs were regarded as 
that which is asserted in a judgment, 1 can take on modalities--such as 
2 3 
possibility, and can be contradictory. States-of-affairs were also 
4 
said to subsist (bestehen) rather than exist. In the course of the 
Logische Untersuchungen clarity about the nature of states-of-affairs is 
only gradually attained, as is natural in the course of actual analysis. 
Reinach observes that Husserl, like Meinong later, had made the error 
in volume I of using the terms "true" and "false" in relation to states-
of-affairs, but dropped this usage in Volume II when the distinction 
5 between propositions and states-of-affairs had become clear. 
The simple setting forth of these similarities between Meinong's 
obJectives and Russerl's states-of-affairs, however, does not give an 
adequate sense of the role of states-of-affairs as seen in the Logische 
Untersuchungen. For instead of being concerned with developing a theory 
of objects, a primarily ontological enterprise, Husserl emphasized the 
6 
essential correlation of the structure of the subjective and objective 
and consequently, unlike Meinong, gave equal, if not greater, attention 
to the analysis of the logic of propositions and, of course, to the 
1 LI, p. 60, p. 288, p. 581, pp. 611-12, etc. 2 Ibid., pp. 61-63. 
3
rbid., p. 121. 4 Ibid., p. 121, p. 769 
5 NU,GS, p. 85. See LI, p. 121 for "not-both-being-the-case", 
(Nichtzusammenbestehen). 
6This correlation was later developed (see Ideen) in terms of the 
parallelism between noetic and noematic. 
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analysis of intentionality with which Meinong had had only a limited 
concern. 
The first mention of ~tates-of-affairs in the Logische Untersuchungen 
places it in a central position; it is identified by Husserl, in section 
l 
six of the Prolegomena, as that whose being or not-being is inwardly 
evident in knowing in the narrow sense, and assumed, surmised, and believed 
h id f k . 2 in t e w er sense o now~ng. But in his treatment of normative 
sciences, 3 propositions and their forms, rather than states-of-affairs, are 
4 the subject, and with one exception the referents of these propositions 
are not called states-of-affairs, but are referred to in terms of thing-
property and subject-predicate relations and conditions. Thus the term 
"states-of-affairs" does not have at this point the appeal for Husserl 
which it later had for Reinach. 
In opposition to psychologism Husserl asserts that the view, that 
no judgment is correct in which the same state-of-affairs is at once 
affirmed and denied, expresses the "insight that contradictory propositions 
are not both true, that the states-of-affairs corresponding to them cannot 
both coexist, •• 5 are "objectively incompatible", 6 and 11 logically 
incompatible". 7 Similarly our apodeictic consciousness of necessity is 
said to express insight into its objective correlate, the law that "S is P11 • 
In this law expressions such as, "S is necessarily P11 and 11S's being Pis 
1This is an example of the undistinguished usage to which Reinach 
referred. A stronger one is found on p. 63 (LIJ where Husserl uses the 
term "real being". LI, p. 769 (see below p. 37) indicates that Husserl 
at times used 11 truthitand "being" as the broadest of terms for the two 
spheres of the intentional and the objective. See also LI, p. 151. 
2· LI, 587 for wish, question, See also LI, 608. See p. etc. p. 
3LI _, pp. 81-89. 4LI _, p. 88. 5LI _, p. 119. 
6LI p. 121, 7LI p. 131. _, _, 
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1 
grounded on a law", find their objective equivalent. The law referred 
to here will later be said to be grounded in a necessary state-of-affairs. 
Husserl has not yet introduced the distinction between contingent matters 
of fact and necessary ~ priori essential connections in terms of states-
of-affairs. 
The central position of states-of-affairs is overt in the paragraph 
clarifying the relation between truth and inner evidence. Adequate per-
ception is identified as something being given as itself and as we meant 
it. Likewise, that which is judged in a judgment--a state-of-affairs, 
whether singular or general, empirical or ideal--is given as itself 
present. Inner evidence for all experiences of primal givenness is a 
seeing, a grasping of the self-given ("true"!) state-of-affairs, or the 
experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, 
meant--the self-given state-of-affairs. 2 
Interconnections of things and truths are given together ~ priori 
and are mutually inseparable, the latter being the necessary correlate of 
the former. The state-of-affairs is said to "contain" an object as the 
bearer of such and such properties or the term of such relations, etc. 
Through "ideational abstraction" the truth, rather than the state-of-affairs, 
becomes the apprehended object, and thus the ideal correlate of the act of 
3 
knowledge. Knowledge of necessary truth is grounded as knowledge of 
1 
Ibid., p. 153. 
2Ibid. , pp. 194-95. 11Meaning 11 and "meant" are used here, not with 
reference to Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, but in the sense 
of Meinen, an intentional relation. See below, pp. 99-103. 
3 Ibid., pp. 225-27. 
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necessary states-of-affairs. State-of-Affairs, like Object, is one of 
the pure, formal, objective categories. As such it is a mere concept, 
independent of the particularity of any material of knowledge, and that 
under which all the states-of-affairs that specifically appear in thought 
2 
must be ordered. The laws grounded in the pure formal objective 
categories are in themselves theories. 3 
In the introduction to volume II Husserl states that: 11all thought 
4 
and knowledge have as their ai,m objects or states-of-affairs." "Reflection" 
must be practiced upon the acts which intend objects and on the meaning-
content rather than naively positing the existence of these objects. The 
tendency to slip from this "unnatural attitude of reflection", necessary 
for pure description, back into the naive attitude; to forget that the 
objectivity described "has undergone a change of sense, in virtue of which 
it now- belongs to the sphere of phenomenology",5 must be guarded against. 
Another key aspect of Husserl's position, strongly tied to the practice of 
the "unnatural attitude", is his demand for "freedom from presuppositions 11 .6 
The theoretical significance of states-of-affairs, which was 
occasionally asserted in volume I, is actually reflected in the analyses of 
volume II. The "motivational" unity of our acts of judgment is said to 
have as its o~jective correlate the objective connection of states-of~ 
affairs. 1 Husserl, like Stump£ and later Reinach, regarded states-of-
affairs, ·as Meinong regarded "objectives", rather than objects, to be that 
1Ibid.' pp. 227-28. 
4Ibid., p. 253. 
2 
5 
Ibid., p. 237. 
Ibid., pp. 255-56. 
3 
Ibid. , p. 238. 
6 
Ibid. , pp. 263-66. 
7 Ibid., pp. 270-71. Compare with analogous position of Stump£, see 
pp. 26-29, above. 
36 
1 
which stands in relations of ground and consequent. Two interpretations 
of statements of the form 11S is P" are presented: that the subject of the 
statement is the object "S", or that "the whole state-of-affairs is the 
object of the statement as an analogue of the object a name names." Husserl 
d f f 'h. . 2 oes not argue in avor o e1t er 1nterpretat1on. 
"Idealism" is interpreted by Husserl as a theory of knowledge which 
recognizes the ideal or "specific", the essence of the species, as having 
objective status alongside the real or individual as a condition for the 
3 possibility of objective knowledge. This use by Husserl of "objective" 
in the wide sense is the same as is found in Reinach's discussion of 
ideal objectivities. The distinction has evidently been overlooked by 
those critics who have labelled Reinach's ;?henomenology as realistic in 
the sense corresponding to the narrower sense o£ objective where only that 
which is "real" may be said to be "objective" and thus all that is said 
to be "objective" is regarded as "real". The simple unqualified use of 
the ce;:ms "real", "objective", "ideal", "idealism", and "realism", is 
far from unequivocal. 
In the entire third study, dealing with independent and non-
independent objects and the ~ priori essential laws relevant to them, 
4 Husserl mentions states-of-affairs only twice. The same tendency, i.e., 
to speak in terms of essential connections rather than necessary states-
of-affairs, is found in Reinach's writings in those contexts where he is 
not also concerned with contingent states-of-affairs. 
111, pp. 271-73, see Ibid., p. 324 for inferences and propositions, 
premises and conclusions. 
2Ibid., pp. 288-89. 
4Ibid., p. 444, p. 445. 
3Ibid., p. 338. 
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The fourth study, on ~ priori laws of meaning, mentions states-
of-affairs only once1 as one of the senses in which the term "object" is 
to be understood. 
In "On Intentional Experiences and their 'Contents 111 , the fifth 
study, Husserl explicitly sets forth the relation of many of the types 
and levels of objectivity and meaning which had been analyzed in the 
preceding studies. The distinction between the objective reference of an 
entire act and of its constituent partial acts, which presupposes the 
earlier discussions of simple and complex meanings and objectivities, 
involves the notion that the act of judgment, the meaning-intention, and 
its objective reference, the state-of-affairs, are complex and can be 
meaningfully analyzed into their co~stituent parts. A state-of-affairs 
is said to be "an appearance emergent out of subject and predicate, or 
2 
o:1t of antecedent and consequent". This manner of speaking is found in 
Reinach's writings also and, here as there, it reflects an unfortunate 
usage which blurs the distinction between the nature of propositions and 
the nature of objectivities, real or ideal. 
3 
The first section of the sixth study contains many distinctions 
important for the analysis of objectivity, intentionality, knowing, and 
judgments. The clarification of various senses of "being" and 11 truth 11 
involves a fuller view of the role of states-of-affairs than had previously 
been set forth. Husserl rejects the narrow use of the terms 11 truth11 and 
"being" as referring to judgments, propositions or states-of-affairs 
(their objective correlates), and to absolute objects (not states-of-
4 
affairs) respectively, and instead applies the term "truth" to acts and 
1Ibid.' p. 517. 2 Ibid. , p. 581. 
3
section 1, Chapter 1, Study 6. 4LI _, p. 768. 
~ 
~' 
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their moments, and the term "being" to the corresponding objective 
correlates. Within these broad meanings Husserl then will allow 
narrower concepts, such that "being" would concern the being of 
absolute objects while states-of-affairs would be said to "subsist", and 
"truth" would be limited to the ideal adequation of a relational act 
(predication as opposed to absolute assertion) to the corresponding 
1 
adequate percept of a state-of-affairs. Reinach was later to remark 
that it was only in this section that Husserl finally achieved clarity 
2 
about states-of-affairs. 
3 
In the sixth chapter Husserl m1kes it clear that objective 
correlates of categorial forms are not real moments, not objects of 
possible sense perception. An example of this ideality is found in the 
relational being expressed in predication. The concept of being in this 
4 
sense has its source in our categorial intuition of some state-of-affairs. 
States-of-affairs are higher order objects constituted in synthetic acts, 
5 in founded acts. Husserl regarded states-of-affairs as limited to that 
which is constituted in relational acts. Disjunctions and conjunctions 
are synthetic forms, distinct from states-of-affairs, which may unite 
6 
states-of-affairs in yet higher-order objects. In the terminology of 
the Ideen states-of-affairs are to be referred to as noematic. 
1 Ibid., pp. 768-69. 
2LI, Section 39, Chapter 5, Study 6, pp. 765-770. Questions of 
interpretation of Reinach's own intention in his statements regarding 
states-of-affairs will therefore be resolved in the following pages by 
reference to Investigation VI whenever it is relevant. 
3 6, Study 6. 4Ibid. , Chapter pp. 780-84. 
5Ibid. , 784-93. 6 798-99. pp. Ibid., pp. 
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b) Reinach's theory of states-of-affairs and its problematic aspects. 
Reinach envisioned philosophy as a discipline whose aim was the 
evident knowledge of being in the widest sense. He abhorred the techniques 
of construction and reduction and regarded self-givenness of objectivity 
as the ground of knowledge. Knowing, however, is only one of the many 
possible intentional relations to objectivity and has a precise meaning 
for Reinach. Knowledge is not knowledge in Reinach's sense unless it 
has a discursive form--that such-and-such is so-and-so--although this 
form reflects not the framing of a definition but rather the adequate 
intuition of objective connections. Thus we perceive objects, feel them, 
take pleasure in them, but to know is not to know an object but rather 
a s -of-affairs. States-of-affairs may be either necessary or con-
tingent. In a necessary state-of-affairs the predicate1 is grounded iri 
the essence(s) of the subject-object(s). Reinach calls this relationship 
of grounding and being grounded an "essential connection" (Wesenszusammenhang). 
In contingent states-of-affairs there are no necessary essential connections. 
The necessity and generality pertaining to a necessary state-of-affairs 
both derive from the "essential connection", as does its~ priority. 2 
Essential connections are therefore the subject of knowledge which is 
regarded as being as final, irrespective of time and change, as its sub-
jects are free of change. This presupposes a particular view of the nature 
of essences and their relations to their exemplifications as well 
1Note unfortunate usage, like that found in 
for comment on usage in 
See above, p. 37, 
2Examples: that "3 is greater than 2" is regarded by Reinach as 
a necessary state-of -affairs; that "my chair is sitting next to the wall" 
would be called a contingent state-of-affairs. 
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as of the intuiting of essences. In the context of Reinach's work, 
however, a far-reaching significance pertains to states-of-affairs and 
essential connections simply by virtue of their being that of which 
knowledge is possible. 
It should be clear from the preceding section1 that Reinach by 
no means originated the term "states-of-affairs", nor, as is clear from 
his own careful notes regarding its use by Stump£ and Husserl and the 
use of the term "objective" by Meinong, did he make any claim to have 
done so. In Reinach's writings, however, states-of-affairs undergo a 
careful analysis, vastly enriching the concept. In the process of this 
analysis Reinach took a position in opposition to that of Meinong and, 
in certain respects, to that of Husserl. Underlying his treatment of 
states-of-affairs, in connection with the various problems dealt with 
in his articles, was the conviction that states-of-affairs--not the 
objectivities that are elements of states-of-affairs, nor judgments and 
knowledge which have intentional reference to states-of-affairs--are 
!!!-. priori in the primary sense. It was his belief that the "fundamental 
significance of states-of-affairs for the most important philosophic 
2 problems would set itself forth ever more strongly. 11 
Modal Material Necessity.-- Reinach's discussion of modal and material 
necessity in the latter part of the article on'~ant's Interpretation of the 
3 Humeian Problem" makes explicit the importance Reinach attached to states-
lsee above, pp. 24-38. 
2 KAH,GS, p. 6, nt. 1. See also pp. 40-50, below, on the us-e of 
"!!. priori" as ~ ontological term. 
3 KAH,GS, pp. 1-35. 
c 
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of-affairs. In this article Reinach examines Kant's interpretation of 
Hume's treatment of causal laws. Though the problem is superficially 
historical, Reinach takes this as an opportunity to analyze causal and 
mathematical propositions in terms of essential connections and necessary 
states-of-affairs. This article thus serves as an introduction to 
Reinach 1 s treatment of states-of-affairs, though many of the distinctions 
made here can be better understood and stated in terms of the terminology 
developed in later articles. The problematic aspects of his treatment 
of this topic and its interpretation demonstrate the need for further 
clarification, also provided to some degree in his later articles. 
Reinach identifies two key assumptions in Kant's argument: 
1) in examining the causal propositions Hume was putting one possible 
case of synthetic ~ priori judgments to question, and 2) Hume regarded 
mathematical propositions as analytic and therefore ~priori. 1 But, 
Reinach insists, though Kant's criteria for the~ priori are objective 
generality and objective necessity, independent of experience, Kant left 
these criteria, which Reinach does not regard as constitutive for the 
• . 2 d d 3 a pr~or~, ungroun e ; 
According to Reinach's analysis, formal and material general 
causal laws, and single causal laws, all involve necessity. 4 Reinach 
cites the following examples of these laws: 1) (Formal general)-- 11That 
which begins to exist must have a ground for its existence", or 11Any new 
existence or change of an existent must have a cause," 2) (Material 
general)-- 11Fire produces warmth", and 3) (Single)--''This fire here and now 
1I bid.' p. 3. 2 Ibid., p. 7, nt. 2. 3 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
4Reinach remarks that he is concerned only with the significance 
of these laws, not with their correctness. 
c 
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produces warmth." These three types of causal "laws" express necessary 
states-of-affairs, ones in which an "objective necessity" pertains to the 
\vhole state-of-affairs on the ground of an "essential connection" between 
the "subject and predicate". 1 
In the proposition "all color is necessarily extended" (example from 
the non-causal sphere) the matter referred to belongs to the sphere of the 
sensible-reals, while the necessity expressed has nothing to do with this 
sphere and the "material" content would be in no way altered if this 
necessity, "modal" rather than 11material", were left unexpressed. In 
cases of causal necessity the modal necessity must be clearly distinguished 
from the specifically causal, i.e., the causal connection of two events. 2 
A relation of simple temporal succession between A and B is distinct from 
the stronger causal relation between A and B. The latter presupposes the 
former, but is fundamentally different in "material" content. In con-
trasting these two distinct cases with that of the state-of-affairs, that 
"2 + 2 = 4", where only a modal necessity pertains and remarking that 
the addition of an overt assertion of necessity in this case (that "2 + 2 
necessarily= 4") still refers to the same state-of-affairs, 3 Reinach 
appears to be pointing to a fundamental difference between the relations 
of events, i.e., of empirical entities in succession, and ideal states-of-
affairs. the latter quite evidently are the case (better--"subsist")4 
or not, in accordance with their ideal necessity or impossibility, 
1KAH,GS, pp. 24-25. Here is yet another example of the unfortunate 
use of the terms "subject" and "predicate" borro>ved from the sphere of 
propositions. Reinach notes that though there may be certain differences 
in the necessity involved in the three cases he will not take up that 
question. 
2Ibid. , p. 26. 3rbid., p. 27. 
4see above, pp. 29-30, 32, 38. 
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whereas the former are qualified in addition by both ideal and empirical 
possibility. 
Reinach observed that causal necessity is expressed in the 
predicate, while modal necessity is expressed in the copula, thus 
determining the whole state-of-affairs. It is clear that causal necessity 
is not regarded as determining a whole state-of-affairs. It should be 
possible, however, for us to clarify the implications of this distinction 
for the constitution of the state-of-affairs itself. 
In the proposition, "Any new existence or change of an existent 
necessarily presupposes a cause," a modal necessity is expressed. 
Reformulating the notion of "cause" expressed here, Reinach obtains the 
proposition "Any new existence or chang·e of an existent necessarily pre-
supposes an event which stands in a necessary connection with it," in 
which the modal and causal or, as Reinach says, "material" necessity, 
are both expressed. Likewise by reformulating the proposition, "fire 
necessarily produces warmth," the proposition "fire necessarily stands 
in a necessary connection with warmth," is produced, expressing both the 
1 
modal and "m:1terial" necessity. Reinach makes it clear that the modal 
necessity of a state-of-affairs is ideal even in the case where its 
2 
terms (better, "elements") are sensible reals. Likewise, because of 
this strict distinction between the two forms of necessity, Reinach finds 
that Hume's scepticism about objective material necessity pertains to 
the empirical sciences, but not to mathematics or any other science 
insofar as it involves only modal necessity. 3 Nor, in Reinach's view, 
1Ibid.' p. 28. 2 Ibid. , p. 32. 
3
Reinach insisted on the importance for the empirical sciences 
of distinguishing the empirical and essential connections of the 
objectivities which were their subject, PN,GS, pp. 372-73. Precedent for 
this point of view is found, of course, in Stump£ and Husserl. 
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does Hume's scepticism about objective modal necessity alter the a 
priority of mathematical propositions. 
The confusions which lie in this analysis of modal and material 
necessity and its interpretation can be unraveled to a large degree by 
1) distinguishing "material" in the sense used in this article, as a 
synonym for "causal", from "material" in the sense contrasted to "formal", 
and 2) by referring to cause and effect relations as relations of two 
states-of-affairs. This analysis of cause and effect, is also found in 
the Logische Untersuchungen and corresponds to Meinong's analysis of 
cause and effect as a relation of two objectives. The interpretation 
of this article and of the significance of the distinction made between 
modal and material necessity is further confused by reading Hedwig 
Conrad-Martius' comments on it1 and by the fact that Reinach is dealing 
in terms of the terminological preferences of Hume and Kant as well as 
his own. 
It is best to start again and identify all these sources of 
confusion at their root. A necessary state-of-affairs is necessary 
whether or not I grasp it. The necessity in this case is an immanent 
moment of the state-of-affairs. Contingent states-of-affairs are those 
whose contrary is possible. The distinction is not simply that I can 
think both that "this apple is bigger than that pear" and "this apple is 
not bigger than that pear", though (usually) not "3 is smaller than 2". 
Rather the distinction is grounded in the natures of these objects. That 
"3 is greater than 2 11 is due to an "essential connection'i (Wesenszusammenhang), 
the groundedness of the predicate in the essences of the objects, "3" and 
11 211 • 2 h 1 f d 1 T e re ative size o pears an app es, however, is not a function 
1 
GS, XIII-XVI. 2 KAH,GS. pp. 4-5. 
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of their essences. 
The proposition, ''red and orange are similar", was regarded by 
Hume as an "idea-relation" in which "similarity" is grounded in the 
1 
natures of red and orange. Reinach, in turn, calls the referent of this 
proposition a necessary objective state-of-affairs in the sense defined 
above and notes that it is clearly syn~hetic. Hume's question of 
whether the causal relation of tw~ objects is a relation of ideas, is 
the source in this context of the modal/ material dilemma. In an "idea-
relation" (Hume), or a necessary and synthetic state-of-affairs (Reinach), 
the "predicate" is conditioned by the compared ideas (Hume) or grounded 
in the essences of the objects (Reinach). A causal relation, if it were 
to be regarded as an idea-relation, would involve the groundedness of 
one idea and the predicate in the other idea. The groundedness of an 
idea and predicate in another idea cannot be grasped and thus known 
through the perceptual observation of the lone idea, let alone through 
simple visualization (independent of experience) of the idea, as is/ 
said to be the case for knowledge of necessary states-of-affairs (Reinach) 
and idea-relations (Hume). The effect and the causal relation are thus 
seen not to be 11 contained" in the cause in a manner analogous to Kant's 
sense of the analytic as would be the case if causal relations were a 
special type of idea-relation. Nor is the predicate (the causal relation) 
grounded in the essences of the "cause" and "effect" as would be the 
case for an ordinary idea-relation. It is thus clear that causal relations 
are neither necessary states-of-affairs (Reinach) nor idea-relations 
2 (Hume). 
1
rbid., p. 10. 
2 
Ibid. , pp. 10-14. 
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Hume observed, moreover, that a causal relation involves a 
necessary connection in the successive existence of two objects and 
thus, unlike an idea-relation, is~ existence-free. The existence.of 
the cause is a condition of the existence of the effect and the causal 
1 . 1 re at1.on. In Reinach's later articles these same points are made in 
relation to states-of-affairs. Causal relations are not states-of-affairs 
but relations of states-of-affairs. This is clear simply from the 
definition of the existence of an object as a state-of-affairs and the 
observation that a cause is not an object, simply, but an event ("ein 
2 
dingliches Geschehen"). And finally, a necessary state-of-affairs, 
ideal, is like an idea-relation in being regarded as independent of 
exemplification by particular existent objects. 
Hume's matters-of-fact correspond. to Reinach's contingent 
states-of-affairs, as idea-relations were seen above to correspond to 
nece$sary states-of-affairs. Thus both Hume and Reinach distinguish the 
spheres of the empirical and~ priori. Moreover, Reinach finds that Hume's 
idea-relations, structures in which a predicate is grounded in the nature 
of the related ideas, indicate that Hume was aware of what Reinach refers 
to as essential connections, the foundation of the ~priori, and that 
generality and necessity, Kant's criteria for the~ priori, are direct 
consequences of Hume's determinations. Reinach thus concludes that Hume 
and Kant had the same concept of the ~ priori in view though each dealt 
explicitly only with certain distinct aspects of it, the former regarding 
3 it as subjective, the latter as objective. 
1Ibid. ' p. 15. 2see Ibid., p. 28 and NU,GS, pp. 82-84. 
3Ibid., pp. 6-7. Reinach seems to be almost invi.ting confusion 
here regarding the concept of the ~ priori. 
0 
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Reinach supplements Hume's view that the opposite of an idea-
relation is "impossible"1--Reinach firtds this to be a determination of 
the conceptual level alone--with the view that this conceptual 
impossibility of the contrary of an idea-relation is grounded in the 
2 
objective necessity and impossibility of states-of-affairs. An 
impossible state-of-affairs "is 11 one whose ''predicate'' is incompatible 
with the essence(s) of the objects. The opposite of a matter-of-fact 
(Hume) and of a contingent state-of-affairs (Reinach) is always possible 
or rather not impossible. 3 
Reinach identifies two notions of 11contradiction" used by Kant 
and Hume and suggests that Kant's misinterpretation of Hume resulted in 
part from confounding Hume's notion of incompatibility, an ontic 
incompatibility of predicate and subje.ct grounded on an essential contra-
diction, applicable only to synthetic judgments, with his own notion of 
4 (ulogical") contradiction in analytic judgments. Reinach finds no 
evidence in Hume's writings for Kant's claim that Hume regarded mathematical 
pr.;:,positions as analytic, The notion of "idea-relation" (Hume) may appear 
at first to imply that propositions (S~tze) are grounded in concepts. 
Yet "idea" in Hume's sense has, in fact, as little to do with "concept" 
in Kant's sense, Reinach observes, as Hume's view that the predicate is 
1 Hume suggests that we consider a "mountain without a valley'' to 
be impossible because we cannot visualize such a mountain. 
2Ibid. , pp. 14-18. 
3 Ibid., p. 19. Likewise, since we can conceive of the lack of 
causal connections Hume finds that it is "not impossible" that there are 
no causal connections. 
4 
Ibid., pp. 19-20. See below, Chapter V, for discussion of 
analytic and synthetic judgments. 
~ 
"' ~ 
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conditioned through the construction of the idea has to do with Kant's 
notion that the predicate of an analytic judgment is "contained11 in the 
b . 1 su Ject-concept. Had Kant been consistent in his argument he would have 
had to call "red and orange are similar11 an analytic judgment also. 
Reinach observes, however, that this would have been absurd since it is 
instead a typical example of a synthetic judgment. Reinach suspects that 
Kant's view, that Hume regarded mathematical statements as analytic, is 
the result in part of the limitation of Kant's attention to Hume's dis-
cussions of mathematical idea-relations in the "Enquiry Concerning Human 
2 Understanding11 • 
Reinach's ~usage of the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" 
encompasses the distinctions made by Locke, Hume, and Kant. In addition 
Reinach argues that these distinctions are to be regarded as being 
grounded in objective states-of-affairs. As for the 'k priori", "analytic" 
and ''synthetic" are regarded as originally ontological terms referring 
only secondarily to judgments about states-of-affairs. Both terms 
identify the nature of the essential connection obtaining in a necessary 
state-of-affairs. "Analytic11 refers to the connection of an essence 
with itself, or an essential part with the whole, thus retaining Kant's 
notion of the predicate being ''contained11 in the subject. "Synthetic" 
refers to the connection of a predicate or relation with the essences 
in which the predicate or relation is grounded (but not "contained"). 
In his later work Reinach shows little interest in "analytic" states-of-
affairs. This is probably due in large measure to his view that essences 
are irreducible objective elements which can be known only in connection 
1Ibid. ' p. 8. 
2Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
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with one another and thus only in "synthetic" states-of-affairs. Study 
of "analytic" states-of-affairs would coincide with, or come dangerously 
close to, the attempt, which Reinach denounced, to define essences. 
With a grasp on the above distinctions the difference between 
modal and material necessity can be clarified. Reinach compares the 
causal connection "event B follows event A necessarily" with the essential 
connection "moment B necessarily follows moment A". The types of 
necessity involved are "material" (better: "empirical" or simply 11causal") 
and "modal", .§!_ priori, or essential, i.e. , in this latter case, the 
result of the groundedness of the predicate in the essences of the two 
objects respectively. The relation of two states-of-affairs is said to 
be necessary in the first case, a state-of-affairs itself in the second. 
The arguments presented above are rendered intelligible by this formulation 
of the distinction between modal and causal necessity; it is now clear 
that a reference to causal necessity is a reference to the necessary 
causal relation of two events, that is, two states-of-affairs. The 
strict dependence on existence that thus pertains to causal necessity is 
seen to be the characteristic which marks it as an empirical non-ideal 
1 . 1 re at~on. Reinach regards it as clear that though Hume did not clearly 
distinguish between the two forms of necessity his attention was focused 
on what Reinach has identified as material necessity and not, as main-
tained by Kant, on the necessity mathematical and causal propositions 
1 It might be assumed that the referent of a judgment of causal 
necessity is a contingent state-of-affairs of higher order, say of the 
second degree, constituted by a non-essential (thus purely empirical) 
relation of two states-of-affairs. It is not clear at this point 
whether this view is in accordance with Reinach's theory of states-of-
affairs, but the question will be raised again later in this chapter 
in anticipation of the need for referents of complex propositions and 
judgments to be discussed in Chapter IV. 
c 
have in common, i.e. ' 
1 
modal necessity. 
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The above gives an interpretation of Reinach's distinction be-
tween modal and material necessity quite different from that provided 
by Hedwig Conrad-Martius in the introduction to the Gesammelte Schriften 
(pp. xiii-xvi). The first remarks she makes about the article, to the 
effect that Reinach has shown Kant's interpretation of Hume to involve 
the confounding of logical and ontic categories, are valuable. The 
statements (see p. xv) that modal and material necessity are relations 
of two states-of-affairs and of two objects respectively, are, however, 
simply not in accordance with Reinach's position. Likewise her claim, 
that it is implicit in the article that modal necessity is grounded on 
material necessity, is not substantiated by any remarks in the paper. 
This claim is particularly misleading because of the extensive use 
by Reinach in the article of the term "material" in the sense of "causal". 
It is to be remembered that Reinach, like Husserl, maintained a strict 
distinction between the empirical and ideal spheres and strongly rejected 
attempts to obtain ~ priori laws through induction from particulars of 
the empirical sphere. Conrad-Martius' claim that it is clear that no 
modal necessity can subsist objectively for itself, which was to follow 
from the above, is likewise misleading and unsubstantiated by the article. 
Object and Objectivity. -- Reinach's analysis of objects and objectivities 
is of significance for clarification of his theory of states-of-affairs. 
The parallel aspect --the analysis of the concepts of these objects and 
objectivities -- is of similar significance in connection with his theory 
of judgments and propositions and will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the 
1 Ibid., pp. 29-32. 
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article1 devoted to examination of Kant's views on rules governing valid 
reasoning, Reinach comes to the conclusion, in opposition to Kant, that 
judgments are ultimately never made about concepts, but rather, immediateLy 
or mediately about objects or objectivities. The judgment about "this 
particular tree" has as its immediate subject a determinate single object. 
Judgments "about" concepts ("tree") have as their ultimate, though 
mediate, subjects, all objectivity insofar as it falls under the given 
2 
concept. Moreover, Reinach later asserts that the concept "triangle" 
in the statement, "This is a triangle," refers to the essence (Wesen) of 
3 
the object (Gegenstand), what it is, (Was~ ist). 
Individual objects, whether physical (and thus material, extended, 
colored, etc.) or psychic, are said to "exist". They have a certain 
duration in time and therefore a beginning and an end in time. "Tree in 
general'', like the number "2", has none of these characteristics. Yet 
Reinach maintains that they are not "nothing", because~ can make valid 
positive and negative statements about such objectivities (Gegenst~nd­
lichkeiten).4 "Ideal objectivities"5 is the term Reinach chooses to use 
to refer to these "entities" in order to distinguish them clearly from 
real particular objects. Ideal objectivities are then divided into two 
groups: those to which there corresponds an unbounded set of individual 
objects (examples: "tree in general" and "all particular trees") and 
1 RVK,GS, pp. 36-55. 
2 RVK,GS, pp. 48-49. 3Ibid. , p. 54. 
4
rbid. , p. 43. This is one of the points where Reinach clearly 
appears to presuppose a correspondence of the structure of language and 
thought with the structure of objectivity. The sense and relation of 
this point of view to Reinach's work in general will be examined below. 
5ideelle, not ideate, see Ibid., p. 44. 
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those to which no such set corresponds. The latter (such as 11 211 "4" 
' ' 
and propositions) are said to be themselves individual. Thus while all 
real objects are individual, ideal objectivities may be individual or 
1 
"general". 
Reinach counters his earlier statement, that ideal objectivities 
are not "nothing", by raising the question, left unanswered in this con-
text, of whether and in what sense one can speak of ideal objectivities 
. 2 
as having 11an existence outside consciousness. 11 This question is later 
raised again and in part resolved by claiming a mode of being for ideal 
entities which is not existence in the sense of real being, but 11 ideal 
existence11 • 3 However, Reinach always maintained that knowing, by essence, 
does not involve the creation or production of a being, but rather its 
d . 4 ~scovery. This implies at the very least some strong form of independ-
ence from consciousness for ideal objects and objectivities. 
Reinach remarks that he has dealt only with generalities of 
1In his article entitled 11 Bemerkungen llber das Wesen, die Wesenheit 
und die Idee,'' (JfPupF IV, 1921), pp. 495-543, Jean Hering sets forth a 
detailed series of distinctions between Wesen, Wesenheit, Idee, 
Allgemeinheit, and Gattung. The article was based on notes taken in dis-
cussions in courses with Husserl and Reinach in 1913. Many of the 
distinctions made by Hering do not appear explicitly in Reinach's articles, 
but appear to be in general accord with his position. 
2 RVK,GS, p. 44. 
3 The Russell of logical atomism is not willing to allow this option, 
asserting instead that particulars, sense-data, are the only real entities 
and all other "entities" are logical constructions. Earlier, Russell had 
asserted that: 11 being is a general attribute of everything, and to mention 
anything is to show that it is," (Principles of Mathematics, para. 427), a 
position not equivalent to that of Meinong, though it is often said to be, 
nor, of course, to that of Reinach. 
4 PN,GS, p. 374. 
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concrete unities, such as triangles, men, trees, etc., and not with 
general qualities such as triangular, red, etc. Reinach suggests that 
the latter may lie on a different level. The analysis of states-of-
affairs, such as the "being-b of A", in the article on negative judgments 
contributes to the clarification of general qualities, though Reinach · 
makes no overt mention of the relation of the two topics. 
The objects and objectivities with which the preceding paragraphs 
dealt were GegenstUnde and GegenstMndlichkeiten, not Objekte. Thus it is 
clear that Reinach is concerned with entities under the aspect of being 
correlates of a grasping act, an intentional act. The term "object" in 
the sense of Gegenstand is further clarified in the article on Paul 
1 Natorp's definition of psychology. It is in the third sense of 
Gegenstand as that which is foreign to the "I", transcendent to the con-
sciousness, rather than that which belongs to the "I" as a function, 
state-of-being, act or subjective experience (i.e., all that which can 
be executed by and in the "111), which Reinach intends by his use of the 
term. A tree which appears to the "I 11 in an hallucination and the unicorn 
which is the subject of a dream are also transcendent in this sense. 2 
States-of-affairs subsist.-- The question of whether and in what sense 
ideal objectivities may be said to have an existence outside consciousness 
was posed by Reinach in his article criticizing Kant's view that judgments 
1Ibid.' pp. 351-376. 
2Ibid., pp. 364-65. See LI, p. 866, for the example of a tooth-
ache where-rrthe perceived object i;-not the pain as experienced, .but the 
pain in a transcendent reference as connected with the tooth." Husserl 
observes that error may also be involved as in the case where the pain 
appears to come from a sound tooth. 
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1 
are made about concepts. States-of-affairs, Reinach maintains, are 
completely different in nature from objects whether real or ideal, (for 
example: things, tones, experiences, or numbers, propositions, and 
2 
concepts, respectively). Among the main characteristics which result 
from this difference in nature are that states-of-affairs, unlike real 
or ideal objects, can stand in relations of cause and effect and of 
3 ground and result, be negated, and take on modalities. 
Real objects are said to exist and ideal objects to exist 
4 ideally. States-of-affairs subsist (bestehen). The concept of states-
of-affairs in no way includes its subsistence as an essential moment, 
just as the existence of an object is distinguished from the object. 
Thus certain states-of-affairs, such as, the "being-gold of a mountain", 
5 
and the "being-round of a square" do not or cannot subsist. The 
fundamental difference between states-of-affairs and objects is that when 
a state-of-affairs does not subsist the contrary state-of-affairs 
necessarily subsists and vice-versa, while for non-existing objects there 
. 6 is no corresponding obJective existent. Reinach does not claim to have 
produced a conclusive definition of states-of-affairs and, in fact 
questions whether it is possible to do so for "such final objective 
structures 11 as states-of-affairs and things. This point of view is in 
accord with his view that essences can be grasped only as they are given 
together with their essential connections, only in the medium, so to speak, 
1 RVK,GS, pp. 36-55; see above Chapter II, section b, Object and 
Objectivity. 
2 NU,GS, p. 82. 
4
rbid., p. 85, nt. 1. 
3
rbid. , pp. 82-85. 
5 Ibid., p. 85. 
6rbid., p. 86. This characteristic of states-of-affairs will be 
seen to be of key significance for Reinach's theory of judgments. 
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of essential laws. 
Reinach thus does not claim a real existence for states-of-
affairs, but he does assert that the denial of the objective subsistence 
of states-of-affairs in general is the contrary-to-sense position of 
absolute scepticism in the theory of knowledge. The laws of states-of-
affairs are said by Reinach to be in fact the foundation of most of the 
1 
traditional logical laws governing propositions and judgments. Here 
Reinach can be said to be trying to win "believers" in the validity of 
the law of contradiction over to support of the analogous law of states-
of-affairs. We must supplement Reinach's position by asserting that many 
states-of-affairs actually require a many-valued logic. This is clearly 
the case for those states-of-affairs which take on modalities in the 
range between necessary and impossible, and for states-of-affairs of 
2 
values. This view is in fundamental agreement ·with Reinach's point that 
the laws of logic must be grounded in the nature of the subject matter, 
the objective states-of-affairs to which propositions refer. 
Reinach insists that the being "in" a state-of-affairs, such as 
the "being-b of A", is not to be con:founded with the mode of being of 
the state-of-affairs, the subsistence or non-subsistence of the state-of-
1 Ibid. , p. 113. 
2The development of deontic, modal, imperative, tense, and action 
logics, and logic applicable to a specific subject matter such as law, is 
reviewed by G.H. von Wright in "The Logic of Practical Discourse," 
Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Raymond Klibansky, (Firenze: La Nuova Italia 
Editrice, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 141-167. Von Wright illustrates the 
difficulties which early attempts to discuss denotic relationships 
involved with references to Husserl's LU, part I, 1900, and E. Mally's 
Grundgesetz des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens, Graz, 1926. 
0 
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affairs itself. 1 This is clarified by considering the relationships 
whereby the subsistence of the "being-b of A" is coordinated with the 
non-subsistence of the "not-being-b of A", though in the case of the 
non-subsistence of the "being-b of A" the coordinate state-of-affairs 
is the subsistence of the "not-being-b of A". A state-of-affairs such 
as the "not being-b of A" is called a negative state-of-affairs and is 
said by Reinach to subsist in the ~ sense and with the same objectivity 
as any positive state-of-affairs. 2 Like Stump£ and Husserl, Reinach 
regards the sphere of the objective·to include, but be greater than, 
that of reality. A subjective interpretation of the negativity of 
states-of-affairs is found to be neither necessary nor possible. 3 In 
connection with his explication of the constitution of negative and 
positive states-of-affairs Reinach emphasizes that the term "constitution" 
is not to be misunderstood as implying that states-of-affairs themselves 
areproduced by constituting acts. The proper sense of "constitution"--
including the various functions--is rather as the means by which a state-
of-affairs is built up ~ and for "meaning" (Meinen). 'tvJe know," Reinach 
asserts, "that the negative states-of-affairs, just like positive states-
of-affairs, subsist whether or not they are represented, known, believed, 
meant and asserted by anyone."4 
1 NU,~, p. 91. For this reason Reinach regards the assertions 
of Meinong, UAz, p. 61 and Ameseder, "Beitdlge zur Grundlegung der 
Gegenstandstneorie", Untersuchungen ~ Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, 
ed. Alexius Meinong, (Leipz : J. A. Barth, 1904, pp. 51-120), p. 72, 
that the "Objektiv" "is Being and has Being" (Sein ist und Sein hat) as 
highly misleading. 
2 NU,GS, 
4Ibid., 
"constitution" , 
p. 93. 3rbid., p. 93. 
p. 104, see below pp. 58-59 and Chapters Ill and IV on 
"meaning", and "functions". 
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Negative and positive objective states-of-affairs either subsist 
or not and it is the resultant four alternatives--subsistence of a 
positive state-of-affairs, non-subsistence of a positive state-of-affairs, 
subsistence of a negative state-of-affairs, and non-subsistence of a 
negative state-of-affairs--which form the basis for Reinach's ciassifica-
1 
tion of the types of judgments. 
The existence (or non-existence) of an object is a state-of-
affairs. Assertions, such as "x exists 11 , are assertions of the subsistence 
of states-of-affairs. An assertion is a judgment by .virtue of the act 
of asserting 11x exists" as opposed to simply saying "x exists", which 
could also be a conjecture. The same state-of-affairs can be the content 
of a variety of intentional acts--belief, knowledge, doubt, question, etc. 2 
We therefore consider it to follow immediately from Reinach's position that 
the full objective referent of a judgment in the strict sense (whether a 
conviction or an assertion) is not simply the state-of-affairs, positive 
or negative, but the state-of-affairs together with its subsistence or 
non-subsistence. It is only in this way that it is possible to maintain 
that a distinct objective referent corresponds to each of the four types 
of judgments identified by Reinach. It is necessary to make this claim 
in order to support Reinach's claim that the laws of traditional logic are 
1 See Chapter 'IV, below, for discussion of Reinach's theory of 
judgment.s. 
2As for Russell (''Logical Atomism", in Logic and Knowledge, Essays 
1901-1950, ed. Robert Charles Marsh, (London: George, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 
1956), p. 220, hereafter cited as LK), belief is not of objects, but rather 
"that so and so, etc. 11 Belief propositions were troublesome for Russell, 
particularly after his exclusion of the "subject" or ''act" as a 
constituent of ·a presentation ("On Propositions", in LK, p. 305), and his 
rejection of "Brentano's view that mental phenomena are characterized by 
'objective' reference", (p. 306). A comparison of logical atomism and 
early phenomenology provides strong arguments for the value of the concepts 
of "intentionality" and "constitutive acts" for attempts to clarify the 
nature of relationships of consciousness and being, (see below, pp. 63-65). 
c 
. 58 
actually founded in the laws of states-of-affairs. 
Well-formed states-of-affairs.-- Reinach does not use the phrase "well-
formed states-of-affairs", but it is useful in expressing his point 
that states-of-affairs, as they are constituted for meaning (Meinen) in 
assertions, cannot be simply t~rown together in arbitrary fashion out 
of any elements whatsoever, but rather only in accordance with determinate 
1 f . . . 1 aws o const~tut~on. It is the form, not the content of the state-of-
affairs, which is described by these laws. A state-of-affairs of the 
form "the being-b of A" must be constituted out of elements of the forms 
A and b. These essential elements may be supplemented by elements 
2 
unessential for the formal constitution of the state-of-affairs. Though 
it may at first glance appear that this is a case where Reinach argues 
that the structure of objective states~of-affairs corresponds in a one-
to-one relation to the structure of language used to refer to states-of-
affairs, this is not the case. According to Reinach it is strictly 
within the sphere of meaning (Meinen) and therefore of assertions, not 
in the sphere of knowing convictions (erkennende Uberzeugung), that 
the concept of function, required for constituting any state-of-affairs 
more complex than "the being-b of A," has its place. Thus, while a 
single state-of-affairs is set forward in the assertion "A is b and c" 
by means of the connecting function, in the sphere of knowing conviction--
where no connection is constituted--two states-of-affairs are represented. 
Reinach asserts, however, that the role of the functions is founded and 
justified on the objective states-of-affairs and their objective relations. 
1For an analogous point see Russell, "On Propositions", 1919, in 
LK, on non-interchangeability of relations and terms. 
2 NU, GS , p. lll. 
C' 
59 
Only when an objective negative state-of-affairs subsists may a negation 
function act within the sphere of meaning in reference to this state-of-
affairs. 1 There may be certain problems of detail here. An assertion 
involving a function, for example, is said to be grounded on the 
objective relations of states-of-affairs by means of, or mediated by, a 
knowing conviction. In knowing convictions, however, the functions have 
no role although more than one state-of-affairs may be represented. It 
is clear, however, that Reinach is by no means arguing for a "grammatical" 
objective structure, but rather making use of the constitutive 
activities of intentionality. The pitfall of one-to-one correspondence 
is to be avoided in attempts to interpret and extend his position. As 
an aid to avoiding confusion, states-of-affairs will henceforth be 
referred to as either 11 constituted" or "objective". This distinction 
for the most part is not made explicit by Reinach in his writings and can 
only be inferred from the context in which each individual state-of-
affairs is discussed, as we shall do in accordance with the distinctions 
clarified above. 
Husserl had been straightforward in his rejection of a "picture-
analogy" whereby the complexity of meanings reflects the complexity of 
2 
the objects presented by these meanings. His treatment of the ~ priori 
laws governing combinations of meanings was developed, not in terms of 
states-of-affairs as they are constituted for meaning (Meinen), but in 
terms of ideal forms of independent logical propositions--"this tree is 
green", "this S is P". 3 A comparison of this discussion with the 
1
see below, Chapter III, on "meaning". 
211, pp. 494-95. 3~. ' pp. 511-13. 
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position of Reinach presented above shows, on the one hand, the funda-
mental significance of Husserl's work for Reinach's position and, on the 
other hand, provides many examples of the manner in which Reinach both 
reformulated and developed more fully certain aspects of Husserl's 
phenomenology. Thus while Reinach attempted to provide specific 
analyzes of negation, conjunction, etc. --a project suggested in the 
Logische Untersuchungen--he does not pursue this analysis within the 
context of developing a pure logical grammar as envisaged by Husserl. 
Reinach's attention is turned to. this problem--that of functions--only 
because their clarification is required for the development of an 
adequate theory of judgment. His point of reference is, in the end, 
always the objective states-of-affairs. This strongly directs the 
course Reinach's analysis takes. Husserl considers the incompatibilities 
1 2 involved in both the combinations "a man and is" or "King but or like", 
3 
and "a round square". Reinach, however, evidences concern only with 
the latter--which Husserl in the context of pure logical grammar had 
4 
referred to as a meaning which "itself exists" --presumably because only 
for such a meaning can the question of the nature of its objective 
referent even arise. 
Negative States-of-Affairs. -- A key characteristic of states-of-affairs 
(particularly for the theory of judgments) is that they, unlike objects, 
can take on negation. Reinach asserts that there are no negative objects 
or qualities corresponding to the negative linguistic abbreviations used 
in the judgments "the rose is not red" and "the non-smokers enter any 
1 Ibid. , p. 517. 2 Ibid., p. 522. 
3 Ibid., p. 523. 4 Ibid. , p. 517. 
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section." In both cases the complete reference is rather to a negative 
state-o£-affairs,--"the rose is something that is not red," and "those 
1 people who do not .smoke enter any section. 11 
Going beyond Reinach's position, we may argue that the role in 
these judgments of the phrases referring to negative states-of-affairs is 
similar to that which Reinach attributed to concepts. Concepts, logical 
elements, were said to set forth the universality of objectivity under 
which a particular object was to be grasped. In the case of reference 
to objective negative states-of-affairs we find the universality of 
objectivity involved to be set forth by means of the negation of some 
constituted positive state-of-affairs. The objective negative state-
of-affairs, such as the "not-being b of A", may be then referred to in 
a judgment, not by a concept, but by a phrase of the form "that A is 
not b". A self-sufficient assertion can be made about this objective 
negative state-of-affairs, such as--11It is the case that A is not b", 
or, as is seen above, a phrase referring to the objective negative 
state-of-affairs may perform the function, within a more complex state-
ment, of a "negative concept". There can be no negative concepts, as 
such, for concepts refer to unbounded sets of particular objects and 
we accept Reinach's view that there are no negative objects. Analogously, 
we argue that there are no negative qualities. Yet, the information 
conveyed in a statement of the type, "This x is a y' and 'y is not z"', 
or '"This rose is a thing' and 'the thing is not red"', .may be more 
or less precise depending upon the number of alternatives there are to 
the elements negated--(for example: "today is not Monday" conveys more 
1 
NU,GS, p. llS. 
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information in this sense than the statement ''this month is not 
November"). 
Reinach's comments to the effect that objects and essences are 
knowable only within states-of-affairs and essential connections suggest 
that it is possible, again going beyond his position, to argue that all 
concepts of ''unitary entities", including "smoker", "1 ion", and "rose", 
etc., are logical abbreviations whose full objective referent is not 
simply an unbounded set of particular objects falling under that con-
cept, but rather an unbounded set of particular objects falling under 
that concept insofar as they are "subject" elements of objective states-
of-affairs. Likewise in response to Reinach's question about general 
1 qualities, we suggest that concepts of general qualities (redness, 
squareness, evenness, etc.) are logical abbreviations whose full 
referents are the unbounded sets of particular qualities falling under 
those concepts respectively insofar.as they are the "predicate" or 
"predicate elements" .2! objective states-of-affairs. 
Reinach's statements about states-of-affairs include one assert-
ing that many positive and negative states-of-affairs may be grounded in 
the same thing-like unitary complex (dingliche Einheitskomplex) or sub-
sisting fact (Tatbestand). 2 Though both negative and positive states-
of-affairs "subsist in the same sense and with the same objectivity" our 
1 RVK,GS, p. SS. 
2NU,Q§_, p. 85. Reinach does not use the term "Tatsache" but 
rather the term "Tatbestand. '' See also NU,GS, pp. 79, 81, 88, and 89. 
The mode of being of facts, in this sense,-rs apparently subsistence. 
The subsistence of a fact is dependent on the existence or non-existence 
of empirical things and their properties just as the subsistence of a 
state-of-affairs is a function of the subsistence or non-subsistence 
of essential connections. Thus the levels of "founding" and 
"foundedness" are in the end clearer than the precise labels Reinach 
intends to use for the various modes of being. See below, pp. 76-81. 
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knowledge of negative states-of-affairs is derivative, being based 
on knowledge of contrary positive states-of-affairs. There is no 
1 
objective element corresponding to the categorial element "not" and 
thus the list of states-of-affairs which can be simply 11 read of£ 11 from 
objectivity contains only positive states-of-affairs. 
Russell set forth the analogous view that sensible facts are 
always positive. 2 Although a detailed comparison of logical atomism and 
early phenomenology is beyond the scope of this thesis, certain similarities 
and differences in the work of Russell and Reinach are of particular 
interest. Russell's and Reinach's claims, for example, that there are 
negative facts and negative states-of-affairs, respectively, were both 
made in response to the problems surrounding objective reference of 
negative and false propositions. Russell admits negative and positive 
facts, but not what he calls "false facts". Thus for any fact there 
were said to be two corresponding propositions--one positive and one 
3 
negative--only one of which is true by reference to the fact, whereas 
Reinach's subsisting and non-subsisting negative and positive states-
of-affairs made possible a one-to-one correspondence between a state-of-
affairs and a true or false, positive or negative proposition. Negative 
facts allowed Russell to explain what happens when you make a positive 
assertion that is false and made possible the analysis of molecular pro-
positions as truth functions of atomic facts. 4 Reinach's contention 
1An important problem of intentionality lies hidden here. See 
below, Chapter III. 
2110n Propositions", in LK, p. 317. 
3LK, p. 187. 
411Logical Atomism, 1918 1 in LK, p. 287. 
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that the subsistence of a positive state-of-affairs entails the non-
subsistence of the corresponding negative state-of-affairs, etc., was 
paralleled in part by Russell's assertion that there is always one 
fact of a pair of correlated facts but not both. Reinach would have 
accepted the view that the term "not" in a proposition corresponds 
to no objective element but is rather a symbol for an ultimate and 
irreducible difference between negative and positive facts or states-of-
1 
affairs. 
Negative facts and propositions continued to provide Russell 
with problems, however. All "word propositions," whether or not they 
contained the term "not", were themselves regarded as positive facts 
though some were verified by positive objectives, others by negative 
objectives. The mediate stage between a 11word proposition" and the 
facts referred to was the 11 image proposition" which contained no 
duality of content corresponding to positive and negative facts but was 
2 
rather believed or disbelieved. This was awkward as it followed a 
rejection of "subject" or 11act" as constituent of a presentation3 and 
of belief as consisting in a multiple relation of the subject to the 
objects constituting the objective. 4 Russell himself noted that the 
resulting gulf between the content and the objective made it doubtful 
in what sense we can be said to "know" the objective. 5 
1 
"On Propositions," in 
2Ibid,, p. 317. 3 Ibid. , p. 305. 
4 Ibid., p. 306 .. 
5
rbid., p. 307. See also, above, pp. 52, 57, 58, and below 
pp. 68, 73, for other comparisons with Russell's position. 
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Reinach's phenomenology could claim to deal with many of the 
questions over which logical atomism stumbled by virtue of the functions 
performed by intentionality and the variety of constitutive acts of con-
sciousness. The value of the concepts of "intentionality" and 
!!constitution" for Reinach's attempts to clarify various relationships 
of consciousness and being will become more apparent in the following 
three chapters. 
A key distinction between objects and states-of-affairs, accord-
ing to Reinach, is that the latter take on negation while the former 
never do. Our interpretation regards this difference between states-of-
affairs and objects to be grounded in the fact that the relational being 
expressed in predication--often by the copula--is not independent of the 
state-of-affairs but is founded in the objective connection of the 
1 
elements of an objective state-of-affairs. Negation of an objective 
state-of-affairs is thus a negation of this objective connection, the 
"relational being". Relational being is the ideal objective correlate 
of the categorial form "being" in the copulative sense. In a judgment 
it is precisely this categorial "being" and thus the whole constituted 
2 
state-of-affairs which can be negated. 
The use of the term "not" as a means of "pushing away" a non-
essential element--as in "the car was not driven fast", where the non-
1The subsistence, on the other hand, of states-of-affairs--like 
the existence of objects--is in no way included in the concept, "State-
of -Affairs'i, or in the concepts of individual states -of-affairs. 
2 
This interpretation presupposes Husserl's discussion of the 
ideality of categorial forms, one of which is 11 relational being"; see LI, 
pp. 780-84. 
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essential element is "fast",--is distinguished from negation by Reinach. 
This may be applied to the "negation" of causal judgments, left unclarified 
by Reinach, as are causal judgments as such, by arguing that in the case· 
of a judgment referring to a causal relation--an empirical non-essential 
relation of two states-of-affairs--it is the necessity qualifying the 
predicate (the causal necessity) which is 11pushed away". Either this or 
some similar explanation must be applied to the "negation" of causal 
relations and relations of ground and result for these are relations of 
two states-of-affairs, whereas the negation function effects only an 
individual state-of-affairs. 
An alternative would be to regard a constituted causal relation 
as a higher order and, of course, contingent state-of-affairs and the 
corresponding objective causal relation as an empirical relation of two 
states-of-affairs. Take the case "A is the cause of B", where 11A11 and· 
"B" are understood to be successive temporal events which are both in 
the past. At the most primitive level there are simply the two states-
of-affairs--"the existing of A", "the existing of B". In fact this is 
not the most primitive level; for, as events, "A 11 and "B" both involve 
processes such that a more accurate statement might involve "the 
becoming-z of A", etc. In the following we shall nevertheless use the 
shorthand "the existing of A". 1 As successive temporal events in the 
past they stand in an essential connection by virtue of the essence of 
time itself. A possible expression of this connection, containing the 
above states-of-affairs as objective elements in a higher order state-
1 
A more literal formulation would be "the being-existing of A" 
and "the being-becoming-z of A". Although that formulation would 
maintain the parallel with the form of the general case, "the being-b 
of A", it has been avoided as it is awkward. 
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of-affairs, is "the being-before the existing of B of the existing of 
A". The constituted causal relation asserts that given the subsistence 
of the objective state-of-affairs "the existing of B", the objective 
state-of-affairs "the being before the existing of B of the existing 
of A'', necessarily subsists. And since, as noted previously, the sub-
sistence of a state-of-affairs is no more included in its concept than 
the existence of an object is included in its concept, the negation of 
the constituted causal relation is merely a negation of the necessity 
of the subsistence of the state-of-affairs, not a negation of the 
state-of-affairs. The negation of the constituted causal relation could 
then take some form such as: "If the existing of B subsists, then the 
being-before the existing of B of the existing of A does not necessarily 
subsist." 
Modality.--Reinach refers to degrees of probability and possibility as 
"modality". The "being-b of A", a state-of-affairs, not an object, may 
be possible or probable. As in the case of negation an object cannot 
take on modality, though the existence of the object, the state-of-
affairs, "the existing of A", can. Reinach states that this difference 
is grounde~ in the essence of the respective forms of objects and states-
of-affairs.1 Extending his remarks, it can be argued2 that since 
1 
My interpretation of Reinach's position on modality differs 
fundamentally from that given by Irmingard Habbel, (Die Sachverhalts-
" --problematik in der Phanomenologie und bei Thomas ~ Aquin, (Regensburg: 
Jose£ Habbel, 1960), p. 53): that modality is related to the subsistence 
of a state-of-affairs only as it is meant in a judgment, only as it is 
grasped. Moreover, Habbel's entire approach to the "states-of-affairs 
problematic" differs from mine. Terminological differences between 
early phenomenologists, which are, of course, not to be passed over, 
assume too major a role in her interpretation with the result that the 
context within which they arose and the problems which they were intended 
to clarify are lost from sight. Habbel's tendency to overlook precedents 
for certain of the "originaln distinctio.ns made by Hedwig Conrad-Martius 
may have resulted in part from this emphasis on terminological differences. 
2 . 
As above, pp. 65-66, for negation. 
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modality apparently qualifies "being"--which in the case of the existence 
of an object is not included in the concept of the object and in the 
case of the subsistence of a state-of-affairs is not included in the 
concept of the state-of-affairs--the only being which it is possible 
for modality to qualify in a constituted state-of-affairs is the 
relational being expressed in predication and founded in the objective 
modality of the connection of the elements of the objective state-of-
1 
affairs. 
In his discussion of the probability (modality) of the existence 
2 
of an object, i.e., of a state-of-af~airs, Reinach does not associate 
this topic with elements involved in the non-existence of a golden 
mountain (contingent) and of a round square (necessary) or the non-
subsistence of the "being-gold of a mountain" (contingent) and of the 
"being-round of a square" (necessary). Not only are the distinctions 
involved in these examples, presented by Reinach as though they were 
distinct, closely related, but the two extremes, necessity and 
impossibility, are actually the ideal limits of probability. These ideal 
limits pertain only to states-of-affairs containing an essential ~priori 
connection--as in the case of the round square--and are clearly excluded 
by the contingent nature of states-of-affairs which contain non-essential 
connections, In not associating the ideal limits with the probability 
1
see Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Das Sein (Munich: K3sel, 1957), pp. 
19-31, for another attempt to clarify the "being'' immanent to states-of-
affairs. 
2 . 
Compare with Russell who regarded existence and modality as 
properties of prepositional functions, not of individuals and propositions. 
( 11Logical Atomism'', in LK, p. 231-32). 
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of which they are the limits it might be said that Reinach is merely 
being consistent in maintaining a strict distinction between the 
empirical and a priori, the real and ideal, realms. However, from 
the above it is seen that necessity, probability, possibility, and 
impossibility belong to the same category--we may still call it 
modality--just as negation in general belongs to one category even 
though the implications of the laws stating its relationships are 
weaker for states-of-affairs containing non-essential connections 
than for those containing essential connections. 
Reinach claims that the non-subsistence of a state-of-affairs 
entails the necessary subsistence of the contrary state-of-affairs. 
This point can be granted immediately for states-of-affairs involving 
essential connections. It is clear that it also holds for contingent 
states-of-affairs, and thus for those involving probability as well 
as for any other state-of-affairs which by nature of its subject--
such as values--admits of degrees. A comparison of the following 
statements we have set forth to illustrate various cases indicates, 
however, that the implications of the necessary relationships of the 
subsistence and non-subsistence of negative and positive states-of-
affairs are not equally strong for our knowledge of every state-of-affairs. 
It is not the case that today is Monday. It is not the case that 3 < 2. 
It is the case that today is not Monday. It is the case that 3 $: 2.-
It is not the case that today is not It is not the case that 2+2=5. 
Monday. 
It is the case that today is Monday. It is the case that 2+2¥5. 
It is not the case that this number is It is not the case that x+y~z. 
odd. 
It is the case that this number is not It is the case that x+y=z. 
c odd. 
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It is not the case that this number is 
not odd. 
It is not the case that x+y=z. 
It is the case that this number is odd. It is the case that x+yrz. 
It is not the case that the next card w~ll probably be a Jack. 
It is the case that the next card will probably not be a Jack. 
It is not the case that the next card will probably not be a Jack. 
It is the case that the next card will probably be a Jack. 
The above pairs of statements regarding subsisting and non-
subsisting states-of-affairs (the order of each pair, of course, is not 
relevant since each member of a pair entails the other) provide varying 
amounts of information. In all the cases involving non-subsistence of 
positive states-of-affairs and subsistence of negative states-of-affairs 
the question of what positive state-of-affairs does subsist is, 
strictly speaking, left unanswered--even for the case of the subsistence 
of the "not-being-odd-of-a-number" or of the "not-being-less-than-or-
equal-to-two-of-three". This is more obvious for the subsistence of the 
"not-being Monday of today". The amount of information conveyed in each 
of these three cases and all others of this type depends on the context 
and our knowledge of it. Within the standard arithmetic framework we 
are quick to add to the above--"therefore the number is even," and 
"therefore three is greater than two." The reader has probably already 
done this and may even now be shaking his head over these "trivialities". 
If so he must stop and note that he was assuming "that numbers are either 
even or odd" and "that any ·number is either greater than, less than, or 
equal to any other number. 11 Likewise the subsistence of the ''not-being 
Monday of today," only when taken together with the subsistence or non-
subsistence of certain other negative or positive states-of-affairs, can 
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entail the subsistence of a positive state-of-affairs which in turn can 
be the objective referent of a statement of the form, "It is the case 
that today is ---". 
Nor do we find the cases involving the subsistence of a positive 
state-of-affairs and the non-subsistence of a negative state-of-affairs 
to be always more conclusive, though those such as the subsistence of 
"the being odd of this number" and "the being Monday .of today", immediately 
provide what was asked for above--the subsistence of a positive state-of-
affairs. The inconclusive cases of this type are precisely those 
involving probability or possibility--modality between the two ideal 
limits. Like all cases of the type above these cases require knowledge 
of certain other subsisting or non-subsisting positive and negative 
states-of-affairs, if knowledge of the subsistence of a positive state-
of-affairs, which can be the objective referent of a statement of the 
form--"the next card will be a ---," is to be achieved. 
In the necessary subsistence of "the being three-sided of a 
triangle", a state-of-affairs involving an essential connection, taken 
together with the simple subsistence of the "being red of this rose", 
the possible subsistence of the "being gold of a mountain", the probable 
subsistence of the "being a Jack of the next card", and the impossible 
subsistence of the "being round of a square" (a state-of-affairs invol-
ving essential contradiction), we have exhibited examples of the range 
of modality. We find necessary states-of-affairs to be characterized 
in addition by the fact that it is possible to apply negation to either 
the state-of-affairs, its subsistence, or both, without doing violence 
to either the sphere of ideal meanings or implying basic change in the 
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structure of objectivity, ~ long ~ simple, possible, or probable 
states-of-affairs and thus the subsistence of states-of-affairs between 
the ideal limits alone is involved. The two ideal limits, necessity 
and impossibility, are governed by stricter laws than the simple, 
possible, or probable. These laws are grounded in the objective 
. 1 
essential connections of the states-of-affairs to which they pertain. 
Relations and states-.Qf-affairs.--Reinach states quite clearly that 
states-of-affairs are not relations and defends his position by an 
1 
See Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, II/1, 
11 -- -- -- -- ---(Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1965), pp. 292-315, for a valuable discussion 
of 11 negative states-of-affairs11 • Ingarden argues (p. 293) that to deny 
the 11 seinsautonome Bestehen der negativen Sachverhalte" would produce 
great difficulties for the understanding of the principles of ontology 
and logic; the principles of contradiction and the excluded middle 
presuppose at least the possibility of the subsistence of negative states-
of-affairs, Reinach's claim that there is no ontological distinction 
between negative and positive states-of-affairs is examined (pp. 300-315). 
Ingarden finds it correct that negative states-of-affairs cannot be 
"read off" (are not "ablesbar"), but wishes to know why. In the case of 
the state-of-affairs referred to by the judgment "A is not b", A is, 
Ingarden asserts, "seinsautonomous", while "b" is not but could be, 
Rather, 11 b" is here the pure intentional correlate of an act of thought. 
Therefore, Ingarden concludes, negative and positive states-of-affairs 
are not on the same level of being. Yet the negative state-of-affairs 
is not a "reine ~ rationis" (Duns Scotus), for when "A is not b" is 
true there is some fact (Tatsache) to which it corresponds. Ingarden 
therefore speaks of the negative state-of-affairs as having a side of the 
11 seinsautonome Sein" in itself and claims that the degree to which negative 
states-of-affairs are made overt is a reflection of the level of interest 
of the knowing subject. Ingarden approaches this topic again by asking, 
whether a negative state-of-affairs can be a cause of a result: '~ie kann 
etwas 1wirken', was nicht da ist?" (p. 312). The ensuing discussion points 
to the diversity of negative states-of-affairs which can be coordinated 
with a single positive state-of-affairs and finds the former to be of 
meaning for the knowledge of objects (Gegenst~nde). Ingarden concludes 
that there are many cases, other than negative states-of-affairs, of 
higher layers built on seinsautonom~us objectivities though these layers 
are not seinsautonomous in the same sense. This indicates to Ingatden 
that the concept of Seinsheteronomie is not "empty" but has an essential 
application in various situations. 
The work of Roman Ingarden is representative of many of the 
c 
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analysis of the judgments "A is inherent in B" and "A is similar to B". 1 
The 11being-similar of A and B" is a state-of-affairs, but could also be 
regarded as a 11 relationn. Reinach finds the term "relation" to be 
ambiguous. Left and right, above and under, as well as being-left and 
being-under, may all be called "relations". Reinach regards the last 
two examples--only these are states-of-affairs--as fundamentally different 
from the first four. Left is said to be related to being-left as red is 
to being-red. 
The ambiguity of the term "relation" allows five interpretations: 
1) A state-of-affairs is never a relation and a relation is never a 
state-of-affairs; 2) All relations are states-of-affairs; 3) All states-
of-affairs are relations; 4) All states-of-affairs are relations and 
conversely; 5) Some states-of-affairs are relations and some relations 
are states-of-affairs. Reinach eliminated the first and second inter-
pretations with the examples above of 11being-left 11 and "left" respectively. 
Three and four are eliminated by the example of "the being-red of a rose"--
a state-of-affairs which is not a relation. States-of-affairs of only 
one term--"being-red11 , "being-smooth11 ,--are even more striking examples. 
Such one term states-of-affairs can be believed and asserted in judgments 
of the form "it is warm", "it is smooth11 • 2 The fifth interpretation 
11 
tendencies and interests of the early Gottingen phenomenology in a more 
fully developed form. He was evidently cognizant of the later work of 
Husserl but himself chose to pursue questions with an ontological focus. 
A comparison of the work of Ingarden with that of Reinach, Hering, 
11 
Scheler, and Husserl from the Gottingen period would therefore be of value 
for any attempt to assess the potential of the so-called "realistic" 
branch of phenomenology. 
1NU,GS, P• 90. 
2
compare with Russell: the content of a belief may in some cases 
be a simple image, not of the form "that ... ", though 11 important" beliefs 
are always of the latter form ("On Propositions'', in LK, p. 307). 
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alone was not eliminated. Reinach observes that if relations were never 
states-of-affairs then they could not be judged, save insofar as they 
were contained as objective elements in states-of-affairs--such as the 
"being-similar of A and B". 1 
Reinach believed that the old question of the essence of the 
impersonal judgment could be solved at one stroke by means of reference 
to the one-term states-of-affairs. 2 When we say, "it is warm", the 
warmth can be said to belong to the wind blowing from the south, for 
instance, but need not be. Reinach maintains that it would be a con-
struction of the worst sort to claim that the warmth must be connected 
to the "surrounding space", to the 1't:otal ity of being", or to the "chaos", 
for these would then also have to be perceived in order to ground the 
statement "it is warm". Rather "warmth" alone is all that need be 
perceived, the "being-warm" is what is known, and it is this one term 
state-of-affairs to which the judgment, "it is warm", refers. "Being-
warm" has all the characteristics of states-of-affairs (it can be negated, 
take on modalities, etc.). Yet as a simple "being-so", and not the 
3 
ubeing-so of some object", it is distinct from other states-of-affairs. 
Reinach asserts that the judgment "it is warm" cannot refer to the 
"situation" which we call warmth, for a "situation" is clearly not a 
state-of-affairs. Moreover, he has maintained that by essence a judgment 
refers to a state-of-affairs. He shows that "warmth" is an ambiguous term 
applying both to a situation and a state-of-affairs by means of analysis 
of the distinction between pleasure (or any other feeling) referring to 
lNU,GS, p. 92, see below Chapter IV. 
3rbid. , p. 118. 
2 NU,GS, p. 92. 
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objects (warm drink) and situations (warmth) and pleasure referring to 
the state-of-affairs which is the objective correlate of the statement, 
"it is warm". This ambiguity is regarded as explaining the tendency 
to erroneous interpretations of impersonal judgments as references to 
situations rather than to states-of-affairs. Situations cannot take 
on modalities, be negated, etc. Judgments involving modalities, 
negations, etc., therefore can be understood only if they refer to 
1 
states-of-affairs and not to situations, Simplified, the argument 
runs: we make impersonal judgments, all judgments are about states-of-
affairs, therefore impersonal judgments are about states-of-affairs. 
The argument, as such, is sound but only if it is indeed the case that 
all judgments are about states-of-affairs. Arguing more positively 
emphasis must be given to Reinach's implicit point--that situations, like 
2 
objects, ground states-of-affairs but are not states-of-affairs. 
1fbid., pp. 119-120. 
2Brentano had also discussed judgments of this form in his review 
(in the Wiener Zeitung, Nov. 13 and 14, 1883; reprinted as an appendix 
to VUSE, lst ed.; see for English translation, OKRW, pp. 98-108) of Franz 
Miklosich's Subjektlose S~tze (Vienna: BraumU11~1883) (subjectless 
propositions). Brentano regarded arguments that the subject referred to 
was Zeus, or Chaos, as absurd and supports Miklosich's general position. 
Brentano found it preferable, however, not .to call these propositions 
"subjectless propositions" or "predicate propositions" as this might lead 
to the assumption that they are a type of stunted subject-predicate 
propositions, but rather "simple propositions" or "existential propositions". 
In the Psychology Brentano had argued that every judgment (his later view 
claimed this only for truly unitary or simple judgments) could be 
expressed without loss of meaning in the form of a subjectless proposition 
or, as he preferred to call it, an existential proposition. 
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Reinach's argument included stating that the second term of 
the one term state-of-affairs is somehow "present" (vorhanden) but need 
not be grasped in the judgment. We find the function of "it", in the 
statement "it is warm", to be analogous to the function of categorial 
elements such as "all", "that", "this", etc., which are used within a 
context and serve to provide a ''view" (Fassung) of the universality of 
objectivity to which reference is being made. Concepts and categorial 
elements, insofar as they both function in this manner, bear a strong 
similarity to one another which may be of relevance in clarifying the 
nature of their intentional reference. 1 
Reinach's ontology,--The use of the phrase, "Reinach's ontology", 
should not be allowed to mislead; none of Reinach's writings contain an 
explicit or comprehensive statement of the ontological assumptions 
involved in his position. To a large extent his methodological position 
would have rendered such a statement premature, for he had by no means 
completed the range of work he presumably would have wished to examine 
in formulating such a statement. We can sketch, however, an outline of 
the ontological assumptions which appear to.underlie his work. 
Reinach was a realist. That characterization alone, however, is 
also misleading. A diagram of his world could be given the following 
form: First--and it is for this reason we have said that Reinach was a 
realist,--there are the real individual objects whose status as real 
entities is completely independent from their being the intentional 
correlates of conscious acts. These objects exist and have a beginning 
1 See Chapter IV, below, for development of this interpretation. 
!! See also Husserl, LI, pp. 314-20, pp. 682-87, and Reinach, UP,GS, p. 391. 
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and an end in time. Events, situations, and causal relations, all real, 
are all founded on the existence and alteration of these real objects. 
To this point we have been entirely in the empirical realm. 
Now let us take the case where real objects are the intentional 
correlates of conscious acts. On the one hand an analysis of the nature 
of this intentional relation is required. For the most part it can be 
analyzed as an empirical relationship involving acts and processes. 
More of that is to come in the following chapters. Reference to another 
realm of objects, however, is also involved in this analysis. The status 
of the referents of the concepts by means of which we think and talk 
about real particular objects and their relationships must be identified. 
Judgments, beliefs, and so forth are not, in Reinach's view, about 
concepts, but instead about objects, objectivities, and (we have argued) 
qualities. To those objects and objectivities about which we can make 
meaningful positive and negative statements, though they are not real 
individuals, Reinach attributes "ideal existence". Both the number "2" 
(individual) and 11 tree in general" (general) exist ideally. Reinach 
never makes the status of general qualities, such as "red" and "triangular", 
clear. We suggest that they too should be said to exist ideally, for they 
function on the same level as ideal objects and objectivities in relation 
both to essences and to states-of-affairs. 
Reinach maintains that these entities (and qualities) exist 
ideally, are objective, and are independent in this objective, ideal 
existence, of consciousness. He thus forges a path mid-way between an 
unmitigated realism, for which all objectivities are real, and idealism 
in which consciousness creates and sustains its objects in existence. 
0 
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His position is distinct as well from that of Stump£ who had qualified 
the latter position yet still asserted the logical dependency of 
Gebilde on psychic functions. We referred to Stumpf's position earlier 
. as that of the agnostic--meaning in this instance among other things 
being unwilling to say with Reinach: "they are independent of 
consciousness", and instead reserving judgment on the issue by stating: 
"they are real insofar as they are the objects of a true judgment. 11 
For Reinach objectivity thus includes both ideal and real 
existents. By attributing to both kinds of existents a status independ-
ent of consciousness Reinach avoids idealism and scepticism. An 
objective ground for judgments about objects other than real individuals 
is maintained. How one can come to know other than real individuals 
is a distinct question. The completed diagram is given below. 
individual real facts individual ideal facts 
(subsist or not) objective states-of-affairs (positive/negative) 
(necessary) 
(possible) 
(impossible) 
essential connections (analytic/synthetic) 
essences 
(ideal existence) general ideals (entities, qualities) 
(exist) real individuals 'deal individuals (ideal existence) 
Below the double line we have all the objective elements; above, all the 
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1 
objective connections, relations, and facts resulting from the combina-
tion of these objective elements. Moving away from the line in both 
directions, correspondingly successive "founding" and nfounded" levels 
are passed through. To each of the general ideal objectivities there 
corresponds an unbounded set of the individual real and ideal entities. 
\~e have argued as well that to each of the general qualities there 
corresponds an unbounded set of real particular ones. The general ideal 
entities and qualities are not to be regarded as consisting of the 
unbounded set to which they correspond; presumably there are general 
ideal entities such as "unicorn" and "round square" even though each 
of these correspond to an empty set of individuals, in fact and by 
necessity, respectively. Separation of general and individual retains the 
order of "founded and ''founding". 
Each of the entities and qualities, real or ideal, has an 
essence. Reinach does not identify any mode of being for essences though 
it is clear they are objective and non-temporal. We are of the opinion 
that the reason was not a desire to distinguish essence and existence in 
traditional fashion.but rather reflected Reinach's insistence that it is 
impossible to grasp essences without imposing arbitrary definitions save 
in the medium of essential connections. 
Connections between the relevant essences correspond to each and 
every real or ideal connection of real and ideal entities and qualities. 
Like essences, essential connections are not said to "exist", "to be11 , or 
"to exist ideally". Yet the connection is the objective correlate of the 
1
see above, p. 62 on Reinach' s use of the term "fact". 
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ideal "relational being", expressed in predication, and the whole 
essential connection including the essences connected is said to found 
a state-of-affairs that in turn subsists or does not subsist. 
The diagram is over-simplified and we will not attempt to 
improve upon it, believing that such attempts are doomed to failure by 
the nature of the problem. It serves, however, to illustrate certain 
aspects of Reinach's position. One is the above-mentioned levels of 
11 founding" and "foundedness". To these hierarchic ontological relation-
ships there correspond those of knowledge. Moreover, to know is not to 
know an object, but that the object is so-and-so. Thus knowledge about 
all of the entities below the double line--essences, general entities 
and qualities, real and ideal individuals--is obtained only through 
knowledge of the facts, states-of-affairs, and essential connections into 
which these objective elements enter. Yet more precisely it is states-of-
affairs that are known and thus only indirectly can facts, to which there 
may correspond many states-of-affairs, and essential connections, which 
ground states-of-affairs, be known. 
Concepts and constituted states-of-affairs are the means by which 
we think and talk about objects and the objective states-of-affairs into 
which these objects enter as elements. General objectivities (including 
qualities) and objective states-of-affairs lie at one level removed from 
the individual objects and facts. It is no coincidence that general 
concepts and constituted states-of-affairs lie at one level removed from 
self-given individual objectivities and facts. In the following two 
chapters we sha.ll present many such parallels in the structures of 
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intentionality, objectivity, propositions, and judgments, Not an 
idealist, not a sceptic, Reinach regarded evident knowledge as grounded 
in the self-givenness of objectivity. Parellels in structure such as 
those found above both result from Reinach's view of the nature of 
evident knowledge and, once established, serve to sustain and explicate 
that same view. 
-
Chapter III 
Intentionality and Evidence 
The last chapter was concerned with Reinach's response to the 
questions: "What do we know?" and "To what do judgments refer?". This 
chapter will ask how we have access to objects, states-of-affairs, and 
essential connections; what is the nature of the relationship of con-
sciousness to being; what is "self-givenness11 ; how are states-of-
affairs constituted for "meaning"; and what constitutes evidence. The 
1 
work of Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl is of significance in connection 
with these questions, as it was for those of the last chapter, for their 
work was a source for Reinach both of fundamental method and unanswered 
or inadequately answered questions. 
2 
a) Brentano and Husserl. 
In 1874 and for many years thereafter Brentano regarded what 
1 See above, pp. 29-32. 
2The scope of the dissertation permits only a sketch of the 
development of the notion of intentionality. There are available more 
articles dealing with the topic than there are for states-of-affairs; 
11 See: Herbert Spiegelberg, 11Der Begriff der Intentionalitat in der 
Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl", in PhiloSO£hische Hefte, ed., 
Maximilian Beck, V (1936), pp. 72-91. In English see R. M. Chisholm, ed., 
Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Glencoe, Illinois: The 
Free Press, 1960); Aron Gurwitsch, 11Towards a Theory of Intentionality", 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX (1969-70), 354-67; Aron 
Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness", Studies in 
Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), pp. 124-40; and James C. Morrison, "Husserl and Brentano on 
- 82 -
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he then called "intentional inexistence" as the common characteristic 
1 
of all psychic phenomena in contrast to all physical phenomena. 
"Intentional inexistence" signified the perceptibility of an object in 
inner consciousness, consciousness being defined as any psychic appear-
2 
ance insofar as it had a content. Representations, providing the 
content, were basic to all psychic acts and phenomena for "nothing can 
be judged, nor can anything be desired, nothing can be hoped for or 
feared, if it is not represented. 113 The full implications of the dis-
tinction between psychic and physical phenomena emerge with Brentano's 
claim that psychic phenomena alone can be immediately and adequately 
grasped as self-evident. Psychic phenomena were distinguished into 
three fundamental classes--representation, judgment, and affectivity--
each characterized by a distinct type of intentional relation. Though 
judgment and affectivity in general were said to be open to error, 
Breritano claimed that some judgments and affective acts were based on 
4 
self-evidence rather than on habit or instinct. Affective acts were 
5 
not to be regarded as cognitive though they were based on the cognitive 
acts of representation and judgment. 
The intentional relation to an object was perhaps the richest 
Intentionality", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXXI (1971), 
27-46. For a non-historical approach to intentionality see, R.M. 
Chisholm, Perceiving: ~ Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1957) and Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969). 
1 PVES, I, pp. 115-118. I, p. 181. 
3 Ibid., p. 104; see also OKRW, p. 14. 
4oKRW, pp. 18-22. SPVES, I, p. 312. 
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and most influential of the ideas developed by Brentano and at the same 
time one of the most easily misunderstood. 1 As early as 1889 Brentano 
2 
stressed that something represented as an object need not be actual. 
The nature of the correlation between thoughts, concepts, "contents" 
of consciousness, and their referents was problematic however. A £rag-
ment from around 1902 asserts a correlation between the-thinking-of-a-
horse and the horse-as-something-whi.ch-is-thought-about. By 1905 
Brentano had come to regard this correlation as merely linguistic, not 
conceptua1. 3 In 1889 the content of an idea had been regarded as having 
a mental existence, 4 while in 1905 Brentano insisted that what we think 
about is the object (horse) and not at all "the object of thought" in 
5 the sense of contemplated horse. In a letter to Anton Marty, Brentano 
explains that the term "immanent object 11 had been meant to distinguish 
the object of thought (horse), which may or may not exist, from object 
(res) in the unqualified sense. 6 In the case of the "immanent object" 
its being an object, however, is merely the linguistic correlate of the 
person experiencing having it as object, i.e., his thinking of it in 
his experience. 7 During this same period Brentano was pursuing the 
closely related battle against "the infinite multiplication of entities."8 
1 See below, Chapter IV, on Brentano's use of the intentional 
relation in his analysis of judgments. It is only through such analysis 
that the richness of the concept of intentionality can be fully grasped. 
2 OKRW, p. 14. 
3TE, pp. 26-67, p. 154, nt. 29. Brentano was by 1905 giving 
careful attention to the analysis of linguistic forms. 
4 
· TE, p. 42. 5 Ibid. , p. 77. 6 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
7 Ibid., p. 78. 8 Ibid. , p. 86. 
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Brentano's treatment of the topic of evidence was of major 
importance for the development of the Husserlian doctrines of direct 
and apodeictic intuition and evidence; Brentano affirms the lack of 
rational grounds for claiming that a judgment is immediately evident. 1 
Ultimately the experience of insight itself is the only referent by 
which to justify claims of evidence. 2 This is essentially the view of 
evidence found in Husserl' s writings. Brentano states: ''any judgment 
which is thus seen by one person to be true is universally valid; its 
contradictory cannot be ·seen to be evident by any other person; and 
anyone who accepts its contradictory is ipso facto mistaken."3 He 
emphasizes, however, that this "awareness of something being true for 
everyone" does not imply 11an awareness of a universal compulsion to 
believe. 114 This point of view is also found in Husserl's arguments 
against "psychologism".s 
It is the aspect of referring to an object or being directed to 
an object, rather than the immanence of the object in the intending con-
sciousness, which has been important for phenomenology. Although Husserl 
loKRW, p. 20. 
3Ibid,, p. 80. 
2 OKRW, p. 20, p. 78. 
4Ibid. , p. 80. 
5see Oskar Kraus' Introduction and Notes to Brentano's Wahrheit 
und Evidenz for a comparison of the work of Brentano and Husserl on these 
and related topics. It was the opinion of Kraus that Husserl never went 
beyond the stage of Brentano's Psychologie (PVES) of 1874 in questions in 
the theory of knowledge, see TE, pp. 146-47. Both Husserl and Brentano, 
however, at later stages of their work than Kraus here cites, distinguish 
between being in the sense of truth and being in the sense of being a 
thing. There thus continue to be strong parallels between significant 
aspects of their work after the 1874 edition of Psychologie (PVES) and the 
early lectures. 
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continued to enrich his analysis of intentionality, the Logische Unter-
suchungen and Ideen I contain all the distinctions clearly presupposed 
by Reinach's writings. In the Logische Untersuchungen Husserl made his 
position in contrast to that of Brentano clear, further expanding the 
notion of "manner of reference" in his recognition of essential 
1 
differences in intentional relation; dispensing with "immanent intended 
objects", truly immanent contents, which render an intention possible, 
2 
not themselves being intentional; retaining representation as the 
ultimate, though not always immediate, basis for all ~;3 and admitting 
that not all psychic content is intentional4 as, for example, the sensed 
. 5 
visual field which contains many parts not intended. 
The distinction between the object and the object as it is 
6 intended allows for a variety of distinct intentions of the same object. 
Intentional essence also can be differentiated, however, by "act quality", 
in addition to 11act matter" and "semantic essence". 7 Husserl's analysis 
of simple and complex acts and intentional objects, and the recognition 
of founded and founding acts and their respective ("higher and lower order") 
objective correlates8 is of great importance for Reinach's work, as is the 
notion of intentionality "constituting" its intentional objects. The dis-
tinction between simple intending and fulfilled intending lays the 
foundation for the identification of the goal of absolute knowledge as the 
1LI, pp. 554-55. 
3Ibid. , p .. 598 
5Ibid. , p. 556. 
2 
4 
LI, pp. 557-60. 
Ibid. , p. 385~ 
l'c 0 Ibid., p. 578; this view had previously been set forth by 
Brentano in PVES. 
7Ibid., pp. 586-87, 597-98, 601. etc. 
8rbid., pp. 580-Bl. 
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adequate self-presentation of the object of knowledge1 and the development 
of the notion of levels of knowledge. 
The claim of apodeictic evidence for the self-givenness of the 
essential in adequate intuition has been highly problematic for 
phenomenology. The Logische Untersuchungen (1st ed.) and Reinach's 
I! 11 Harburg lecture, "Uber Phanomenologie", both have been said to contain 
2 
a naive theory of evidence. Be this as it may, the work of the early 
phenomenologists does display a high level of sensitivity to problems 
of evidence, illusion, error, and to the influence of practical interests on 
beliefs, decisions, judgments, actions, etc. They recognized both the 
inadequacy of the evidence for most of what we usually claim to "know" 
and the significance of the role of knowledge of essences and of 
essential connections for our knowledge of particulars, however, inadequate 
that knowledge might be, as well as for our ability to communicate mean-
ingfully with one another regarding these particulars. It is easy to see 
how within this position the avoidance of total scepticism could appear 
to demand the possibility of 'absolute knowledge, in the ideal case, of 
essences and essential laws. Husserl did not allow the case to rest with 
its treatment in the Logische Untersuchungen, but pursued the question 
of the nature of phenomenological criteria for.~ priori and eidetic judg-
ments and in the Cartesian Meditations recognized the need for a critique 
of apodeictic evidence. 
1rbid.' p. 720. 
2David Michael Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p.~3--cited hereafter as 
RE, and Alexander von Baeyer, "Adolf Reinachs Ph~nomenologie: Untersuchungen 
- 11 11 ' 
zum Verhaltnis van phanomenologischer Forschung und Geschichtlichkeit 11 
(Dissertation, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bern, Hunich: 
Mikrokopie, 1969), p. 19--cited hereafter as ARP;--respectively. 
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Recent criticism indicates a wide-spread dissatisfaction among 
phenomenologists with the notions of adequacy, self-evidence, "apodeictic", 
etc. Winthrop claimed to have only the "faintest glimmerings 111 of what 
is meant by the concept of "adequacy" and called for a study of the 
constitution of error in the phenomenological reduction. Levin has 
given these issues a sustained treatment and calls for recognition of 
the hypothetical nature of "~ priori" and "necessary" knowledge, 
hypothetical because dependent on "the nature of a human consciousness 
2 3 
who dwells in the world". Like Gardies, Levin can conceive of "the 
philosophically significant eidetic possibility of a different meaning 
for the transcendent world", and of "the possibility of a consciousness 
which, as structured eidetically in critical knowledge, may be very 
different from the familiar."4 Early phenomenologists would probably 
find strong traces of "psychologism" in these comments. Levin qualifies 
his criticism by remarking that eidetic consciousness is "a mode of 
consciousness with a very special title and dignity" whose evidence is 
"so constituted that doubt relative to the present, temporally determinate 
5 
evidential state-of-affairs would be unwarranted, even absurd." 
1Henry Winthrop, "The Constitution of Error in the Phenomenological 
Reduction", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IX (1948-49), 741-748. 
2RE, p. 169. 
3Jean-Louis Gardies, "La philosophie du droit d'Adol£ Reinach," 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, X (1965), 17-32. 
4 RE, p. 170. 
5
rbid., p. 200. See also, Herbert Spiegelberg, 11Phenomenology of 
Direct Evidence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II, pp. 427-56. 
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b) Intentionality and Evidence in Reinach's work. 
This section will attempt to identify Reinach's contributions 
to the theories of intentionality and evidence. The standard for 
evaluating his position will be the degree to which it provides an ade-
quate explanation of the manner in which judgments can be grounded on 
knowledge of objective states-of-affairs. Attention will be directed 
particularly to the distinction between assertions and convictions, the 
analysis of the act of "meaning" (Meinen), and the relation between 
language and intentionality. The distinction between grasping something 
objectively given and taking a position to that object will be seen to 
be of fundamental significance for the various reflective processes whose 
aim is the achievement of insight and the production of an assertable 
judgment. 
Evidence.--Reinach's remarks on evidence include making the distinctions 
between mediate and immediate, and positive and negative evidence, 1 as 
well as the related observation that the type of evidence has an 
essential relation to the type of objectivity known. Thus, for example, 
states-of-affairs containing essential connections can be grasped as 
necessary with indisputable evidence, while the necessity of causal 
2 
relations is not evident. There is no final absolute evidence for 
claims of real existence. Perception of motion, for example, is regarded 
by Reinach as providing neither absolute evidence nor the lack thereof, 
but rather an "evident indication" of its actual existence, which does 
not, however, guarantee the existence of motion. The fact that we can 
intuitively visualize motion, on the other hand, gives us absolute 
1 See below, pp. 121-34. 2 KAH,GS, pp. 12-13. 
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evidence of its existential possibility. The same evidence is given 
for the possibility of the existence of a golden mountain, the 
impossibility of a colored tone, and the possibility of the existence 
of God. It is as impossible to show the existence of motion to be 
impossible by essence as it is to show the existence of God to be 
necessary by essence. Claims of real existence may thus be supported, 
but not guaranteed, by perception. 1 
Reinach argues that lack of final evidence is not a mark of all 
empirical knowledge; final evidence pertains to statements of the form, 
"I see a house", though not to the statement "there stands a house". The 
1 u See pp. 409-412, in Adolf Reinach, 11 ber das Wesen der Bewegung", 
in the Gesammelte Schriften (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921), pp. 406-61;--
cited henceforth as WB,GS. Edith Stein prepared this text for publica-
tion on the basis of Reinach's notes and notes from the seminar on the 
topic in which she and Roman Ingarden (see pp. 11-12, above), among 
others, took part. Reinach did not complete his study of the problem and 
the work was by no means left in final form. In its published form it 
contains an analysis of continuity and the essence of the traversing of 
space, the re.sults of which are then applied to Zeno' s paradoxes. 
Although the discussion is not complete, its central points, as drawn 
together by Edith Stein in her concluding note, allow for the following 
argument: A motion is a continuous process, which.cannot be thought of 
as a series of single processes set together. The space which is traversed 
in an unbroken motion is a continuum. Therefore, to overtake the hare, 
Achilles must perform not a series of tasks, but only one task (unless 
it is prescribed that he must stop at intervals, which is quite a 
different matter). Such a continuous motion involves the passing of 
infinitely many points. 
Alexander Koyre, in his article dedicated to Reinach, "Bemerkungen zu den 
Zenonischen Paradoxienn, (Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und ph~nomenologische 
Forschung V, 1922, pp. 603-628), noted that, as shown by Reinach, the 
elements relevant to dissolving Zeno's problems were infinity and continuity, 
and that these problems were to be found in all areas in which these two 
elements play a role. Reinach's analysis of continuity is also used by 
Edith Stein in her discussion of the continuum of qualities formed by 
feeling~states (Beitr~ge zur philosophischen BegrUndung der Psychologie 
und der Geisteswissenschaften", in Ibid., 1-283, p. 30). The analysis 
of continuity is also referred to by Hedwig Conrad-Martius ("Realontologie", 
I. JfPupF, VI(l923), 159-333, p. 210), and byKurt Stavenhagen in 
reference to heard tones as a secondary temporal continuum (Person und 
" --Personlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie und Ethik, ed. by Harald 
Delius, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957, p. 51.). 
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evidence for some ~priori knowledge is mediate; not all ~priori 
knowledge can itself be intuited, but instead must be derived from 
those final connections intuitable in themselves. Reinach vigorou~ly 
opposed all attempts to ground final ~ priori connections on facta 
1 
which can themselves be grounded only through the former and insisted 
2 that essential laws are never to be assumed~ Reinach regards the 
attempt at a clear and articulate grasping of objects to be open to all 
3 
the possibilities of illusion that any knowledge involves. 
In the discussion of the essence of motion Reinach observed that 
it is self-evident that all motion requires a bearer. However, Reinach 
asserts, this 11ontic 11 proposition may not be confused with the "noematic" 
proposition, which Linke4 derived from it, that "motion can only be given 
to us as motion of something moving". Ontic connections cannot be trans-
£erred without further ado to the acts in which the elements of this antic 
connection are grasped. I can speak of motion and "mean" motion without 
at the same time meaning something which moves. 5 This section is signifi-
cint in relation to Reinach's position on questions of knowledge and 
evidence, for it may be interpreted as a statement that there is no 
necessity for essential (antic) connections to be given to us in our 
intuition of an objectivity. 
Although Reinach's remarks about the great difficulty of achieving 
adequate intuition and his caution in the course of concrete analysis 
indicate great sensitivity to problems of evidence, the results of his 
1" UP,GS, p. 399. 2rbid. , p. 403. 3Ibid., p. 405. 
4Paul F. Link.e, 11Ph~nomenologie und Experiment in der Frage der 
Bewegungsauffassung," Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phaHomenologische 
Forschung, II (1916), 1-20. 
5 WB,GS, pp. 425-426. 
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analysis are immediately thrown into question on two grounds in addition 
to those mentioned above. The free variation of essences is to result 
in evident insight into ~priori essential connections, but there is no 
methodological standard for determining an end or a range for this 
theoretically infinite process of variation. Interest, experience, and 
unexamined pre-judgments, may all influence the range of variation as, 
of course, phenomenologists of this period were by no means unaware. 
Secondly, insofar as the intuiting of essences and essential connections 
in any way presupposes other less adequate forms of givenness, such as 
the perception of real objects, the insight gained through intuition 
becomes hypothetical. These points of criticism will also be of relevance 
in evaluating Reinach's ethical and legal philosophy. 
Givenness of objectivity. -- Reinach states that objects are ~whereas 
the states-of-affairs containing these objects are known, not seen, in a 
new and distinct act, Likewise, in any form of perception (hearing, 
smelling, feeling, etc.) and in any categorial intuition the objects are 
first grasped and then on the basis of these "representations" (Vorstell-
ungen), the state-of-affairs, whose elements these objects are, may be 
known (erkannt) by means of a new and distinct act. The type of represen-
tation differs according to the type of object represented, but there is 
only one type of act of knowing a state-of-affairs. Objective states-of-
affairs may also be visualized, (as in the case of a remembered 
representation). Visualization of a state-of-affairs is based on 
1 
visualized, not represented, objects and things. Reinach suggests that 
1 
NU,GS, pp. 87-88. 
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there may also be perception of subsisting objective states-of-affairs 
(though, it is to be inferred, not of non-subsisting states-of-affairs) 
though he does not wish to discuss this point. 1 It appears unlikely 
that he would have been able to argue for this point while maintaining 
the strict distinction between states-of-affairs ("the being-red of this 
rose") and the things ("this red rose") in which those objective states-
of-affairs are grounded. 
The act of knowing (erkennen), distinct from all other ways of 
relating intentionally to states-of-affairs, is fundamental for Reinach's 
theory of judgments as the means for grounding convictions on objective 
states-of-affairs. 2 Even in the case where an objective state-of-affairs, 
previously known, is now merely visualized as grounding an identical 
conviction, the act of knowing remains, though mediately, the means by 
which the conviction is founded on objective states-of-affairs. Reinach 
emphasizes that knowing is distinct from all judgments, both assertions 
and convictions. Unlike convictions, knowing does not admit of degrees 
of certainty. 3 Lack of certainty may lead to the formation of a doubt, 
also an intellectual position-taking, as is a conjecture. Reinach states 
that one may see a "bicycle-rider" approaching and form a judgment to 
this effect, based on an act of knowing, even when the "bicycle-rider" 
4 turns out actually to be a cow. This example serves to assure us 
that Reinach is by no means presuming to have eliminated problems of 
error and illusion. 
1 Ibid., p. 89. 
2Reinach's treatment of the formation of positive and negative 
convictions will be discussed in Chapter IV. It should be noted, however, 
that the notion of "position-taking", fundamental to his theory of the 
formation of convictions, is an intentional relation, a manner of being 
intentionally related to an objective state-of-affairs. 
3Ibid. , pp. 89-90. 4Ibid., p. 90, nt. 1. 
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It would seem appropriate to give somewhat more attention than 
Reinach does to both the question of the degree of evidence of what is 
grasped in knowing (erkennen) and to the question of illusion and error 
in the acts of representation (perceptual and categorial) and visualiza-
tion of the elements of states-of-affairs. Inability to eliminate 
illusion and error in the latter respect would appear to entail either 
denying that acts of knowing, insofar as they are founded on representative 
and visualizing acts, grasp objective states-of-affairs with evidence, 
or admitting the hypothetical nature of the evidence pertaining to 
objective states-of-affairs grasped in acts of knowing. The degree of 
evidence in knowing must be 11essentially connected" with the level of 
certainty of the intellectual position taken to what is known in the 
ideal case, 
The pure "l" ~the "bearer of experience".--In an article criticizing 
Paul Natorp's General Psychologyl Reinach clarified the notions of 
"appearance", "object", and "subjective experience11 , all of which are of 
significance for interpreting the sense in which Reinach uses the term 
11 intentional relation". 
Central to Natorp's position was the view that since the psyche 
is subjective and can never be an object (Objekt), psychology is not an 
objective science. The moments of consciousness in Natorp's sense are: 
1) content, where content is taken in its widest sense as all that of 
which there is consciousness, 2) the "1 11 , and 3) a relation of the 111 11 and 
1Adolf Reinach11 "Paul Natorp, Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode", Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 1914, No. 4. Cited 
as it appears reprinted in the Gesammelte Schriften (Hal1e: Max Niemeyer, 
1921, pp. 351-376) as PN,GS. 
c 
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the content. But the "1 11 can never be a "content", it can never be "in" 
consciousness, it can never be an object (Gegenstand) of thought. We 
have only a reflection, as in a mirror, of the 11 I 11 , of consciousness. 
The pure "I" is neither a fact, nor an existent, nor a phenomenon, but 
rather the ground of all facts and all appearances. Therefore the pure 
111 11 and the pure relation to the "I" is not a problem for psychology, 
but the ground and prerequisite of all psychological problems. The only 
field of research for psychology is therefore the content of consciousness 
itself, all that in general of which one is conscious. 1 
In opposition to this position Reinach asserts that it is grounded 
in the essence of cogitations in the widest Cartesian sense that they can 
come to execution only as subjective experiences of an "I", (just as no 
real movement is possible unless something moves). Observation of sub-
jective experience, as such, leads us to the pure "I" as the necessary 
"bearer" of experience. The pure "I" is in each subjective experience and 
as such can come to self-givenness for us at any time. This, Reinach 
asserts, is what Descartes had in mind when he referred to the cogito as 
the starting point of our knowing. The pure "I" is not the empirical 
person, nor a thing with characteristics; it does not exist in the sense 
of a 11real existent" and is not a fact in the sense of "real facts". 
Rather, the pure "I" is unique and its being is given to us with irrefut-
able evidence, in contrast to the being of the outer world of perception. 
Although he admits that Natorp may be correct that no explanation of the 
pure "I" is possible, Reinach regards its clarification as both possible 
and needed. 2 
1
rbid.' pp. 351-56. 2 . Ibid., pp. 356-57. 
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In Reinach's view the grasping, as such, of the "I" cannot make 
the "I" into a "Not-I", and if the subjectivity of the "I" implies that 
it cannot be grasped, a petitio principii is clearly involved. The two · 
concepts of object (Objekt and Gegenstand) are ambiguous. The first 
(Objekt), by reference to the construction of something, sets what is 
not so constructed over against it as the non-objective 
(NichtgegenstMndliche). It is the second (Gegenstand) which refers to 
something as the correlate of a grasping act. This distinction is 
important here, for in grasping itself the "I" is both the bearer and 
the end point or correlate (thus Gegenstand) of the grasping act. Reinach 
sees no logical difficulty here, and therefore, unlike Natorp, no 
difficulty involved in the possibility of the "I" grasping itself. To 
Natorp's insistence that each relation has two terms, Reinach replies 
that this is true, but that the intentionality of consciousness is not a 
1 
relation in the sense of equality, difference, etc. 
In accord with his view that psychology is not an objective 
science, a science of objects (Objekte), Natorp had asserted that the 
relation of the "I" to a content cannot be made objective (gegenstMndlich) 
any more than the "I" can be made objective. Reinach wishes to know how 
it is possible for us to talk of the relation of the "I" to its content 
if this relationship cannot be "objectified", just as earlier he had 
asked the same question about the possibility of talking about the "I". 
He asserts, in opposition to Natorp, that seeing and hearing are examples 
of functions executed in the subject, for which an intentional relation 
to determinate types of objects (Objekte) is essential. Moreover, he 
1 Ibid., pp. 357-58. 
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continues, we can be conscious of functions (like seeing), but need not 
1 be. 
Reinach observes that another problem for Natorp lies in the 
terms "content" and "object" (in the sense of Gegenstand), Natorp 
ide·ntified these terms with 11presenting" and "representing" consciousness. 
This distinction is too fluid to be of use in clarifying the concept of 
psychology. Reinach therefore analyzes some of the senses in which these 
terms are used in psychology and philosophy. In the first case "object11 
refers to all that which is intended as such by the subject, while 
"content'' is all that which is in consciousness or there for consciousness, 
without being "intended". In this case., anything in the world which can be 
intended can be .an object and, moreover, that which is now a content can 
become an object in an instant. 2 
In the second case the sense of the terms is associated with the 
opposition between an object and the appearance of that object. Whenever 
we perceive, this distinction is relevant, as, for example, in our ability 
to see only ~ part of a box at once, not the whole, including the back-
side. Reinach admits that the problem of clarifying the essence of appear-
ances of objects is a difficult one. He finds it erroneous, however, to 
regard the appearance of the object as a separate object, which is then 
thought to stand over against the original object in a relation of equality, 
simila:dty, or dissimilarity. The result of this ·is that the appearance, 
falsified to an object, is regarded as the end-point of perception, with 
a separate role outside consciousness. This in turn, Reinach asserts, 
leads to senseless discussions as to whether the conclusion based on the 
1Ibid.' pp. 359-61. 2 Ibid., pp. 362-63. 
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"perceived11 appearance of the 11unperceived" object is correct or not, 
although in truth the object itself is what is perceived and appears to 
us in determinate and changing ways. These ways of appearing indeed 
"set forth there" the object for us, but are normally not the end-point 
of the grasping consciousness. Reinach emphasizes that in the moment 
in which we are intentionally directed to an object we have a conscious-
ness of it, not of its ways of appearing as such, and even less of the 
. 1 
connections of these ways of appearing to that which is appearing itself. 
The third case is often found in assertions of the absolute 
contrast of the two, i.e., of "content" and "object". Thus if "content" 
is said to be all that belongs to the "I" as a function, state-of-being, 
act, or subjective experience (i.e., all that can be executed by and in 
the "I"), then "object" can be said simply to be all that is foreign to 
the "I", transcendent to the consciousness, 2 
Reinach suggests that it is in the third sense of "object" 
(Gegenstand) and "content" (which is not a relative and changing opposition 
as it is for the first, and in a different way for the second sense), that 
the distinction lies which can be used to properly limit the field of 
psychology. The object (Objekt) of psychology is, Reinach asserts, 
content in the third sense. The laws grounded in the pure essences of 
perception, representation, judgment, will, etc., determine the sphere 
of an absolutely unique science, rational psychology. The relation of 
empirical and rational psychology is thus similar to that of natural 
3 
science and geometry. 
1Ibid. ' pp. 363-64. 
3 Ibid. , pp. 365-66. 
2Ibid., pp. 364-65. 
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Representation and meaning, --An "intentional" relation to an objectivity 
is essential to both convictions and assertions. The distinction between 
these two kinds of judgments--convictions and assertions--, first made by_ 
Reinach, is fundamental for his theory of judgments. Reinach developed 
this distinction in detail and found it to entail numerous differences 
in intentionality. Among these, the distinction between representation 
(Vorstellung) and meaning (in the sense of referring to, pointing at, 
1 Meinen), both intentional, is fundamental. The intentionality of a 
subjective experience entails that it has a "direction towards" 
objectivity which is somehow 11present" ("vorhanden11 ) for the consciousness. 
Not all intentional acts involve representation (Vorstellung), though the 
term "representation" does refer to many intentional acts--including per-
ception, memory, phantasy, indeed any intentional act in which something 
is "set before" me. Reinach finds an example of a non-representative 
intentional act in the act of saying a list of names while meaning (Meinen) 
each of the objects in turn to which the names refer. The objects named 
could be represented in a distinct act, but need not be. The act of 
1
spiegelberg ("tiber das Wesen der Idee: Eine ontologische Unter-
" . " suchung," Jahrbuch fur Ph~losophie und phanomenologische Forschung, 
XI (1930), 1-238) gives a sketch of the various senses in which the term 
"meaning" (Meinen) has been used by phenomenologists and non-
phenomenologists. He is undoubtedly correct that Reinach 1 s sense of 
''meaning" is not clear. This very lack of clarity leaves it open to 
interpretation. Spiegelberg suggests that "in jedem Falle setzt alles 
sinnvolle Meinen ein vermeintliches anschauliches Kennen des gemeinten 
Gegenstandes voraus und ist auf dieses intentional bezogen,'' (p. 123). 
Spiegelberg finds it possible to regard Reinach's sense of "meaning" 
to be that of a Meinen directed at nothing. We argue instead that Meinen, 
as used by Reinach, is intentional and does presuppose some sort of 
intuitive knowledge of the meant object. The intentional correlate 
actually given in the act of Meinen itself, however, appears to be limited 
to a mere 11 that 11 or "something" as the correlate of the unfulfilled con-
stituted meaning (Bedeutung). A mere "that" or "something" is, in any 
case, not "nothing". 
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1 
meaning is not used here in Husserl's sense and thus does not involve 
a turning toward the object, for this would presuppose the representa-
tion of the meant object. In defense of this distinction Reinach 
notes that we can speak of a row of objects, referring to them in an 
act of meaning, but a new act, that of representation, is required 
before we can turn towards them and observe them. In representation 
there are "essential connections" between the type of representative 
act and the type of objective referent, (colors are seen, tones are 
heard, etc.). There are no such distinctions for the act of meaning; 
. 2 
rather all meant objectivities are s~mply meant. 
Reinach emphasizes that meaning and representation are distinct 
acts. Either act may occur first and they may often overlap in occurrence 
as a result of the punctual nature of meaning and the enduring nature of 
representation. According to the circumstances an object that is at 
first merely represented may later be grasped in an act of meaning or an 
object that is at first simply meant later may be given in an act of 
. 3 
representa t ~on. 
The presence or absence of intuitive fulfillment has no relation 
to Reinach's distinction between meaning and representation. Reinach 
finds it doubtful that there are any absolutely unintuitive acts of 
representation. They could not, in any case, be equated with an act of 
4 
meaning in his sense. Representation, unlike intuiting, admits of no 
degrees and, in the case of sensible representation, for example, can 
1LU1, II, p. 129f. ; 1.!!z, II/1, pp. 129-130; LI, I, p. 356-57. 
2NU,GS, pp. 63-68, It is the observation that all meant (in Reinach's 
sense) objectivities are simply meant without distinction as to type, no~ 
the assertion of essential connections between types of representative~ts 
and objective referents, which is original. 
3 
. ' p. 66. 4 Ibid., p. 68. 
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include that which cannot be intuited (for example, the back-side of a 
box). In all sensible perception of things an aspect of the represen-
tation is always unintuited. The sense of "meaning" used by Husserl 
pertains to the way in which we meant this unintuited aspect together 
with the intuited aspect of the representation of the box. "Meaning", 
in Reinach's sense, can be seen superimposed on the above situation, 
where we have a representation of a box, by speaking with understanding 
h " h b k id f h. h . i ll 1 t e sentence t e ac -s eo t ~s t ~ng s .... 
An act of meaning (providing a reference to the object), though 
not one of representation, is found by Reinach to be required by all 
assertions. In an assertion, as such, that about which I make an 
assertion is not present to me, and is not visualized by me, though I 
may represent it in a distinct act. Assertions are grounded on convic-
tions and convictions, in turn, are grounded by acts of representation. 
But, in a conviction which endures when we have turned away from the 
state-of-affairs with which it is concerned, the reference to the objective 
state-of-affairs need not continue to be mediated by a representation of 
that state-of-affairs. Reinach does not wish to pursue an analysis of 
the intentional reference involved in this last case, but he does remark 
that there are many possible intentions towards the objective, represen-
2 tation and meaning being only two among these . 
. The sphere of judgments is divided by the distinction between 
representation and meaning into two spheres: assertions, which refer to 
the objective in acts of meaning and may or may not be accompanied by 
intuition; and convictions, which grow out of more or less intuitive acts 
1 Ibid., pp. 68-70. 2 NU,GS, pp. 72-74. 
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of representation. Acts not based on convictions founded on represen-
tation are not judgments in any strict sense but rather a somewhat 
vague "knowing about 11 • 1 
The act of meaning and the specific moment (in the sense of 
aspect, not of time) of assertion are also to be distinguished within an 
assertion, the former serving to relate the latter to the state-of-
affairs in which it is necessarily founded. The act of meaning is said 
to take on the qualifications reflected in the statements "is A b?" and 
"A is b". The case of "is A b?" is not given central treatment by 
Reinach, but it is clear that he attempts to absorb Husserl's "act-
1 • !I di • • 2 qua ~ty st1nCt1on. It appears that an adequate treatment of the 
distinction would require not merely qualification of the act of meaning, 
but also replacement of the "moment of assertion" by a "moment of 
questioning", etc., for questions and all the other types of speech-acts 
neglected by Reinach. Reinach devotes much attention to the distinction 
between assertions and convictions and to the point that assertions do 
not involve representation. In this context, however, he neglects the 
relation whereby assertions, if authentic, are necessarily originally 
founded on convictions. This relation of foundedness allows many assertions 
to be made from habit or on the basis of a remembered conviction and is 
recognized as being of significance later in this same article by Reinach 
in the more detailed discussions of the formation of convictions and 
assertions. 
The distinction made by Reinach between acts, like representation 
and meaning, in which we grasp an object in "having" or "aiming" and 
1 Ibid. , p. 74. 2Ibid., pp. 59-62. 
. -., 
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those experiences like convictions, striving, expectations, etc., in 
which we 11 take a position to something" is a highly useful one. The 
attempt referred to above--to make a place for the distinction between 
questions and assertions within the sphere of assertions (in the 
generic sense) by assigning this role to the act of meaning--was part 
of Reinach's response to the general problem of explaining the nature 
of the constitution of assertions of convictions. Convictions can take 
on a rich variety of forms in reference to an identical state-of-affairs 
in virtue of being "position-takings 11 • Ideally the sphere of assertions 
should include a similar variety. Reinach's theory of assertions is too 
restricted, however, to provide a solution to this general problem with-
1 
out making certain extensions. 
Assertions.--Reinach maintains that assertions must always be based on 
positive convictions, never negative ones, for it is the essence of 
assertions that they assert what is believed. A negative conviction 
(a disbelief that "A is b") must be changed into a .positive conviction 
in the contrary state-of-affairs ("the not-being b of A") before an 
assertion ("A is not b") can be made. Thus within the terms of his 
analysis no direct assertion of the negative conviction of a positive or 
negative state-of-affairs can be made. 2 Many statements, however, not 
of the form "A is b" or "A is not b", 3 do function as assertions and thus 
1we will return to the problem of the constitution of assertions 
in the following sections. 
2Examples of negative convictions of positive and negative states-
of-affairs, respectively: "It is not the case that the ball is red", and 
"It is not the case that the ball is not red." Reinach, of course, does 
not provide examples of assertions of negative convictions because he 
maintains that there are no such assertions. 
311The ball is red," and "The ball is not red 11 , are assertions of 
positive convictions of positive and negative states-of-affairs, 
respectively. 
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may be said to contain a "moment of assertion". Among these are to be 
included not only those of the form "It is not the case that ... " and 
"It is the case that ... " expressing negative convictions and positive 
convictions in a more explicit form (where the phrase "it is the case 
that" corresponds to subsistence of the objective state-of-affairs), 
but also statements involving expressions referring to objective modality. 
Likewise, it is possible to formulate more complex assertions in reference 
to higher order states-of-affairs, including those whose elements involve 
belief, disbelief, doubt, fear, wishes, desires, as well as any other 
"subjective states-of-affairs" regarded as transcendent. Such assertions 
would have the characteristics attributed by Reinach to assertions except 
that they would not all be based on "positive convic~ions", in the sense 
identified for that term by Reinach, though they would all be assertions 
of what is believed. 
Another example makes our arguments clearer. A disbelief that 
"A is b" is called a negative conviction by Reinach and must, in the 
terms of his analysis, be transformed into the positive conviction, the 
belief, that "A is not b" if it is to be asserted. The view suggested in 
opposition to Reinach is that the original disbelief that "A is b" is 
equivalent to a belie£ that 11 it is not the case that A is b11 , which is 
immediately assertable. This extension of Reinach's work would permit a 
more adequate theory of assertions. Without this extension the sphere of 
assertions is unrealistically impoverished. 1 
1see p.l21, nt.2, below, for an argument that the transformation of 
a negativ€ conviction in a positive state-of-affairs into a positive 
conviction in a negative state-of-affairs, as suggested by Reinach, may 
in some cases result in an erroneous assertion. 
0 
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A significant and characteristic difference between assertions 
and convictions is seen in the nature of the intentional relation to 
their objective correlates. 1 In convictions the objective correlate, 
the state-of-affairs, is grasped as given as a whole in an act of know-
ing, while in an assertion the elements of the state-of-affairs are 
meant one after another in succession in a series of acts. The objective 
unity of the elements of the objective state-of-affairs grounds the 
unification of the series of acts of meaning into a collective meaning. 
A series of categorial forms have their place in building up this 
collective meaning in and for consciousness. This view is in accord 
with his earlier statement that no intentional act passes to any 
objectivity unless on both sides necessary "ordering connections" 
(Zuordnungsverh~ltnisse) are present as a result of the subsistence of 
essential connections between the consciousness that formulates judgments 
and the objectivity to which these judgments refer. 2 This view presumably 
would hold, however, only for the case of the correct judgment and rests 
on the assumption that consciousness is somehow capable of formulating 
"ordering connections" which do indeed correspond to those of objectivity. 
The validity of this assumption reduces to the question of whether the 
"ordering connections" of constituted states-of-affairs, which form the 
content of our judgments, actually correspond to those of objectivity. 
The occurrence of erroneous judgments, which also involve "intentional acts" 
1Reinach analyzed in detail only spoken assertions, yet suggested 
that there are also inner, non-spoken assertions. Hermann Ritzel, "liber 
analytische Urteile: Eine Studie zur Ph~nomenologie des Begriffs, 11 
Jahrbuch flir Philosophie und ph1'nomenologische Forschung, III (1916), 
253-344, was of the opinion that "meaning" in Reinach's sense pertains to 
"silent assertions". 
2Nu,cs, p. 77. 
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passing to "objectivity", gives the lie to the above flat statement 
and suggests instead that all authentic judgments, correct or not, are 
the result of the belief that the "ordering connections" of the 
constituted state-of-affairs correspond to the "ordering connections" 
of the objectivity referred to by the judgment. 
and Functions.--It was in Reinach's analysis of the negative 
assertion ("A is not b") that the constitution of categorial forms by 
·means of various functions in the sphere of meaning, to which reference 
has been made above, received detailed attention. "And", "but", "also", 
"not", are all words without objective referents in the sense in which 
"tree", "Peter", "ball", etc., have objective referents. Reinach 
regards the use of the word 11and" in speech as the execution of the 
function of connecting or grasping together whereby the distinct elements 
are meant as connected together. The totality (Inbegriff) constituted for 
meaning by the connecting function is not a spatial or temporal unity. 
Nor, Reinach insists, is it to be confounded with synthetic apperception 
in which we grasp as a unity the objectivity represented; the "and"-
function belongs to the sphere of meaning in which nothing is represented. 
The totality (Inbegriff), "A and B", constituted by the function, ~be 
represented in a distinct act at any time, and then grasped or known as 
1 that which was constituted as connected in meaning (Meinen). 
The negation function operates on objectivity, rather than 
two as in the case of the connecting function. Moreover, this one 
objectivity is not an object, but rather an entire constituted state-of-
affairs that is negated through the medium of the negation of the copula. 2 
1
rbid. pp. 101-103. 2 Ibid. , p. 103. 
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The negative state-of-affairs is constituted in and for consciousness 
through the performance of the negation function. Insofar as a 
negative state-of-affairs is objective its subsistence or non-subsistence· 
is independent of any consciousness which performs constituting functions. 
"Constitution" as used here implies only that the negative state-of-
affairs is presented in and for the act of meaning by means of the nega-
tion function, that the negative state-of-affairs is constituted in and 
for consciousness in this manner, and not that the negative objective 
1 
state-of-affairs itself is "produced". As in the case of the "and"-
function, here there is also a distinction between representing and 
meaning, the function (negation) and what is constituted by the execution 
of that function (a negative state-of-affairs), and between the execution 
of the function and the representation of what is constituted by the 
2 
execution of the function. 
The negation-function, as is the case for the other functions, is 
not limited to constituting assertions, but rather has its place in con-
stituting all negative states-of-affairs for meaning. And thus while 
Reinach uses examples of statements involving negation that are not 
assertions to emphasize the distinct roles of the moment of assertion and 
the negation function in judgments, it appears feasible to extend his dis-
cussion of the constitution of states-of-affairs in and for meaning, which 
he limited to the objects of positive convictions, for statements of all 
forms. It may be presumed that he did not choose to do this because it 
lay outside the sphere of his set problem. 
libid. , p. 104. 2 Ibid. , p. 104. 
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Reinach maintains that the functions "and", "or", "but", etc., 
belong to the sphere of meaning alone and thus have no role in convic-
tions. The assertion "A is b and c" is said to set forth one state-of- · 
affairs by virtue of the "and."-function. The knowing conviction, 
however, on which this assertion is based, grows on the basis of the 
representation of two distinct states-of.:..affairs, "A is b11 , "A is c". 
Reinach maintained that a state-of-affairs is correctly constituted as 
involving a function only when this function corresponds to an objective 
characteristic of the state(s)-of-affairs that form(s) the objective 
correlate. 1 
Comparison of the "and"-function and the negation function 
points to an important difference between many objective and constituted 
states-of-affairs. Negative states-of-affairs are said to subsist with 
the same objectivity as positive states-of-affairs. A negative objective 
state-of-affairs belongs to the same ontological level as a positive 
objective state-of-affairs. An objective negative state-of-affairs is 
not a negated positive objective state-of-affairs. Correspondence 
between a constituted negative state-of-affairs and an objective negative 
state-of-affairs requires only that the negation function is performed 
only in constituting a state-of-affairs whose objective correlate is a 
negative state-of-affairs. In the case of the 11and"-function the 
objective correlate is not a single state-of-affairs, but two or more 
distinct states-of-affairs. The constituted state-of-affairs is synthetic. 
Correspondence requires that the "and"-function be performed only when its 
1 Ibid., p. 112; See above pp. 105-106, for discussion of an 
analogous argument that a·judgment presupposes the presence of "ordering 
connections" in consciousness corresponding to those of objectivity. 
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use, resulting in the constitution of a higher-order state-of-affairs, 
is grounded in the states-of-affairs forming the objective correlate. 
In the sketchy form in which Reinach allowed the distinctions 
between meaning and representation to remain, it is difficult to 
evaluate them. A far more detailed discussion than is provided by 
Reinach of the complex of intentional processes required from the stage 
of sense perception to the stage of making an assertion would, of course, 
be desirable. Yet it must be recognized that the functions are of the 
greatest importance for his theoretical position; they are the means 
by which negation, conjunction, disjunction, causal relations, and 
deductive relations can be grounded in objectivity and yet can be con-
stituted for consciousness in forms which theoretically correspond 
strictly to the primitive elements and connections of objectivity. An 
adequate theory constructed along the lines of Reinach's analysis would 
make use of his distinction between the performance of a function and 
the representation of the state-of-affairs constituted by this perform-
ance.1 Acts of knowing could then be directed at the constituted state-
of-affairs. The latter could thus be compared with the corresponding 
objective state(s)-of-affairs and be evaluated as to its adequacy. 
Alexander von Baeyer remarked2 that Reinach was the first to 
recognize the problem of the relation of language and intentionality. 
The diStinctions Reinach made regarding meaning (Meinen), in his sense, 
indeed may be regarded as being the result of his attempt to provide an 
1Nor doe~ Reinach discuss the nature of our representation of 
states-of-affairs constituted by the performance of a function though he 
does say that we can grasp represented objectivity as a unity in syn-
thetic apperception. See above, p. 106, and NU,GS, pp. 101-102. 
2 ARP, p. 55, p. 171, n t. 15. 
c 
110 
articulated formulation of the relationship between language and 
intentionality. Moreover, in respect to the analysis of meaning 
(Meinen), in Rein~ch's precise sense, claims of originality are scarcely. 
disputable. The work of Brentano, Marty, and Husserl from this period, 
however, also contains many passages relevant to the problem of the 
relationship of language and intentionality. The problem in its general 
form was a contemporary one, not first discovered by Reinach. Corn-
parison of their work on the theory of judgments with that of Reinach 
serves to illustrate this point. 1 
Reinach's writings contain no detailed treatment of the manifold 
intentional processes. 2 His discussions of the formation of convictions 
and the intellectual and practical processes of reflection3 , however, 
do offer a source for determining whether the distinctions he did 
develop with respect to intentionality are consistent with the view he 
presented in more general terms of the over-all process of forming a 
judgment, achieving an insight, and taking a position. These questions 
will be returned to in Chapter IV. 
1 See Chapter IV, below. 
2 NU,GS, pp. 75-85 and 87-94. 
3tt UB, GS. 
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Judgments and Propositions 
In this chapter Reinach's theory of judgments is to be evaluated 
as a correlate of his theories of states-of-affairs and intentionality. 
The critical approach taken is therefore concerned not with the adequacy 
of his treatment of judgments in some absolute sense, but rather its 
adequacy within the framework set forth by the theories of states-of-
affairs and intentionality. Only if the three theories are found to be 
mutually consistent and sustaining will it be asked whether Reinach's 
fundamental assumptions are defensible and whether the resultant three-
fold structure is adequate as an approach to the problem of the nature 
of· the relationship of consciousness and being. As for the previous 
two chapters, the work of Brentano, Meinong, 1 and Husserl is of signifi-
cance as the source for many of the problems considered by Reinach and 
as a means for evaluating Reinach's originality. 
a) Brentano and Husserl on the theory of judgments. 
Brentano rejected the view that judgments involve connection and 
separation. He found the proposition 11A is" not to involve the connec-
tion of "A" with existence or the predication of existence, but merely 
recognition of the object 11A11 • It was therefore clear to Brentano that 
2 predication does not belong to the essence of any judgment. Moreover, 
1see above, Chapter II, pp. 29-32. 
2 PVES, pp. 276-78. 
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the concept of existence was said to arise from inner experience and be 
1 
applied to judgments only in an afterthought. Brentano argues that 
judgments of all forms can be transformed without loss of meaning into 
existential judgments--regarded by Brentano as the fundamental form. 
For Brentano this reducibility confirmed his view that the distinction 
between representations and judgments is not that the contents of the 
two are simple and complex, respectively. Rather, in terms of content 
he found no distinction. Questions, denials, and affirmations may 
have the same object. An object that is the content of a representa-
tion can be the content of a judgment. The difference between 
representation and judgment lies instead, Brentano asserts, in the 
2 
manner of relating to the object. 
In The Origin of the Knowledge £! Right and Wrong Brentano 
qualifies the above view by observing that only "simple" judgments can 
be reduced to judgments of the existential form. In such a case the 
existential judgment can express a judgment only equivalent to the com-
pound judgment, not the latter as such. 3 So-called "double judgments" 
were among those resisting reduction. Brentano now regarded these 
judgments as ones in which something is first accepted as existing and 
then of this thing, something is affirmed or denied. Simple existential 
judgments, however, in confirmation of his view that judgments do not 
involve combination and separation, are "subjectless propositions" or 
propositions of only one term, without any division into so-called 
11 subject 11 and "predicate11 • 4 
1Ibid. ) p. 279. 
3oKRW, pp. 57-8. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 280-90. 
4oKRW, pp. 106-108, see also TE, p. 156, nts. 36 and 37. 
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The concepts of existence and non-existence are said to be 
correlates of the concepts of the truth of affirmative and negative 
simple judgments. To say an affirmative judgment is true is regarded 
as the same as to say that its object is existent. 1 This view is found 
in the work of his students and, of course, Reinach's work. Although 
Brentano later rejected this interpretation of the relation between the 
truth and the existence of judgments and their referents respectively, 
the basic distinction here, between being in the sense of truth and 
being in the sense of thing, is an important and lasting one for his 
position. In a letter to Anton Marty in 1906, Brentano clearly rejected 
treatment of this correlation as one between "the being of Au and the 
correctness of the judgment "A is". Instead he wished to say, simply, 
2 
"In the case A is and someone says that A is, he judges correctly." 
This position is in accord with the view Brentano had by then developed 
that "the being of A" is a fictitious entity. 
In the 1ogische Untersuchungen Husserl adhered to the corres-
pondence theory of truth. Thus, for example, in opposition to 
"psychologism" Husserl asserted that the view that no judgment is correct 
in which the same state-of-affairs is at once affirmed and denied, ex-
presses the "insight that contradictory propositions are not both true, 
3 
that the states-of-affairs corresponding to them cannot both co-exist," 
are "objectively incompatible,"4 and "logically incompatible. 115 
Apodeictic consciousness of necessity is said to express insight into 
objective laws.6 
1oKRW pp. 60-61. 2TE p. 84. 
--' 
_, 
31I p. 119. 411 p. 121. _, _, 
51 I p. 131. 61I p. 153. _, _, 
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Interconnections of things and truths are given together ~ priori 
and are mutually inseparable, the latter being the necessary correlate of 
the former. Through "ideational abstraction" the truth, rather than the 
state-of-affairs, becomes the apprehended object, and thus the ideal 
1 
correlate of the act of knowledge. Knowledge of necessary truth is 
. 2 grounded as knowledge of necessary states-of-affa~rs. Likewise the 
"motivational unity" of our acts of judgment is said to have as its objec-
3 
tive correlate the objective connection of states-of-affairs. 
All acts of judgment are said to be based on at least one 
representation. Complex judgments--act-complexes--are ultimately founded 
4 
on many representations. Here, as in the analysis of meaning-intention 
and states-of-affairs, it is argued that acts of judgment can be meaning-
fully analyzed into their constituent parts. Analogies between Husserl's 
analyses of simple and complex objectivities, meaning-intentions, end 
acts of judgment, both support the correspondence view of truth and at 
the same time result from the working assumption that it is a valid view. 
The whole of the fourth chapter of study five is of significance 
in relation to Reinach's treatment of judgments. 5 Husserl here clarifies 
the relationships between types of propositions and judgments in terms of 
differences in intentional essence referring to the same objective state-
of-affairs.6 The ideal laws which Husserl discovers here, such as that 
111, pp. 225-27. 2Lr, pp. 227-28. 
3 LI, pp. 270-71. Compare with analogous position of Stump£, see 
above, pp. 26-29. 
411, pp. 622-24. 511, Study 5, Chapter 4. 
6The role performid by intentionality enabled phenomenologists to 
analyze the belief propositions which were so awkward for logical atomists. 
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it is ~ priori inconsistent that propositions containing positing names 
should be true and that existential judgments which correspond to such 
names should be false, have analogies among.the ideal laws concerning 
the relations of states-of-affairs. This becomes self-evident within the 
context of Reinach's work, but is not explicit in the Logische Unter-
suchungen. The mutual influence of Reinach and Husserl on these and 
related topics can be determined only approximately on the basis of a 
comparison of the two editions of the Logische Untersuchungen, Ideen I, 
Erfahrung und Urteil, and the as yet unpublished lectures on judgments, 1 
with Reinach' s writings. 2 It is impossible in this instance, as is often 
the case with the early period of phenomenology, to identify the origin 
of many notions within the development of a single topic. It is possible, 
however, to suggest that the paragraph added in the 2nd edition of the 
Logische Untersuchungen3 concerning the mediacy of nominal attribution 
and the derivation of the nominal object from the corresponding state-
4 
of-affairs "which has an intrinsic priority as regards authenticity," 
as well as the lengthy addition5 concerning the relations of synthetic 
and thetic acts and the ultimate reference to simple act-members, may, 
at least in part, have been added in response to Reinach's treatment of 
propositions and judgments as being grounded on states-of-affairs. 6 
1An edition is being prepared by Ursula Panzer, Cologne. 
2A thorough comparison of Husserl's and Reinach's theories of 
judgment is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
3see middle of section 35, Chapter 4, Study 5. 
4LI, p. 630. 5 See section 38, Chapter 5, Study 5. 
6 See below for discussion of these chapters of the LI, and their 
relation to Reinach's work. 
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c b) Reinach 
1 s theory of judgments. 
Reinach 1 s theory of judgments presupposes his theory of states-
of-affairs, states-of-affairs being the intentional correlates of acts 
of knowing and that which is evident and ~ priori in the primary sense. 
Historically the negative judgment had been one of the more problematic 
forms of judgment and serves as the main focus for much of Reinach's 
work on the theory of judgments. In the process of his analysis Reinach 
clearly rejects the claims that negativity is not objective, that judg-
ments are affirmations or denials, and that judgments refer to objects, 
as well as Brentano's divergence from the correspondence theory. The 
differences between their two positions are all ultimately grounded in 
their distinct ontological assumptions. 
Almost all of the distinctions which Reinach made with regard to 
the various types of judgments and propositions, the nature of the evi-
dence for them, the logic required by them, and the processes by which 
they are formulated and constituted as judgments and potential assertions, 
respectively, are said to be grounded in the nature of the objective 
states-of-affairs to which they refer. Strictly speaking, this entails 
regarding all epistemological and logical terms as being primarily 
ontological. In the ideal case this would indeed actually hold true. 
However, as will be seen below from reference to the articles on reflec-
tion, motion, premonitions, and religious experience, whose topics all 
lead to an enrichment of Reinach's theory of judgments and their formation, 
in actual practice this view apparently represents only an ideal limit to 
be approached to some degree. Thus, for example, as we argued above, an 
authentic judgment, correct or not, is the result of the belief that the 
c 
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"ordering connections" of the constituted state-of-affairs correspond 
to the "ordering connections" of the objective state(s)-of-affairs 
referred to by the judgment, the belief that the judgment is indeed a 
1 founded judgment. A judgment may be incorrect or not fully evident 
and yet serve to ground other intentional relations and states-of-being 
of the 111 11 • 
Premonitions and the intellectual and practical reflection re-
quired to ground ethical decisions are among the cases dealt with by 
Reinach which demonstrate that his basic theory is of relevance for 
analysis of the problematic types of judgments. The following pages will 
be concerned first with the basic and simpler aspects of judgments and 
their formation and will then turn to religious experiences, ethical 
decisions, and premonitions. The latter involve both a wider sense of 
"knowing" than the traditional one and a related change in the type of 
objective state-of-affairs known. 
Concepts and categorial elements.--This topic was first discussed in de-
tail by Reinach in the article2 examining Kant's view that the two 
propositions, 1) "A characteristic of a characteristic of a thing is a 
characteristic of the thing itsel£, 11 and 2) "That which contradicts the 
characteristic of a thing contradicts the thing itself," are the general 
3 
rules for all rational conclusions. In order to avoid arguments which 
themselves depend on rules of inference and thus would be ungrounded, 
Reinach appealed to immediate evidence to show that there are cases for 
1 See above Chapter III, pp. 105-106. 
2 RVK,GS, pp. 36-55. 
3 Ibid., p. 37. See LI, pp. 168-69 for Husserl's critique of 
these rules. 
which Kant's rules are not valid. 
"This tree is green," 
"Green is a color," 
therefore, 
"This tree is a color." 
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For example: 
"No color is a living thing," 
"This dog is brown," 
therefore, . 1 
"This dog is not a living thing." 
The observation that the "characteristics" of things include qualities, 
membership in a class, qualities of the class(es) of which the thing 
is a member, and membership in classes of classes, led Reinach to reformu-
late Kant's general rules in the following provisional way: 1) "A class 
characteristic or a characteristic of the construction of a class 
characteristic is also a characteristic of the thing itself, 11 and 2) "A 
class characteristic or a characteristic of construction of a character-
istic of construction is never a characteristic of the thing itsel£. 112 
Reinach observed that while the statement, "The lion has a mane," 
holds when it is an individual to which reference is made, absurdities 
result when the predicate is taken to state a characteristic of the 
concept, "lion". Kant's view that judgments, such as "the lion has a 
mane," are made about concepts, as such, is thus thrown into question. 
Whereas Reinach found there to be no problem in knowing valid predicates 
for ideelle individuals, there are problems surrounding knowing whether 
a predicate applies to an ideelle generality, or to the individuals of 
the coordinated set, or to both. This is the problem underlying the 
example of the "lion's mane", above. Through analysis of various types 
of statements Reinach determines that in judgments about single objects 
("this particular tree") the subject is a determinate single object, 
1 RVK,GS, pp. 38-39. The reader may observe that these syllogisms 
are invalid b~ause "is" is used here in two distinct ways. Reinach 1 s 
concern, however, is focused immediately on the nature of the objects to 
which reference is made. 
2rbid. , pp. 40-41. 
-· 
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while in judgments "about" concepts ("tree"), the subject is simply 
all objectivity insofar as it falls under the given concept. Both types 
of judgments thus have real objective subjects though the reference to 
1 
them is in the one case immediate and in the other case mediate. 
The rules of inference must be modified a second time. Reinach 
states: 1) "That which is valid for the whole of that which falls under 
a concept is also valid for each individual which falls under this 
concept," and 2) "That which is invalid for the whole of that which falls 
under a concept is also invalid for each individual which falls under 
2 
this concept." In closing Reinach emphasized the importance for philos-
ophy of an understanding of the unique nature of concepts and their 
relations to single objects, and pointed to errors or lack of clarity 
regarding concepts in the work of Husserl, Erdmann, Locke, Berkeley, and 
3 Aristotle. 
In the context of the article sketched above it is made clear 
that just as objects and objectivities are the elements of states-of-
affairs, concepts and categorial elements are the elements of propositions. 
Concepts and categorial elements bear a strong similarity to one another 
insofar as they both function to provide a "view" (Fassung) of the 
universality of objectivity to which reference is being made. This 
interpretation of categorial elements is in accord with Reinach's dis-
cussion of quantity (Anzahl) 4 as analogous in function to the elements 
"all", "only", "some". Categorial elements such as these are not them-
selves predicable, but presuppose a predication of the objectivity 
1 42-49. 2 Ibid., pp. Ibid., p. 50. 
3Ibid. , 4rr pp. 51-55. UP,GS, p. 391. 
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whose universality they limit. One says not "five trees", or "all A", 
but rather "five trees are green," "All A is b," unless, of course, 
the context is clear and the statement "All A11 is in answer to such a 
question as "how much of A is b?" Objective elements as such do not 
correspond to categorial elements. The role of categorial elements 
is limited to the constitution of states-of-affairs for "meaning", 
though their functions must be founded in objective states-of-affairs. 
Reinach recognizes not only concepts of individual real physical 
and psychic objects, but also of ideal objectivities. Ideal objectivities 
may be general, as in the case where an unbounded set of individual 
objects (for example: "all particular trees") corresponds to it, or 
individual, as in the case where the corresponding set has only one 
member (examples: "2 11 , and all propositions). All three kinds of concepts 
of entities serve to set forth the universality of objectivity under 
which a particular is to be grasped. We argued above, 1 in an extension 
of Reinach's position, that such concepts are logical abbreviations whose 
objective referents are the unbounded sets of particular objects falling 
under the concepts insofar as they are "subject" elements of objective 
states-of-affairs, and that concepts of qualities are, analogously, 
logical abbreviations whose full referents are the unbounded sets of 
particular qualities falling under those concepts respectively insofar 
as they are the "predicate" elements of objective states-of-affairs. 
It is in any case not irrelevant whether analysis is directed at the 
clarification of concepts or the discovery and clarification of essences 
and essential connections, for within Reinach's theoretical framework, 
1 Chapter II, p. 62. 
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concepts are derivative and secondary and, insofar as they are adequate, 
1 
are based on essences and essential connections. 
Formation and classification of negative and positive convictions.--
Reinach recognized two forms of negative judgments in the sense of con-
viction (not assertion, for which there was said to be only one form): 
1) Negative conviction (disbelief in) of a positive state-of-affairs, and 
2 
2) Positive conviction (belief in) of a negative state-of-affairs. Both 
of these two forms of conviction presuppose and are coordinated with 
positive convictions of positive states-of-affairs. The presuppositions 
required for formation of these negative judgments are distinct from those 
.
1
compare with Charles Taylor's assertion that "when we refine our 
concepts we are at the same time projecting a model of the thing concerned, 
we are making clear its 'essence'. Correspondingly the only way to clarify 
an essence is to criticise the concepts we use to describe it, and one 
of the best ways to accomplish this is to study the many uses of the 
corresponding word which are unclear to us. The method of phenomenology 
and that of linguistic analysis are, therefore, properly understood, 
quite compatible," ( 11Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis", 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXXIII, 1959, pp. 108-109), and 
A. J. Ayer's observation that phenomenologists and linguistic analysts 
are close in practice for '~hatever phenomenologists may think they ought 
to be doing, what the best of them in fact do is to study concepts at 
work. They try to discover what is essential to a given concept by seeing 
what is common to the situations to which it typically applies," (Ibid., 
p. 121.). Chisholm, however, appears to differ with Taylor and Ayer for 
he suggests that linguistic analysis is open to much of the same criticism 
as was directed at psychologism by phenomenologists insofar as linguistic 
analysis regards the formulation of truths of logic to be true in virtue 
of "the rules of language" or "the way in which we use words," R. M. 
Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J,: Prentice-Hall, 
1966), p. 79. The issue ultimately under contention here is whether 
phenomenology can and/or did actually study ontological relationships. 
2 Transformed into assertable statements these convictions have the 
respective forms: 1) It is not the case that A is b, and 2) It is the case 
that A is not b. Both 1 and 2 may be equivalent to "It is the case that 
A and not b." Reinach apparently believed the convictions corresponding 
to 1 and 2 to be equivalent. However, if "A is b" is taken to mean 
A = b then it is to be noted that, not (A = b) = not ((A implies b) and 
(b implies A)), which =((A and not b) or (band not A)). This example 
indicates first that: 1 and 2 above are -;;-at always logically identical; 
and second that study is required of whether there are various types of 
negative states-of-affairs corresponding to the various types of "is". 
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required for positive judgments. Knowledge of positive states-of-affairs 
and the resulting positive convictions are built on sensible perception 
of things. Negative states-of-affairs cannot be known in this way nor 
can negative convictions thus arise; only positive states-of-affairs can 
be "read-off" from objectivity. 
Reinach explains the process of formation of the negative con-
viction of a positive state-of-affairs such as "the being-yellow of the 
rose" in the following manner. First an intellectual position-taking 
(such as positive conviction, conjecture, doubt, question, etc.) towards 
the state-of-affairs is required. Sensible perception of the thing 
which the state-of-affairs concerns must then give rise to "knowing" a 
conflicting state-of-affairs ("the being red of the rose") with positive 
evidence. The grasped conflict provides negative evidence for the 
original state-of-affairs-- 11 the being-yellow of the rose"--and on the 
basis of this negative evidence grows the negative conviction in the 
original state-of-affairs. Reinach regards knowing the conflict).ng state-
of-affairs and grasping the conflict as the foundation (Fundament) of the 
1 
negative judgment. 
Positive convictions of negative states-of-affairs, the second 
case, can be explained only in a manner which overcomes the problem of 
the impossibility of grasping negative states-of-affairs immediately. 
No negative state-of-affairs can be "read off" from representations of 
real and ideal objects. Reinach's explanation of the process of formation 
of such convictions is that first an intellectual position-taking towards 
the negative state-of-affairs is required, that is, the subject's interest 
must somehow be turned towards the negative state-of-affairs. Reinach 
1 NU,~, pp. 94-95. 
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claims that this is possible once we have a negative conviction of a 
positive state-of-affairs. 1 Assume that the judgment to result from 
the process is the positive conviction that 3 is not less than 2, a 
negative state-of-affairs. As in the first case a positive state-of-
affairs must be grasped with positive evidence. Here, however, there 
is not merely a conflict, bu·t rather a necessary connection of the two 
states-of-affairs. The subsistence of the negative state-of-affairs 
is necessarily connected with the subsistence of the immediately grasped 
positive state-of-affairs--the being greater than 2·of 3. The positive 
conviction of the negative state-of-affairs is grounded with positive 
evidence on knowing the positive state-of-affairs and grasping this 
2 
necessary connection. We find that a consequence of the requirement 
of necessary connections is to limit the subjects of this type of 
3 judgment. 
Reinach regards the negative conviction of a negative state-of-
affairs as a doubly negative judgment requiring both an intellectual 
position-taking to the negative state-of-affairs and the knowledge of a 
positive state-of-affairs. As in the case of the formation of a negative 
conviction of a positive state-of-affairs the two states-of-affairs are 
in conflict, but this conflict is that of the stronger form, contradiction. 
Reinach remarks that the formation of negative judgments based on chains 
of premises and conclusions, rather than on immediate knowledge and 
1Reinach notes that psychologically the two are so closely related 
as to be interchangable. We doubt that this is always the case. The foot-
note above, p. 121, suggests that the nature of the states-of-affairs 
in question must be considered. 
2 NU,GS, pp. 95-96. 
3see below, pp. 124-25, for our argument in support of this point. 
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evidence, as is the case above, is different. In the remainder of 
this section we shall argue that many more negative judgments arise 
from inference than from immediate knowledge and evidence, and thus 
are not formed in the manner presently under discussion, than it appears 
1 
from a first reading of Reinach's comments. 
Reinach summarizes the epistemological presuppositions, not the 
psychological presuppositions, of these cases of immediate knowledge 
and evidence in the following manner. Any positive conviction of a 
positive or negative state-of-affairs presupposes its positive evidence. 
Any negative conviction of a positive or negative state-of-affairs pre-
supposes its negative evidence. Positive evidence of a negative state-
of-affairs presupposes the positive evidence of a positive state-of-
affairs necessarily connected with that negative state-of-affairs. 
Negative evidence of a positive or negative state-of-affairs presupposes 
the positive evidence of a conflicting positive state-of-affairs, which 
in the stricter case of negative evidence of a negative state-of-affairs 
must conflict by contradiction. All these relations are regarded by 
2 
Reinach as ~priori essential connections requiring further study. 
Reinach does not comment on the nature of the formation of the 
positive convictions of negative states-of-affairs of different modalities. 
3 
We argued in the section above on modality that the distinctions between 
necessary and contingent states-of-affairs entail corresponding dis-
tinctions in the evidence required to ground a given judgment. Quite 
1 11 In UB,GS, p. 139, Reinach himself remarks that examples of the 
types of intellectual and practical reflection involving only immediate 
evidence are rare. See below pp. 126-34, for Reinach's comparison of 
mediate and immediate judgments. 
2 NU,GS, p. 97. 3 See above, Chapter III. 
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apart from questions of modality, however, is the following example of 
a judgment which cannot be grounded in the immediate manner discussed 
by Reinach in this context. 
Let us assume that the resultant judgment is to be the positive 
conviction of the negative state-of-affairs, "the being not yellow of 
the rose." This negative state-of-affairs cannot be immediately grasped. 
Assume the rose (a real individual rose) is red. The positive state-of-
affairs, "the being red of the rose", can be immediately grasped and thus 
known with positive evidence. The subsistence of this positive state-
of-affairs cannot be said to be necessarily connected with the subsistence 
of the negative state-of-affairs "the being not yellow of the rose"; the 
subsistence of a positive state-of-affairs is necessarily connected only 
with the non-subsistence of the corresponding negative state-of-affairs--
in this case with "the not being red of the rose." Reinach stated that 
positive convictions of negative states-of-affairs presupposed positive 
evidence of a positive state-of-affairs necessarily connected with the 
negative state-of-affairs. These conditions cannot be fulfilled for a 
positive conviction of 11 the being not yellow of the rose." 
Similarly, negative convictions of positive states-of-affairs 
require positive evidence of "conflicting" positive states-of-affairs 
and negative convictions of negative states-of-affairs presuppose 
positive evidence of contradictory positive states-of-affairs. Judgments 
which do not or cannot fulfill these conditions must be grounded, if at 
all, through inferences. 
It is open to question whether the example Reinach chose for the 
case of positive convictions of negative states-of-affairs--the necessary 
connection of the "not being less than 2 of 3" with the "being greater 
c 
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than 2 of 3"--is actually any more clearly "necessary" than the "being 
yellow of a rose" and the 11being red of a rose" is clearly a "conflict"--
the example for the negative conviction of a positive state-of-affairs. 
At the very least it must be admitted, apart from all claims of immediacy, 
that in the first case it is assumed that 3 is either greater than, or 
less than, but not equal to 2, and in the second case that "the being 
any given color of the rose" excludes the possibility of the rose being 
any other color. Certain assumptions and inferences, however "immediate" 
or "self-evident'' they may be said to be, are thus involved even in 
1 
these cases. 
Higher-order and mediate judgments. Reinach. finds the act of asserting 
to be that which makes a statement a judgment as such rather than a mere 
conjecture. Only states-of-affairs constituted for meaning (Meinen) in 
accordance with determinate laws of constitution can be asserted. These 
laws of constitution are said to be founded and justified on the objective 
states-of-affairs and their objective relations. The reader may find it 
2 
useful to refer to Chapter II, above, concerning "well-formed states-of-
affairs", the role in judgments of phrases referring to objective negative 
states-of-affairs, the nature of negation in judgments, negation of causal 
judgments, modality and relational being in constituted states-of-affairs, 
and one term states-of-affairs and impersonal judgments, as well as the 
3 
section in Chapter III, above, on ''assertions". Although this material 
"belongs" in the present chapter it was presented earlier to aid under-
standing of closely related problems regarding objective states-of-affairs 
1
see below, pp.126-34,for Reinach's comparison of mediate and 
immediate intellectual and practical judgments. 
2 pp. 58-76. 3 pp. 103-106. 
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and intentionality. 
Disjunctions and conjunctions had been said by Husserl to unite 
states-of-affairs in yet higher-order objects by means of synthetic 
1 
acts. Reinach used the terms "higher-order" and "synthetic acts" very 
little in his own treatment of disjunctions and conjunctions, devoted 
primarily to analysis of the role of functions. We find, however, no 
. 2 
indication that Reinach disagreed with Husserl's treatment of the topic. 
Causal judgments were given a somewhat problematic treatment by 
Reinach in the early article dealing with Kant's interpretation of Hume. 
The discussion of the objective correlates of causal judgments in Chapter 
II above, 3 to which the reader may wish to refer, attempted to reinter-
pret the distinctions made by Reinach in that article in the terms of 
his later theories of judgments and states-of-affairs. 
The formation of mediate judgments is dealt with by Reinach 
primarily in the article on the ethical and legal meaning of reflection 
(Uberlegung). 4 Reinach's aim in this article was to examine the founda-
tion of various uses of the presence and absence of reflection as 
criteria for the assigning of praise and reproach. 5 Reinach observed 
that meritorius acts are usually held in less merit when they are not 
preceded by reflection, and in even less merit when performed only "after 
long reflection11 , whereas a reproachable act is judged more severely when 
it is preceded by reflection. A negative value was placed on reflection 
lg, pp. 798-99. 
2see pp. 108-109, above for comparison of the 11and11 -function and 
the negation function which clarifies Reinach·' s use of the term "synthetic". 
3see pp. 40-50. 
Sibid., pp. 121-122. 
4" UB,GS, pp. 121-65. 
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by German criminal law of the time, which used it as the criterion 
for determining whether the penalty for causing another's death should 
be six months in jail or death. His critique of this process is pre-
ceded by an analysis of the process of reflection. 
It is this article as well as the short pieces on premonitions 
and religious experience which reveal Reinach's ability to bring dis-
tinctions on the theoretical level to bear on problems of the practical 
sphere without descending into dogmatism. The gulf between the ideal 
and real realms is not lessened thereby, but it is seen that the results 
of his analysis of the ideal realm can be utilized to provide a 
theoretic framework for critical examination of some of the most 
problematic issues of the practical sphere. 
Reflection, according to Reinach's analysis, is a teleological 
process whose last stage, save in the cases where the process is not 
fulfilled, is always the taking of a position by the reflecting agent. 
The position taken as a result of intellectual reflection may be one of 
conviction, conjecture, indifference, or doubt. Every intellectual 
position is necessarily taken to a state-of-affairs. The theme of 
reflection, its intentional correlate, stands in close relation to the 
state-of-affairs to which a position is taken. In the simplest cases 
these two intentional correlates are identical. Reflection may also 
have conflicting states-of-affairs as its, theme. The final taking of a 
positive position to one of these states-of-affairs at the same time 
entails the taking of a negative position to the others. 
Reinach found the reflective process to be given unity through 
c 
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the inner attitude of the "I" aiming at insight. It is the act of 
stopping to question with its "enduring preparedness" to obtain an 
answer, which allows the nr" to enter upon a process of reflection. 
Thus, for example, bewilderment about a state-of-affairs, a passive 
state, can be broken off by the inner posing of a question that can, 
but need not, in turn lead to reflection, an active process. As in 
the case of assertions it is the inner act, the moment of questioning 
in this case, which is essential, and not the words in which the question 
or assertion can be expressed. The inner act and the speech-act are to 
be distinguished. Though insight is the aim of reflection it is not 
1 
always the result. It is clear that Husserl's analysis of the 
intentional relations of the consciousness to its intentional correlate(s) 
is presupposed here. 
Reinach analyses the reflective process itself in the following 
manner. The essence of reflection, as such, is characterized by the 
achievement of a determinate endpoint (the taking of a position) from a 
determinate starting point (the stopping to question). The means by 
which this process is achieved are secondary and only delineate distinct 
types of reflection. Representation has no essential role within the 
process of reflection, though it may convince us, independent of the 
reflective process, of the existence in the world of the state-of-affairs 
that is the theme of the reflection, or it may aid us in grasping the 
state-of-affairs in question. 
Reinach distinguishes various types of reflection. What he calls 
the first type involves only immediate evidence. The theory of judgment 
1r· 'd 
....E2:_·' pp. 122-26 . 
c 
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set forth in the article on negative judgments is limited to this first 
type. Reflective processes of the first type may involve visualization 
of the state(s)-of-affairs in question as an aid, in the senses 
mentioned above, but even the most complete visualization cannot provide 
insight into the state-of-affairs in question. 
An example of a reflective process of the "second" type is con-
sideration of the question of whether a friend will come to visit. In 
this case, as was not the case for the first type--requiring immediate 
1 insight into the content already present in the intentional correlate, --
the information available to the reflective process must be augmented. 
Augmentation occurs, for example, if I remember that the friend had 
2 
promised to come, but that he is quite absent-minded. Other grounds for 
believing that he will or will not come may also occur to me. All of 
these are grasped together in a determinate act of synthetic apperception 
and depending on the relative weight of the grounds for and against, and 
on my attitude towards these grounds (this will influence my estimation 
of their relative weight), the position taken as a result of reflection 
will be a conjecture, indifference, or doubt, but presumably never a con-
viction. Such a reflective process may include chains of arguments where 
each one is itself a reflective process of either type. Thus any insight 
achieved in one of these intermediary reflective processes may, if it is 
relevant, then be used to ground the arguments leading to insight about 
h . . 1 h 3 t e or~g~na t erne. 
Reinach asserts that the striving, hope, fear, etc., experienced 
by the agent about the question made the theme of reflection is irrelevant 
1 It is assumed that the intentional correlate--a proposition or 
axiom, for example--is understood. Reflective processes to achieve 
understanding are regarded as a distinct case; Ibid., p. 127. 
2Ibid., pp. 127-132. 3Ibid., pp. 132-35. 
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for the being 1 of the state-of-affairs in question. Reinach recognizes, 
however, that there are, in fact, always relations between the agent's 
interest in the being of the state-of-affairs and the intellectual posi-
tion taken. One aim of intellectual reflection is to overcome the 
influence of personal interests, the most insidious of personal interests 
being those which are unfounded. 
Though the ideal aim of reflection is to eliminate the influence 
of personal interest, in the case of reflection about what one will do, 
practical reflection--as opposed to intellectual reflection, reflection 
about what is the case--Reinach finds that it is impossible by essence to 
eliminate all personal and emotional interest. 2 As the result of 
reflection about whether one should perform a given act one may decide 
to do it or not to do it. Failure of the reflective process in achieving 
a "position-taking" results in the grasping of neither a positive nor a 
negative intention. In the simplest case the theme of reflection and the 
intentional correlate of the position taken are identical. The second 
case involves the choice between two conflicting projects. In the third 
case, the theme of the reflection is at first unclear. In spite of the 
strong similarities in many respects between intellectual and practical 
reflection, they are not to be confused with one another or with the 
process of reflection itsel£. 3 
An example of the first type of practical reflection is the 
1This use of the term "being" is either an oversight on Reinach's 
part or a categorical use of the term, for in the NU,GS, where the con-
cept of state-of-affairs is developed, states-of-affairs are said to 
subsist (bestehen). 
2 Ibid. , pp. 135-36. 3 Ibid., pp. 136-37. 
0 
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decision to do "x" or not do "x" where the decision is based on the 
value or disvalue of "x". In this case the evidence is immediate, but 
visualization of the project may aid in grasping its value or disvalue. 
The value (or disvalue) may be grasped in varying degrees of evidence 
from absolute givenn.ess to the absolute lack of givenness. Formation 
of ~practical decisions does not require absolute givenness of the 
value of the project. This first type of practical reflection is rare, 
1 Reinach remarks, as is its analog in the intellectual sphere. 
More frequently the project ~ such is without value and a de-
cision can be reached only through consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding the project and the presumed value of the ultimate effects 
of the project. It is significant, Reinach observes, that the first 
type of intellectual reflection, may be corrected by the second type of 
reflection. Thus, while a state-of-affairs, given with immediate 
evidence as being, does not come to be regarded as merely probable due 
to subsequent reflection about mediate evidence, a project given with 
immediate evidence as valuable in and for itself may come to be regarded 
as of disvalue in the light of its anticipated bad consequences (mediate 
value). Ideally practical reflection can have no end due to infinite 
2 
chains of possible consequences resulting from any given project. 
It is possible, Reinach observes, to grasp what one has to do and yet 
neglect. to do it. He is inclined to believe this can be the case even 
when the value of the project is given with absolute evidence. 3 
1 Ibid., pp. 138-39. 2rbid. , pp. 139-141. 
3" UB,GS, p. 142. 
die materia1e Wertethik: 
Personalismus, ed. Marie 
Francke), II (1954), pp. 
See Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und 
Neuer Versuch der-crundlegung eines ;thi~ ---
Sche1er, 4th ed., in Gesammelte Werke, (Berne: 
89-90, for the opposing view that the Socratic 
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Reinach distinguishes clearly between the grasping of values, 
11 that is, the "feeling" (Fuhlen) of values, and the "feeling-states" 
11 (Gefuhle) of the I, such as joy, sadness, fear, etc. The act of value-
feeling (Wertflihlen), like any other act of grasping, may attain many 
degrees of clarity up to absolute self-givenness. Acuteness of eye-
sight is peripherial to a man's character, but in the acuteness of his 
11 • 11 
"value-feeling" (Wertfuhlen) and the feehng-states (Gefuhle) grounded 
in his value-feeling, Reinach says that a man's character documents 
itself. 1 
The stage in practical reflection in which the agent searches 
after the probable consequences of a project is found to be indistinguish-
able from intellectual reflection. But, Reinach asserts, in feeling the 
value of these consequences and in the feeling-states produced in the 
individual in reaction to the evidence provided by the value-feeling, the 
essence of the person is revealed. As was not the case for intellectual 
reflection, here the personal interest of the agent is essential. The 
possibility of the illegitimate influence of personal interest remains 
insofar as the presence of a striving, wish, or inclination for 11x" may 
cause the agent to tend to believe in the value of a project leading to 
11x 11 • Negative interest, of course, may have the opposite effect, and 
principle, that knowledge of the good determines the will, does hold in 
the case where a value and its hierarchic range is self-given and thus 
absolutely evident. Scheler finds, however, that the principle must 
be qualified for cases of judgments of what is good not based on affective 
perception of value, for these judgments do not have force to determine 
the will. 
1" . UB,GS, pp. 142-44. Reinach's comment referred to above (p. 131 ), 
that it is impossible to eliminate personal and emotional interest from 
practical reflection can be understood properly only in terms of the 
general view, which he shared with Husserl, Scheler, and von Hildebrand, 
that it is only through value-feeling that values are known and choices 
concerning values can be validly grounded. 
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thus there must be a strong attempt made to set aside the unfounded 
influence of personal interests. 1 
Subjective interest in a project or its consequences, apart 
from interest in their value in the sense just discussed, also has a 
sphere of influence in everyday practical reflection. Reinach states 
that not to admit this would be to give a false interpretation of 
practical reflection. But illusions about personal interest are as 
possible as illusions about its value in and for itself. Truth and 
filsity are possible in both spheres; there is a true interest of the 
thing for me just as there is a true value of the thing itself. 
Confusion of the two spheres evidently results from the unconditional 
ethical priority often attributed to the value sphere over the interest 
2 
sphere. Any given process of practical reflection may in fact be 
concerned in varying degrees with the value of the project and/or the 
subject's interest in the project~ Reinach regards the result of 
practical reflection to be dependent on the structure of the personality; 
the latter influences both the knowledge of values and what is judged to 
be of interest by the subject. Reinach then applies the results of this 
analysis to the original problem: the use of reflection as a criterion 
for assigning praise and blame to intentions of the will. 3 
lu UB,GS, pp. 145-46. 
2For discussion of the ethical significance of this last distinc-
tion Reinach refers the reader to an unpublished article by Dietrich 
von Hildebrand. This article later appeared under the title "Die Idee 
11 de~ sittlichen Handlung11 in the Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und 
phanomenologische Forschung, III (1916), 126-251. 
3UB,GS, pp. 146-48. 
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Ethical and legal judgments concerning reflection.--Reinach observes 
that an act of service is often regarded as less valuable when it is 
performed without reflection. A reflecting agent is viewed positively 
because it is assumed that he felt the value of the act and formed the 
intention to perform the act on the basis of this feeling and his love 
for the value. Reinach finds this evaluative practice to reflect the 
fact that use of one's ability to feel ethical values, and a love of 
these values, are regarded as being of ethical value in themselves. 
Thus, while the performance of a valuable project is regarded as valuable, 
the agent may in addition be regarded positively because he was not 
deterred from forming the intention to perform the act by reflecting 
on the aspects of it which were or could be undesirable for him. 
Reflection is thus found by Reinach to have a symbolic function; its 
presence is often assumed to be accompanied by value-feeling and the 
examination of possible consequences. Various deviations can enter in 
practice, however, and often do, Reinach observes, as is the case when 
reflection is not accompanied by value-feeling or by examination of the 
possible consequences of an act. It is also possible to feel the 
1 
value of a project and grasp its consequences without needing to reflect. 
Reinach finds a meritorious act to be commonly regarded as less 
worthy when it is preceded by long reflection. In this case reflection 
again has a symbolic function; it is assumed that long reflection can 
be required only by one who lacks ability to feel value, possesses an 
insensitive personality, or places his subjective interests above 
concern with values. A very short period of reflection is taken to imply 
1 
Ibid., pp. 148-50. 
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the presence of a particularly acute feeling of value, etc. Analog-
ously, a reproachable act is generally regarded as being of greater 
ethical disvalue when it is executed with reflection. The worst 
such case is that where the agent grasps the disvalue and in spite of 
this performs the act. Here also reflection is assumed to have a 
symbolic character, though the relationship between reflection, value-
feeling, and thorough examination of the consequences, is no more a 
necessary one in this case than it was in the previous ones. The use 
of reflection as a criterion for evaluating the agent can clearly 
1 
result, Reinach concludes, in misjudgment in all of these cases. 
The fourth and last case considered by Reinach is that of the 
agent who performs a reproachable act and is more harshly judged because 
he acted without reflection. This is the first case where reflection 
is not a symbol, but rather itself an object of evaluation. This case 
does not contradict what was said about the third case. It is regarded 
as good that the criminal reflected about the value or disvalue of the 
project, but this positive judgment is outweighed by the greater 
negative value found in the fact that the agent, though not unreflect-
ing, still either did not feel the positive or negative value of the 
2 project in question, or disregarded the felt value. 
Reinach argues that it is unjustified to use the simple presence 
or absence of intellectual-practical reflection as the criterion in 
positive criminal law for distinguishing between murder .and man-slaughter, 
because there is no unambiguous correlation between .reflection and cold-
bloodedness, or between a lack of reflection and rashness, as is clear 
1
rbid. ' pp. 150-51. 2. Ibid. , pp. 152-53. 
c 
0 
137 
from the earlier discussion of the ambiguous symbolic function of 
reflection. Moreover, Reinach shows that in terms of his analysis a 
reflecting "murderer" can be seen to stand higher, morally and 
legally, than the unreflecting "man-slaughterer", if the latter's lack 
of reflection is the result of a disregard of values on principle or 
1 
of an absolute lack of sensibility to values. It was Reinach's hope 
that the then anticipated reform of criminal law would consider the 
injustice involved in using reflection as the criterion for distinguish-
i b d d • h 2 ng etween mur er an man-sLaug ter. 
In this article Reinach succeeded in portraying the ambiguity 
of "reflection" which renders it an unsuitable criterion for determining 
the punishment to be allotted to the person who has caused another's 
death. The view, which Re~nach shared with other phenomenologists, 
that a person's character or the essence of their personality is 
documented in their ability to feel value and in the feeling-states 
grounded in this value-feeling, emerges from the context of ethics, but 
can have problematic implications for legal philosophy. There is first 
the question, analogous to that treated above by Reinach for "reflection", 
of how in any given actual situation it is possible to infer from the 
"facts" known the extent of the defendant's ability to feel value. 
Secondly, as~JUming the first question were solved, which is no small 
matter due to the ambiguity of all the "facts" which could be used as 
a basis for inference, there is the question of what valid use this 
determination could have in coming to a legal decision regarding punish-
1 
It is open to debate whether or not Reinach meant to include in 
this "absolute lack of sensibility", cases of actual inability to feel 
value. 
2 Ibid., pp. 153-165. 
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ment. Reinach dealt with neither of these two essential questions. 
Reinach found that the use of one's ability to feel ethical values and 
a love of such values are generally regarded as being of ethical value 
in themselves. 1 From this we may infer that Reinach would have agreed 
that nothing~ can be demanded of a person than·that they use what-
2 
ever degree of ability to feel value they may have. Determination of 
inability to feel the disvalue of the act perpetrated would presumably 
entail a verdict of not-guilty. The social responsibility of the 
legal sphere, however, is generally not regarded as ending with the 
verdict of not-guilty in analogous cases. The agent is not eligible 
for punishment, yet society demands some assurance either of protection 
or that the agent is now a "changed man11 • 
Two examples give a more vivid sense of the quagmires into which 
use of the criterion of "ability to feel value'' may lead legal philosophy. 
The first is the case where jurists formulate sentences for crimes not 
according to precedent, but through consideration of the defendant's 
"character". In the most extreme case a minor offence might produce a 
death sentence if the defendant had been previously convicted of two 
or three similar offences and was regarded as a chronic offender--
"defective social material". The second example, representative of a 
social philosophy of a different hue, is the usa of indeterminate 
sentences together with a program of 11rehabilitation11 • Programs of this 
sort have alternately been hailed as a progressive, liberal, social 
reform and as an insidious form of "psychological torture" and the 
enforcement of acceptance (real or apparent) of a selective set of social 
1 2 
See above, p. 135. This is not clear; see above, p. 137, nt. 1. 
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norms. 
What is the extent and nature of the responsibility of law for 
the "intelligence" and "sensibility" of citizens and the·norms of 
society? How, even with the "best" of intentions, can the officials of 
a legal system emphasizing prevention through 11rehabilitation", rather 
than punishment, avoid the tendency to impose their own norms on 
prisoners? Hetergeneous societies--culturally and economically diverse--
provide the greatest challenge to a legal philosophy aiming at 
"rehabilitation"; the practice of rehabilitation requires constant 
reference to norms, and social diversity entails not only a diversity of 
norms, but a constant challenging of these norms. The possibility of 
abuse of law as a tool for the perpetuation of one set of norms over 
another is ever present in any diverse society, but becomes most 
dangerous in times of social stress, when groups feel themselves 
threatened by others, or when a messianic value is attributed to any 
given "normal" pattern. The use of "rehabilitation" may invite abuse 
of the law insofar as it in practice turns prison officials into legis-
lators who regard as their realms the entire world-view held by their 
charges. The question of the proper relation of the norms of society 
and the law of the society is in itself a thorny issue, but within the 
legal/ system itself abuses may arise whenever the social consequences 
of the means of dealing with individual cases are not in accord with 
the principles on which the legal system allegedly rests. 
Judgments grounded on experience of the Absolute.--The first section 
of the unpublished piece, "Fragment of a Treatise on the Philosophy of 
c 
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1 
Religion11 , is concerned with the Absolute, 11 the all-containing peak 
2 
of an infinitely augmentable entity11 • Reinach admits that this 
notion of the Absolute is apparently contradictory and attempts to 
clarify it through a comparison of the experience of the earthly and 
supernatural realms. Continuity with his earlier work is maintained 
by analyzing experience of the supernatural in terms analogous to 
those already developed for the former case. The following excerpt 
from a lett·er to his wife clarifies his intentions in writing about 
religious experience: 
23 May 1916 
My plan stands clearly before my eyes--naturally it is quite 
simple. I would like to start from the experience of God, the 
experience of being sheltered in God and do nothing more than 
show that from the standpoint of "objective science" one can say 
nothing against it; disclose what lies enclosed in the sense of 
that experience and to what extent it may make claim to 
"objectivity", for it sets itself forth as knowledge, indeed of 
a unique type, but in the true sense; and finally draw the 
consequences from this. Such a presentation can give the truly 
religious person nothing at all. But it can support the 
undecided who allow themselves to be discouraged by the objec-
tions of science, and carry further those for whom these objections 
bar the way to God. To perform this task in all humility is, 
I think, today that which is most important, much more 
important than fighting in this war. For, to what will this 
monstrous event lead if it does not bring men nearer to God?3 
In the piece on the Absolute Reinach compared the realms of the 
1 I ll Adolf Reinach, 'Bruchstuck einer religionsphilosophischen 
11 Ausfuhrung", in 11Aufzeichnungen, 26 Juli 1916 - 3 Oktober 1917", Type-
written manuscript compiled by Anna Reinach (presumably) from Reinach's 
papers, Nachlass Adolf Reinach. 
2
section 1 of the nBruchsdlck11 , the only section to have been pub-
lished, appears in the introduction to the GS (pp. xxxi-xxxvi), and is 
cited here as it appears there as "Absolute", GS. Sections 2 and 3 are 
cited as they appear in the Nachlass (see nt. T, p.l40 f .. bove) as 
"BruchstUck". An English translation of these two unpublished sections 
is available for the first time below in Appendix III. 
3This English translation is based on the letter as it appears in 
GS, p. xxxviL 
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earthly and the supernatural in the following manner: In the world, 
love, goodness, thankfulness, dependence, etc., are always capable 
of being increased or intensified; but the love and goodness which we 
ascribe to God cannot be increased; it is infinitely great. Godly 
love contains the infinite, while earthly love only leads towards the 
infinite. Both have the same content, but one has it in absolute full-
ness, the other incompletely. In the acts which men direct to one 
another a determination of direction can be immanent. It is the essence 
1 
of "wishing someone well" to be directed "downward", and in the essence 
2 
of "hate of the more highly placed" to be directed "upward". The 
position one takes to another person colors the acts directed to this 
3 
other person. All of these relations become absolute when we direct 
ourselves towards God. Our position compared to his, an absolute under 
as opposed to an absolute above, specifies our experiences of him. To 
"wish him well" or "wish him good" is senseless. 
Both formally, and in material content, God is absolutely high. 
Between the earth and the supernatural world there is an unbridgeable 
opposition. Insofar as we find an identical essential content here and 
there, which. we may call goodness or love, etc., we may encounter an 
incomplete image of the supernatural. However, by no intensification 
can the earthly attain the level of the supernatural. There is no com-
parison between the two realms, between the love of one human for 
~e suggest that it is not the essence of "wishing someone well 11 
to be "directed downward" though we admit the absurdity of presuming "to 
wish God well". Reinach's remark on this point probably reflects the 
social structure of his time and place just as our denial reflects our 
own. This indicates that direction, up or down, is not part of the 
essence of "wishing someone well". 
2
unlike the former example, this essence is formulated in analytic 
terms and is therefore acceptable yet trivial. 
3with this remark Reinach has broken through to the core of the 
relationships he has been attempting to analyze and has identified an 
essential and universal characteristic. 
c 
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another, however great, and godly love. 
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The infinity of space or time is unlike that of the supernatural. 
The·former is of an essentially negative type. The earthly is the 
world of more and less, of nothing and some and many, of becoming and 
change and passing away; the supernatural is the world of the simple 
All. The world of "more and less11 wears the stamp of the insufficient 
and incomplete. The Absolute, however, is the climax of the finite and 
2 
the augmentable, without being reached from it. The intentional 
correlates of experience of the two realms are thus set forth by 
Reinach as fundamentally distinct in their natures--so distinct that 
Reinach requires few rejoinders to render it clear that the experiences 
he is attempting to analyze are extraordinary. 
In the acts in which the supernatural comes to givenness for us 
there is said to be mirrored in certain ways the absolute fullness of 
the supernatural. The dependence, love, and thanks, which we feel, 
insofar as we experience God, are not relative and augmentable, like the 
relations between men, but of an absolute nature. Thus, assuming we do 
experience God, earthly experience can contain supernatural content. 
For if the supernatural is grasped in position-taking acts, an absolute-
ness of the content of these acts must correspond to the absoluteness 
of what is grasped, The manner in which this absolute content is felt, 
however, is relative. In any experience I may or may not be "filled" 
with the content. The manner in which I experience a content may or may 
not correspond to what the content "demands". When I know of and 
1
"Absolute 11 , Q§_, pp. xxxi-xxxiv. 
2 Ibid., p. xxxiv. 
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e~perience a great misery, and indeed, experience it was the great 
misery that it is, I may yet not experience it in the manner, penetrat-
ing deep into all layers of consciousness, which corresponds to its 
greatness. The weight of the experience is then not as great as the 
weight of the experienced content. The converse may also occur. It 
appears doubtful that an experience with absolute weight is possible 
for men, yet the absoluteness of the experience itself is accessible to 
us and forms the bridge to the realm of the absolute itself. It is 
always the case that the absolute object and the absolute content of 
1 
the experiences are necessarily coordinated. 
The process by which we come to knowledge of God is not, Reinach 
asserts, the same as the process by which we come to knowledge of earthly 
matters. Although, logically, taking God as a reality is a presupposition 
for feeling oneself sheltered in God, in the experience of God the former 
is mediate and the latter immediate. The experience of thankfulness 
and love are likewise mediate and derivative. This is made clearer 
through an analogy with perception. When I perceive an object, the 
relation between perception and the object is not objective to me, though 
through reflection I can come to the knowledge that I am perceiving. 
In an experience of my relationship to God, the relationship is not objective 
. for me, but can lead to the knowledge that I am in this relationship. 2 
In the concluding fragment entitled "Sceptical Reflections" 
Reinach remarks that the nature of the experiences of God of which he 
has been speaking are so unlike the ordinary experiences of men, so open 
1Ibid. , pp. xxxv-xxxvi. 2nBruchsdlck11 , pp. 6-7. 
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to the attacks made on "subjective experiences", that the attempt to 
formulate the claims of such experiences to validity seems futile. 1 
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Kurt Stavenhagen, who drew from these fragments by Reinach on 
the philosophy of religion as well as from works by Scheler, Pf~nder, 
Geiger, and Otto, in his ontological study of religion, makes the 
analogy between the act of taking a position in this context and the 
intellectual position-taking referring to the subsistence of states-of-
affairs, discussed earlier by Reinach in the article on reflection. 2 
In the context of that article one must also distinguish the position 
taking of the will, i.e., the grasping of the intention to do or not to 
do "x", and the taking of a position towards the value or disvalue of 
a subsisting state-of-affairs. By contrast to these other forms of position 
taking the one discussed in the fragments concerning religious experience 
seems to be a position taking of the whole self "towards other selves". 
Stavenhagen calls it the "personal" position taking. 3 It is clearly a 
complex act as it presupposes both a view of self and views of others, 
and moreover, both in its formation and its development and change over 
time would involve a high degree of interaction with the other types of 
position taking as well as the changes which they underwent. 
Stavenhagen finds that specifically religious position takings, 
regarded as sources for knowledge, must be seen as "subjective", not 
verifiable by any demonstrations. 4 This, of course, was precisely the 
point where Reinach left us in his discussion of religious experiences. 
1Ibid,' pp. 7-8. 
2Kurt Stavenhagen, Absolute Stellungnahmen: Eine ontologische 
Untersuchung Uber das Wesen der Religion (Erlangen: Philosophische 
Akademie, 1925), p. 42. 
3rbid., p. 42. 4Ibid. , p. 204. 
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1 Subsequently Stavenhagen observes that relig.ious position takings may 
still be the basis of convictions as discussed by Reinach in the 
article on negative judgments. This opens the way to analyzing con-
victions based on religious position takings as a special case of 
convictions based on "beliefs" as was discussed by Reinach. The short 
piece on the phenomenology of premonitions (see below) indicates that 
such an analysis of the way in which "subjective experiences" in fact 
may serve to "ground" convictions, which in turn may be the basis on 
which other acts of position taking are performed, is not alien to 
2 
Reinach's analysis of such phenomena. 
Premonitions.--It is the short piece of writing entitled "On the 
Phenomenology of Premonitions", 3 perhaps more than any other, which 
allows the present-day reader to understand why Reinach has been called 
the phenomenologist in and as such; here we see Reinach analyzing 
something from his every-day world, the world of soldiers at war; 
4 
premonitions of death. Reinach first establishes that premonitions, 
1 Ibid. , p. 212. 
2 The treatise on the philosophy of religion was left in an incom-
plete form. For this reason we have chosen to discuss only those issues, 
such as Reinach's method of analysis and epistemological questions, which 
bear some relation to. his other work, but not, for example, the 
qualities attributed to the Absolute. 
3 11 Adolf Reinach, 11Zur Phanomenologie der Ahnungen", in "Aufzeichungen, 
26 Juli 1916 - 3 Oktober 1917", Typewritten manuscript, presumably com-
piled by Anna Reinach from Reinach's papers, Nachlass Adolf Reinach; cited 
henceforth as 11Ahnungen11 • An English translation of this unpublished 
piece is ma~e available for the first time below, in Appendix III. 
4Reinach here makes it clear, as it is not always made clear in 
his writings, that there is a distinct difference between grasping the 
intuitive essence of something in itself and acknowledging it only in 
accordance with the meaning of the word. 
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like all other experiences, require an objective correlate or state-
of-affairs to which they refer. This state-of-affairs, the noematic 
aspect of the· premonition, may also be the content of a judgment or a 
1 
fear. It is the noetic aspect of the premonition which is problematic. 
As an act of correctly or incorrectly grasping a state-of-affairs as 
subsisting, and thus as a source of knowledge in what Reinach calls 
the 11wide" sense, the premonition may ground feeling-states (for 
example, dismay), striving, resistance, willing, etc., as do other acts 
of grasping subsisting states-of-affairs. The distinction between 
grounding and grounded structures, and the relationship between judgments 
and the act of grasping a state-of-affairs, were analyzed by Reinach in 
the article on negative judgments for the "narrower" sense of knowledge. 
By comparison with this narrower or more orthodox sense it is clear 
that premonitions are not ungrounded convictions, but rather that which 
may, validly or not, ground convictions. Reinach emphasizes that the 
strength and inner certainty of a conviction grounded on a premonition--
an act in which we grasp, or believe we grasp, a state-of-affairs as 
subsisting--is in no way inferior to one grounded on acts of knowing in 
the traditional sense. 
Reinach has been accused of holding a naive epistemological 
2 
position. These charges are to some extent well-founded. Yet it is 
clear, that Reinach was concerned with epistemological issues in all 
his writings. The role which he recognized to be in fact often performed 
by "subjective" experiences--grounding beliefs, convictions, assertions, 
1Here and in WB,GS, Reinach begins to make limited use of the terms 
11noetic 11 , "noematic". -
2 See above, Chapter III, pp. 87-92. 
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feeling-states, position takings of the will, strivings, and by 
extension influencing the whole range of practical and intellectual 
position takings,--was a significant one. He was not so naive as to 
assert that these "subjective" sources of knowledge in the wide sense 
could be deillonstrated or proven to have real objective correlates or 
to have these in adequate self-givenness--resort to attempts at 
"demonstration" or "proof" in the case of ultimates was indeed a 
course whose validity he strongly denied. He was at the same time, 
however, not afraid of attempting to grasp the essence of these 
experiences, as he occasionally accused non-phenomenologists of being, 
or of admitting the significance of the role they may play in the 
personal, practical, emotional, social, intellectual, and religious 
spheres of human experience. 
c) The theories of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and judgments. 
The first question that might be asked is whether states-of-
affairs are that which is ~ priori in the primary sense.. To accept 
this use of the term "!!. priori" is to accept a usage opposed to tradi-
tion and thus invite some measure of confusion. It is clear, however, 
that within the framework of Reinach's position the term"!!. priori" 
serves well, precisely because of the weight of tradition behind it, 
to describe the nature of the ontological connections of essences and, 
secondarily, the nature of acts of knowing and judgments referring 
to these connections. Reinach wished to make a strong point and 
ultimately the non-traditional use of the term "!!. priori" and the result-
ant shock effect of that usage strengthens his point. 
0 ·A fundamental assumption throughout Reinach's work is that 
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the structure of thought and language correspond to the structure of 
objectivity. This is an assumption with no ultimate defense. It is 
a common-sense point of view closely akin to an "act of faith". In 
the absence of counter-examples or other evidence that the assumption 
is defective it remains a sound philosophic point of view as long as 
its status as an assumption is not forgotten. 
The theory of states-of-affairs--states-of-affairs being that 
which is ~ priori in the primary sense and that which serves as the 
intentional correlate of all acts of knowing and of all judgments--is 
the most fully developed aspect of Reinach's threefold theory. There 
are problems relative to the nature of certain higher-order states-of-
affairs and relations of states-of-affairs. An example was seen above 
for the case of the objective correlates of causal judgments. It 
appears that these are problems capable of solution. 
A more serious area of problems is encountered in the theories 
of intentionality and evidence. These theories must carry the burden 
of clarifying the relationship of consciousness to being, of acts of 
knowing to states-of-affairs, and therefore require a fuller development 
than is overtly given them in Reinach's work. Reinach accepted much 
of Husserl's work on this topic, introducing distinctions only as these 
were motivated by analysis. The division of judgments into "assertions" 
and "~onvictions" and the accompanying analysis of the former as 
speech-acts involving acts of meaning (rneinen) and function, the latter 
as grounded on acts of knowing and representation, is an instance of 
significant and far-ranging dist i.nctions being motivated by such analysis. 
c 
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There are numerous directions for further development, many of 
which have been noted in the preceding chapters. Evidence, self-
givenness, and free variation of essences, all require further analysis. 
Reinach remarked on the severe limitations on evidence, that only 
states-of-affairs containing necessary essential connections can be 
grasped as necessary with indisputable evidence, that there is no 
final evidence for claims of real existence, that ontic connections 
need not necessarily be given to us, that judg:nents involving immediate 
evidence are rare, and that the process of practical reflection is 
theoretically infinite. It is therefore difficult to read his writings 
with care and in the end find his epistemological point of view naive 
1 in the simple pejorative sense. The point of view is far more the 
common-sense one of proceeding painstakingly with analysis in constant 
awareness of the high possibility of illusion and error. 
The subject of Chapter V, Reinach's legal philosophy, will provide 
an opportunity for examining the application of his threefold theory to 
a set of problems in analysis with which he dealt at.length. Among the 
topics to be considered are the method used by Reinach in concrete 
analysis, the relation this method bears to "linguistic-analytic" methods, 
and the controversy over synthetic ~ priori judgments in legal philosophy. 
1see above, pp. 87-88 for reference to von Baeyer's charge that 
Reinach's epistemological point of view was "naive". Further discussion 
of this question would, of course, presuppose clarification of what the 
term "naive" may be taken to mean. 
Chapter V 
Legal Philosophy 
This chapter, consisting of four sections, presents an analysis 
and evaluation of Reinach's legal philosophy. Section a is devoted 
primarily to the description of Reinach's legal philosophy, although 
it also identifies problematic aspects of his legal philosophy for 
further analysis and criticism in the following sections. Section b 
examines Reinach's method for concrete analysis of problems in legal 
philosophy. Reinach's analysis of the distinction between the moral 
and legal spheres, the analysis of "social-acts11 , the analysis of 
''promises", and the analysis of positive Law (Recht) as the product of 
"determinations" or 11 enactments" (Bestimmungen), are the principal sub-
jects. Reinach's treatment of each of these topics is of intrinsic 
interest quite apart from their relation to his legal philosophy as a 
whole. The comparison of Reinach's analysis of "social-acts" with the 
"linguistic-analytic" treatment of "performatives", linguistic and 
non-linguistic, may contribute to dialogue between practitioners of the 
phenomenological .and analytic approaches. 
Section c attempts to evaluate the significance of the theories of 
states-of-affairs, intentionality, and judgments for legal philosophy 
and ethics. The controversy over synthetic and analytic judgments--
central to much of the criticism in the past of Reinach's legal philosophy--
c - 150 -
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0 is discussed. An attempt is made to clarify the claims an~ counter-
claims of which much of the criticism has consisted, as well as to 
clarify Reinach's own position and suggest ways in which his own 
claims and interpretations of their significance may be qualified. 
The nature of the states-of-affairs with which ethics and legal philo-
sophy are concerned is considered, as is the type of logic required by 
these states-of-affairs, and the intentional relations and the types 
of givenness and evidence which are possible for these states-of-affairs. 
Section d, the conclusion, contains an assessment of the over-all 
strong and weak points of Reinach's legal philosophy. 
a) A description of Reinach's legal philosophy. 
Reinach's doctoral dissertation (1905) on the concept of cause 
in contemporary criminal law is not of direct phenomenological import-
ance, but it does display the level of Reinach's early skill in analysis 
and description as well as his pre-phenomenological approach to legal 
problems. 1 The main goals of the work are: 1) a solution of the 
problem of the legal meaning of the concept of "cause", and 2) a demon-
stration of the relation of psychology to the problem of clarifying the 
meaning of the connections of signs or symbols in a legal system. 
Theoretical and practical legal problems are said to result both from 
ambiguities in the expression of laws, and from non-equivalence of the 
intention and expression of laws. Psychology, it is asserted, is 
applicable to solution of both of these problems when the notion of a 
psychic regularity or consistency, as discussed by Lipps, is used to 
c 1 11 Adolf Reinach, Uber den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1905). 
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evaluate the probable intent of a specific law within a given legal 
system as a whole. Reinach, following PfMnder, 1 distinguishes two 
uses of psychology for the clarification of such problems: 
1) descriptive analysis, and 2) causal analysis. 
Problems of ambiguity of expression are to be solved by refer-
ence to psychic consistency. The objective nature of itself, 
the main subject for Reinach's later work on legal philosophy) is not 
discussed here. From the later point of view, the focus in this work 
is seen to be the clarification of the legal "determinations" or 
"enactments" (Bestimmungen) of positive Law and the development of 
guides for their practical interpretation, without regard for what 
Reinach later referred to as ~ priori laws (Gesetze) grounded in the 
essence of Law itself. 
The first four chapters of Reinach's dissertation present the 
inadequacies of the main legal doctrines of causation of the period. 
The problem is then restated and divided into three aspects: 1) delibe-
rate offenses, 2) negligent offenses, and 3) acts that are offenses in 
2 
virtue of their ultimate consequences. Reinach's treatment of 
deliberate offenses is in fact concerned not with the concept of cause 
involved here, but rather with determining what constitutes a deliberate 
offense. The will that "x" occur, together with objective grounds for 
believing that act "y" will lead to "x", and the performance of act 
"y", are found to constitute "deliberation". This result is then applied 
lAl . " " exander Pfander, Einfuhrung in die Psychologie (Leipzig: 
J. A. Barth, 1904), pp. 181-185. 
2chapter 5. 
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to produce a definition of negligence. Reinach concludes that for both 
of these cases any act that is a condition of the result is a cause of 
1 this result in the legal sense. In the more difficult third case 
Reinach concludes that an act followed by a mediated dire consequence 
is an offense only if the consequence could not have occurred had the 
2 
act not been performed. In his concluding remarks Reinach emphasizes 
that the law punishes only those acts over whose "being" and "not-being" 
the agent has power. 
We do not find it clear, however, that the notion of "cause" 
involved in the first two cases is different from that in the third. 
Moreover, in all three cases the problem and Reinach's interests seem 
to lie less with the concept of "cause", as such, than with the notion 
of legal responsibility. The conclusions about legal responsibility 
are not, however, always adequate. Just how probable does it need to 
be, that act "x." will result in event "y", for the agent who chooses to 
do 11x.11 or not to do "x" to be guilty of a deliberate or negligent 
offense? The whole result probably would have been happier had the 
dissertation been recast to coincide more fully with what in fact seem 
to be Reinach's interests in the problem: analyzing the psyche of the 
agents. 
3 11 In the introduction to Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burger-
lichen Rechtes ("The!!. priori Foundations of Civil Lawll) 4 , his principal 
work in legal philosophy and the best known and most widely discussed of 
1 Chapter 6. 2 Chapter 7. 
3 aGbR,GS, pp. 166-74. 
4Ibid., pp. 166-350, see above, p. 9. 
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all of his writings, Reinach sets forth the distinctions which are to 
form the foundation for the treatise. 1 Positive Law as a whole is said 
to develop and change continually in response to changes in moral 
intuition and the development of economic relations and needs. Positive 
legal propositions (S~tze) are thus completely different in essence 
from those of mathematics and may therefore not be spoken of as ''true" 
and "false", but only as "useful" and therefore "right". The proposition, 
11 2 + 2 = 4", subsists independent of men and time, but legal propositions 
2 
of today may have no validity in another period in history. Induction 
can isolate the general underlying argument. for positive Law from its 
single "determinations" or "enactments" (Bestimmungen), but this is also 
clearly subject to change. Although it may be possible to set forth 
formal independent laws which Law, insofar as it is Law, must fulfill, 
such laws would necessarily be strictly formal because Law necessarily 
3 has a changing content which reflects its time. 
The general contemporary view, Reinach observes, is that it is 
senseless to speak of legal concepts as having a Being (Sein) independ-
ent from the positive legal system. Possession as well as the proposi-
tions which rule it are, for example, all generally said to be the 
products o£ positive Law and to reflect the attempt of the community 
to bound and protect the dominion of the individual over things. The 
rise of exchange of goods and services is generally regarded to have 
given rise to the interpretation by positive Law of the problem o.f 
delayed payment in terms of claims and obligations. The key point to be 
lRecht has been translated as "Law" to distinguish it from Gesetz 
which has been translated as "law". 
2 
aGbR,GS, pp. 166-67. 3rbid., p. 167. 
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seen in this example is that all legal propositions and concepts were 
generally regarded as the creations of the social factors which produce 
Law. It was thought to be senseless to speak of the Being of any legal 
proposition as one which is independent from positive Law. 1 
It was Reinach's view, however, quite opposed to the one just 
given, that legal structures (Gebilde) do have a Being which is independ-
ent both from consciousness and from positive Law. He finds it senseless 
to refer to specifically legal structures as the creations of positive 
Law. Nor, he wishes to maintain, are the legal concepts which enter into 
the legal structures creations of positive Law. It is rather the case 
that ~ priori propositions obtain for legal structures. An example of 
such an ~ priori proposition is that it is grounded in the essence of 
a claim (Anspruch), as such, that the claim lapses through an act of 
waiver. There are many such ~priori propositions and Reinach asserts 
.that they are as intuitively evident and independent from consciousness 
and from all positive Law as the legal structures for which they hold. 2 
1Ibid., pp. 167-69. Karl Haff (See, 11Die Bedeutung der Rechts-
psychologie fUr die moderne Rechtsfindung," Archiv fUr Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, XVIII (1924-1925), 133-142)~s a firm supporter 
of this point of view and therefore a critic of Reinach. 
2aGbR,GS, pp. 169-171. The philosophy of law of Juan Llambias de 
Azevedo (see, "Eidetics and Aporetics of the Law", in Latin-American Legal 
Philosophy, by Luis Recasens Siches et al., trans. by Gordon Ireland et al., 
20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Ill, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1948, pp. 403-458.) takes as its primary supposition· the independ-
ence of Law from consciousness. Husserl, Pf~nder, Scheler, N. Hartmann, 
Reinach, Ingarden, and Wm. Schapp are all referred to in the course of the 
treatise. The conclusion decides neither for nor against the notion that 
legal formations or structures have an ~ priori structure independent of 
positive Law, but rather puts it forward as a still viable possibility. 
Other authors in Spanish whose work takes account of Reinach are 
Carlos Cossio, Luis Legaz y Lacambra, and Miguel Reale (see "Questionnaire 
des Archives de Philosophie du Droit," Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 
VII (1962), 83-167.). Jose Mar{a Alvarez M. Taladriz wrote the intro-
duction to the Spanish translation of Reinach's legal philosophy, Los 
fundamentos aprior{sticos del Derecho Civil, (trans. by Jose Luis Klvarez, 
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Reinach emphasizes, to prevent misunderstanding, that he is not 
asserting that positive legal propositions are~ priori. It is, in 
fact, his view that positive legal propositions are not judgmen~s at 
all and t the distinction between ~ priori and empirical consequently 
has no place in positive legal propositions. Reinach regards legal 
structures, and the ~priori synthetic laws which hold for their essences, 
to be of the highest philosophic interest, because they involve a 
previously unrecognized type of object--not physical, not psychical, and 
yet not ideal due to its temporality. 1 
Barcelona: Bosch, 1934). More recent is the section on Reinach's legal 
philosophy in Luis Recasens Siches' Panorama del Pensiamento Jur{dico 
en el XX, (Mexico: Editorial Porroa, 1963, pp. 253-265). 
1aGbR, pp. 171-172. Fritz Schreier interprets Reinach as having 
meant by this that individual legal objectivities are temporal, but finds 
this to be the same situation as that of physical and psychic objects; 
thus Schreier believes all three to be temporal as particulars and time-
less as concepts, (Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts: Entwurf 
ph~nomenologisch begrllndeten form~n Rechts- und-staatslehre, Leipzig 
und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1924, p. 59.). It is rather our opinion that 
had Reinach meant this he would have said so. 
Gerhart Husserl, unlike Schreier, credits Reinach with having 
.correctly shown for the first time that claims and obligations were a 
unique type of temporal object, non-physical and non-psychical, ("Zur 
Lehre von den sog. Doppelwirkungen im Recht," in Recht und 
Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen, Juristische Abhandlungen I, Frankfurt 
am Main: Klostermann, 1964, p. 235.). In his first main work 
~~~~~~ und Rechtsgeltung I, Berlin: Springer, 1925) Husserl commented 
on the superiority of Reinach's pure intuitive approach to the formalism of 
the work of Fritz K~ufmann (see, Die philosophischen Grundprobleme der 
Strafrechtsschuld, Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1929.) 
Fritz Schreier, .££.· cit .. Husserl regards Reinach's failure to 
actually reach the end he had set for himself as due primarily to the 
inadequacy of the material available to him for intuition, which was due 
in turn to the limitation of his attention for the most part to the current 
German civil law, and an insufficient use of the method of comparative law. 
Later phenomenological studies by G. Husserl on possession (a particularly 
weak point in Reinach's work) may be of interest to those wishing to examine 
the implementation of these suggestions, (see, Der 
Rechtslogische Studien zu einer Theorie des Eig~ums, Ber in: Springer, 
1933, and Person, Sache-,-Verhalten: Zwei~nomenologische 
Philosophische Abhandlungen, XXXII, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1969.). 
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~ priori legal doctrine is thus found by Reinach to be completely 
autonomous and independent from positive Law. Although legal structures 
and ~priori legal propositions both subsist independent from positive 
Law, they are both presupposed by positive Law. Insofar as they are pre-
supposed by positive Law, analysis of their essences is of significance 
for the positive legal disciplines. Thus, there is, Reinach remarks, 
often mention in jurisprudence of propositions which are, in fact, not 
contained in positive Law, but which are yet said to be "self-evident" 
or "given by the Nature of the thing". Propositions such as these are 
actually the result of ~ priori legal doctrine. They are, Reinach 
asserts, propositions which actually arise from the "Nature" of "the 
essence" of the concepts in question. 1 Reinach hopes that a priori 
legal doctrine may help to clarify the history of Law. It is his view 
that the structure of positive Law can in any case first be made under-
standable only through the structure of the non-positive (~priori) 
2 legal sphere. 
In the chapter concerning "claims", "obligations", and "promises", 3 
many of the distinctions made in the introduction are given concrete 
application. Let us assume with Reinach that person A makes a promise 
to person B. The effect of this promise is to give rise to a "unique 
connection" between these two persons, which is by essence of some dura-
tion yet has an "immanent tendency" to experience an end and a fulfill-
ment. The promise may also expire, be retracted, or disclaimed. The 
making of a promise is said to give rise to both a "claim11 and an 
1
whether Reinach can say they arise from the essence of the 
"concepts" and remain consistent is open to question. A statement that 
they arise from the essence of the structures in question would seem more 
appropriate. 
2 
aGbR,GS, pp. 173-74. 3rbid., pp. 174-231. 
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"obligation". These constitute the "unique connection" referred to 
above. The proposition that "a claim on a given service lapses the 
moment the service is-rendered" is an "a priori synthetic law" grounded 
in the essence of a claim as such. Reinach regards it as synthetic 
for he finds it to be in no possible sense "contained in the concept" 
of a claim that it expire under determinate circumstances, nor would 
its contrary imply a logical contradiction, as would be the case if it 
1 
fulfilled Kant's criterion of analyticity. Claims and obligations can 
also arise from sources other than promises, as, for example, from the 
taking of something which belongs to another. Reinach's ability to 
defend this last example presupposes the.§!. priority of "possession", 
only one of the possible relations of persons and things. 
Reinach asserts that it is possible to have knowledge about claims 
and obligations whether or not they pertain to us directly. Although 
1rbid., pp. 174-77. Julius Kraft found Reinach to have been mis-
taken in his belief that correct analytic assertions, such as those 
concerning the lapsing of claims, were .§!.priori synthetic propositions. 
The assertion that ''claims and obligations are grounded in promises as 
such", is said by Kraft to be trivial, if by "promise" is meant "a 
binding declaration of will", but false, if only the fact of "a declara-
tion of will" is meant, ("Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der phl:{no-
menologischen Rechtsphilosophie," Kantstudien, XXXI (1926), 286-296). 
Reinach himself made the latter point with considerable force, see 
below, p. 162. Erwin Riezler ("Apriorisches im Recht," Archiv fUr 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, XVII (1924), 264-84.) came to 
essentially the same conclusion (as did Hans Neisser, "The Phenomenological 
Approach in Social Science," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
XX (1959-1960), 198-212, and Nicos Ar. Poulantzas, "Notes sur la 
phenomenologie et l'existentialisme juridiques," Archives de Philosophie 
~Droit, VIII (1963), 213-235.) on the basis of a more lengthy analysis 
of Reinach's legal philosophy, but unfortunately simply confounded 
Reinach's use of the term "analytic" with that of Kant rather than 
recognizing that Reinach, going beyond Kant, regarded the "analytic" as 
grounded in an .§!_priori objective essential connection. This is a 
relatively common error among critics of Reinach. See below, pp. 196-206. 
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subjective experience of claims and obligations is possible only for 
those particular ones which belong to us, Reinach finds that I can also 
.feel myself to be obligated or to have a claim, without an obligation 
or claim actually subsisting, and conversely. Actual claims and obliga-
tions are not merely psychic. They presuppose a bearer and have a 
determinate content. The content may refer to a conduct or to the 
realization of a result. Some obligations may therefore be transferred 
without the consent of the bearer of the claim, (as, for example, when 
C must pay A the sum of money which B owes A). Yet in all cases there 
1 is a correlation between the claim and the obligation. 
Reinach regards it as important to distinguish moral duties and 
rights from legal claims and obligations. Moral rights and duties are 
never grounded in will directed acts and are consequently not trans-
ferable; only what originates in a free act can be abolished in a free 
act. The difference between the moral and legal spheres is seen in the 
fact that though we may say "person x has a moral duty to fulfill the 
obligation he undertook by making that promise", the moral duty 
mentioned here arises only because the obligation already obtains. 2 
Reinach found all previous definitions of ''promises" faulty. In 
order to ground his own discussion of promises, claims, and obligations, 
he analyzes the "social act 113 in general, of which promises are found to 
be but one type. The key characteristics of the "social act" are its 
spontaneity and requirement of recognition. Not all acts directed to 
another person require recognition, nor are all acts requiring recognition 
1 aGbR,GS, pp. 177-80. 2Ibid. , pp. 181-84. 
3
see below, pp. 184-96, for an analysis and comparison of Reinach's 
treatment of "social acts" with "analytic" approaches to "performatives". 
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directed to another person. A command, however, is an example of an 
act of a unique type to which the requirement of recogn.ition, as well 
as spontaneity, intentionality, and direction to another person, are 
all essential. Social acts are found to have an inner and an outer 
aspect. The latter can vary while the inner aspect remains the same, 
but it is only through the outer aspect that a social act can be 
grasped, that it can fulfill its "notification function". The simple 
outward mirroring of inner experiences such as shame, scorn, love, fear, 
etc., in non-will directed ways, is not, Reinach insists, to be confused 
with social acts, which are, by essence, will-directed. Nor are state-
ments such as, 111 am afraid", or "I don't want to do that 11 , to be 
confused with social acts; these statements are merely outer references 
to subjective experiences which could have been there without the outer 
reference. A statement such as, "I have given an order", refers to the 
social act as a whole, including the outer aspect, that is, the act of 
verbally giving an order. The act of verbally giving an order may in 
no case be confused with such a statement referring to the whole social 
1 
act. 
Commands, requests, and communications are all distinct types of 
social acts. Questions are fulfilled only when they receive an answer, 
while answers, though they presuppose social acts in the form of questions, 
require no act in turn. It is clear that these relationships do not hold 
for apparent questions, requests, or communications (i.e., lies). Reinach 
finds that the following distinctions serve to distinguish the various 
types of social acts: 1) simple ones, 2) those which presuppose other 
1 aGbR,CS, pp. 184-92. 
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social acts, and 3) those which point to subsequent social acts or 
other activities. Other distinctions are also possible. It is possible, 
for example, to place a condition on a social act if that social act 
in its unconditioned form would have an effect. The social act may 
be made conditional by making the effect depend on the occurrence of 
a future event, where that future event is possible but not necessary; 
any obligation entailed becomes binding at ~' though the effect or 
conduct becomes necessary only with the actual occurrence of the event 
which had been merely possible at the time of performance of the social 
act. This relationship and other similar ones are said by Reinach to 
1 
be grounded purely in the essence of the "social act". 
There may be more than one person to whom a social act is directed 
or by whom. it is performed. Social acts may also be performed "in the 
name of another", but these are distinct from those "in the interest of 
another". The obligation or claim in the case of a promise would belong, 
in the first instance, to the person named, not to the speaker, and in 
the second, to the person mak-ing the promise. What Reinach finds note-
worthy about all of these cases is what he regards as the strong ~priori 
form of the propositions pertaining to them. He emphasizes that these 
propositions express immediately intuitible essential connections and 
2 
are not the creations of positive Law. 
1
rbid.' pp. 192-97. 
2Ibid., pp. 197-203. Herbert Spiegelberg points out that social 
acts and their modifications have wider applications than to legal 
philosophy; see Spiegelberg, PM, p. 203. Reinach himself remarked, 
aGbR,GS, p. 174, that the ~priori legal doctrine with which he was here 
concerned was a part of the ~ priori foundation of all social interchange. 
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Reinach now turns his attention away from social acts in general 
and back to an analysis of how claims and obligations arise from 
promises. Unlike many requests and commands, promises, by essence, 
require no acceptance. It is rather the case that the person who makes 
a promise assumes the obligation in the very act of making the promise. 
No corresponding social act is required to assume a claim. It is thus 
argued that claims and obligations are grounded in promises as such. 
All claims as such can be waived, although the case where the promise 
included the reguest that the promise be accepted is more complex. Agree-
ment to the request to accept the promise involved the assumption of an 
obligation. Thus the second party cannot waive his claim on the original 
promise without first receiving a waiver to do so from the first party. 
1 
By essence, claims may be waived, but promises cannot be retracted. 
Reinach finds Hume's theory of promises unacceptable because 
promises are simply not equivalent to a will to take on an obligation, 
motivated ultimately by self-interest. The view of Theodor Lipps, that 
promises are the making outward of the will to do something in the 
interest of another, is also unacceptable to Reinach because it does not 
explain the origin of the obligation. Reinach regards Lipps' theory to 
be an example of psychologism. It attempts, Reinach asserts, to clarify 
the objectivity of essential laws of social connections through recourse 
to subjective experiences which are absolutely irrelevant for the sub-
sistence of these connections. Likewise, the position of Wilhelm Schuppe, 
who regarded promises as declarations of intentions of will, is found by 
Reinach to be unable to explain the obligation entailed in making a 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 204-212. 
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promise. Reinach regards Schuppe 1 s error to have arisen from the fact 
that his theory makes obligation rest on moral duty, which according to 
1 Reinach 1 s analysis instead presupposes the existence of obligation. 
Reinach recognizes that his view that obligation is grounded in 
the essence of promises as acts, not in their content, entails the view 
that an immorality of content cannot effect the essential connection; 
thus the obligation would remain. There would therefore be two con-
flicting moral duties with distinct grounds: 1) to fulfil! the 
original obligation, and 2) to prevent its realization. The grounds for 
these conflicting duties would lie in the original obligation and its 
content, respectively. 2 
Reinach states that he will give no theory of promises, but only 
set forth the "simple proposition" that promises as such produce claims 
and obligations. It is fear of givenness, a curious timidity, or an 
inability to grasp final intuitables and recognize them as such, Reinach 
asserts, which has in the past led to an unphenomenologically directed 
philosophy, with this problem as with many other fundamental ones, to 
3 
untenable and simply fantastic constructions. 
There are many possible person-thing relationships, where "thing" 
is taken in the widest sense of the word as including everything "usable". 
Reinach distinguishes physical and legal power: I may exercise one or the 
other or both. Possession, Reinach asserts, is independent of the exist-
ence of positive Law, It is, moreover, grounded in the essence of 
possession that the bearer has an absolute right to do anything with the 
"thing" possessed, though that right may be modified by other moral or 
1Ibid., pp. 212-226. 
3
rbid. , pp. 229-30. 
2
rbid., pp. 226-228. 
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legal duties and obligations. Possession is not primarily a right over 
a "thing", but rather a relation to the "thing" in which all other 
possible rights to the "thing" are grounded. This original and ground-
ing relation is not altered even when all rights to the "thing" are 
ceded to other persons. It is rather presupposed by these ceded rights. 
Laws governing transfers of property and mortgages are thus regarded as 
ultimately grounded on this original relation of possession. 1 
Reinach will continue to avoid trying to "define" the concept of 
rights and obligations, because to define, Le., what he calls to 
2 
attempt to clarify something by means of alien elements, is futile. 
The transfer and ceding of rights are distinct. The transfer of 
possession involves only a change of the bearer of the relation to the 
"thing". In response to the problem of the originof possession Reinach 
attempts only to make clear a few aspects of ~ priori doctrine rather 
than taking up ethical and historical questions related to the problem. 
Reinach asserts that the fact that I have had a "thing" for ten years 
does not mean that I possess it, but if I make something from material 
which "does not belong to anyone else" then I do possess the product. 
The act of production is what grounds the possession in this instance, 
not the "work" involved, as such, for there may be much "work" involved 
in transporting something from one place to another, yet, Reinach asserts, 
I will still not possess the thing transported. The result of the 
collective production by more than one person of one "thing" is that they 
"together'' have possession of the "thing" produced. Reinach asserts 
that he has, by example, shown that it is possible to study the legal 
origins of possession as it is grounded in laws of essences. To the 
1Ibid., pp. 231-50. 2 11 See UP,GS and above p. 19. 
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question of how absolute obligations (corresponding to absolute rights, 
1 
as of possession) originate Reinach has, as yet, no answer. 
Leaving the analysis of "possession" in this incomplete and 
rather unsatisfactory form, Reinach proceeds to study the essential laws 
governing the transfer of obligations. He warns of the possibility of 
being led to false conclusions by our knowledge of what is "customary". 
"Clear insight" into the §!. priori essential connections leads Reinach 
to the observation that transfers may leave the same person addressed 
in the content (thus person A will still benefit from fulfillment of 
the obligation). If the transfer is to involve a change in the person 
addressed that person must agree to the change unless they have already 
ceded the right of transfer. 2 
3 
In the social act of promises and their immediate legal effects --
1aGbR,GS, pp. 250-264. The treatment given possession is one of 
the weakest in this treatise. Karl Haff (.g.r.. cit.) and Friedrich Bassenge 
("Zur Philosophie des Eigentums," Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 
XXXI (1937-38), 324-351) are strongly doubtful that possession is§!. priori 
at all. Somewhat more positively Edgar Bodenheimer ("Phltnomenologie und 
Rechtsquellenlehre," in PhMnomenologie, Rechtsphilosophie, Jurisprudenz, 
Festschrift fUr Gerhart Husserl zum 75. Geburtstag, ed. by Thomas 
wUrtenberger, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1969, p. 90.) remarks that Reinach 
sometimes went too far in his interpretations of §!. priori legal proposi-
tions, but had indeed laid the foundation for later deeper treatment, as 
for example in the work of Gerhart Hus serl. See above p. 156, nt. 1, for 
references to the work of the latter on possession. 
2 
aGbR,GS, pp. 264-273. 
3Fritz Schreier (2£. cit.) made a new start at the attempt to 
treat problems of legal philosophy on a phenomenological basis, having 
found Reinach's approach inadequate. His work was based primarily on the· 
Logische Untersuchungen and the work of Kelsen. Schreier regards social 
and legal acts as completely distinct, thus rejecting one of Reinach's 
basic points, and insists that Law cannot constitute itself in social acts, 
(Ibid., p. 13). Wilhelm Schapp stated that among phenomenologists his 
position lay closest to that of Reinach, whose work influenced him more 
than all the others, though he notes that they both had received much of 
their training from Pf~nder and Daubert. In his view, the strongest aspect 
of Reinach's legal philosophy was the study of acts and the connection 
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claims and obligations--Reinach finds a legal ability, a "can", to 
document itself. This legal ability is not further reducible, but 
rather has its final origin in the legal person as such. This funda-
mental ability is not transferable. Insofar as it is grounded in the 
essence of the legal person as such, it is inseparable from that 
essence; it builds the ultimate foundation which first makes possible 
the constitution of legal-social relations. There are, Reinach asserts, 
in addition three types of rights and obligations which the person 
cannot transfer: 1) moral ones which are grounded in the essence of the 
person as such and are inseparable from it; 2) moral ones which spring 
from determinate objective situations in which the person is involved 
and which cannot be separated from the person so long as these situations 
endure; and 3) rights and obligations which are given to the person 
through social acts and cannot be transferred because the person lacks 
the legal ability to do so. 1 
"Representation", a social act "in the name of another", is next 
studied in order to discover the essential legal foundation which makes 
such acts possible. To act in the name of another is not strictly the 
same as acting in the manner I assume the other would act. If I make a 
promise in the name of another no obligation results for me, only for 
the person named. It is ~ priori possible that B promises C, in the name 
between acts and legal relations, (Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht, 2 
vols. Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild,l930-1932, I, p. 182. ~The close 
tie between the ~ priori legal and social essences was also the subject 
of part of the article by C. A. Emge, "liber die Zusammenh~nge zwischen 
Soziologie und Rechtswissenschaft einerseits, zwischen Religionsphilosophie, 
Geschichtsphilosophie und Rechtsphilosophie anderseits, 11 II, Archiv fllr 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, XVIII (1924-1925), 30-57. 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 274-75. 
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of A, that he, B, will do "x". The result is that C has a claim 
against A that B fulfill the obligation. There are, of course, con-
ditions on acts in the name of another. I cannot make promises in 
someone's name if those promises are against his will. The person whom 
I am to represent may promise, however, to fulfill all obligations 
which I make in his name. In doing so he takes on an obligation whose 
content is identical to the content of any obligation I may subsequently 
k . h' 1 ta e on 1n 1S name. 
The case where I promise a third person that I will do whatever B 
promises him in my name, involves an obligation on my part to the third 
person and is thus not a true case of "representation" in the sense 
discussed above. The legal ability to represent someone comes about 
instead by an "act of ceding of power" by the person to be represented. 
The power ceded may include all types of legal social acts or it may be 
limited to specific ones. The "mandate" extended in this ceding of 
power may either be complete or it may include certain stipulations about 
how particular cases are to be handled. "Passive-representative power", 
as opposed to the "active" form discussed above, is found in cases where 
the sole function of the representative is to receive social acts in the 
11 name of someone 11 though he has no power to perform social acts in that 
person's name. An example of this distinction is seen in the comparison 
of an errand-boy with one who actively represents. The errand-boy must 
deliver what is received to the person addressed, whereas the one who 
2 
represents fulfills his function by simply receiving it. 
In the remainder of the treatise Reinach plans to limit himself to 
two paths of research: 1) the exhibition and teleological foundation of 
1Ibid., pp. 275-80. 2Ibid., pp. 280-91. 
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general positiv~ legal propositions, and 2) the study of the eternal 
1 
laws of Being which are grounded in the pure legal concepts. Reinach 
begins this new stage in his analysis with the observation that positiva 
Law seems to contradict what he has said at almost all points. The 
fundamental observation that only persons can be the bearers of rights 
and obligations is, for example, apparently disproven through the fact 
that positive Law recognizes foundations as the bearers of rights and 
obligations and does not recognize a twenty-year old person as being one 
who may assume legal obligations. It is on paints such as these that 
Reinach expects there to be objections to his attempt to formulate an 
~ priori legal doctrine. He therefore takes great pa~ns to explain 
clearly that positive and ~ priori legal propositions stand on two quite 
distinct levels, with the result that there can be no actual contra-
dictions. 
The propositions of ~priori legal doctrine, insofar as they set 
forth a being as subsisting, i.e., presuppose an~ priori legal structure 
independent of positive Law, are propositions of judgment. But proposi-
tions of positive Law are not judgments; "true" and "false" in the 
logical sense may never be applied to them. Rather they are 
"determinations" or "enactments" (Bestimmungen) which may then serve as 
the basis for legal assertions, such as, "it is the case that 'the legal 
ability of men begins with the completion of birth'". Thus one cannot 
speak of a true contradiction between essential ~ priori laws and the 
propositions of positive Law. 1f positive Law asserted its propositions 
originally then contradictions with essential a priori laws would indeed 
1
rbid., p.297. See above, p. 157, nt. 1, and below, pp. 201-204, 
on the use of the term "concept". 
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result. However, positive Law "determines'' ("it is to be regarded as 
being the case that .... ") its propositions rather than asserting them 
( " 4 t . th 11 ) 1 .... ~s e case... . 
Reinach clarifies this distinction by a discussion of determina-
tions as such. A "determination" is a social act founded on the will 
that something shou.ld be the ~· The experience, act, statement, 
content, and effect of a determination are all to be distinguished. In 
executing an act of determination a law-giver may say, "A should be b". 
This same statement as used in ethics--where it is a means of expressing 
the subsistence of an objective should-be (Seinsollen), grounded in the 
rightness of the "being-b of A",--stands in sharp contrast to its use 
by the law-giver. Any judgment, as such, including false judgments, can 
refer only to states-of-affairs. In judgments states-of-affairs are set 
forth as subsisting or non-subsisting. In determinations they are set 
forth as that which should or should not be. Conduct can be the object 
of a determination, even one's own conduct, as is reflected in the self-
binding Laws made by the state. This explains the tendency to confuse 
2 
orders and determinations. 
A determination, Reinach insists, does not correspond to any in-
itself in the objective sphere (i.e., to any objective state-of-affairs). 
It exists only as a correlate of the determining act of the law-giver. 
In this respect it is arbitrary. All determinations aim at the realization 
of that which they set forth as what "should be". The content of a 
1 aGbR,GS, pp. 296-300. 
2Ibid., pp. 300-304. Edith Stein, in her treatise on the State 
( 11~ine U~suchung ~ber den Staat," Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und 
phanomenologische Forschung, VII (1925), 1-123), states that her con-
clusions regarding the State and Law are for the most part only conse-
quences of Reinach's legal philosophy. One question she deals with is the 
significance of the distinction between ord'ers and determinations in 
relation to various acts of the State. 
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determination cannot be that which is a priori necessary or impossible 
if the determination is to be meaningful. In the former case it would 
be redundant and in the latter ineffective. Like many other social 
1 
acts, a determination may be made by, or directed to, many persons. 
Determinations have power to produce legal effects only if this 
power has already been bestowed on the law-giver by the persons effected. 
Bestowal of power is a unique social act. The validity of a priori 
connections is presupposed by determinations, not altered by them. The 
function of the determination is to negate the legal structures which 
grow from the ~ priori laws or to produce by its own power the legal 
structures excluded by these laws. A law-giver, one with power to make 
determinations, may, for example, know that certain legal structures do 
not result from the present social acts though from some relevant .point 
of view they "should be". He may then make a determination that they 
"should be" with the result that they are realized, insofar as he in 
fact has the power to make effective determinations. 2 
Reinach considers the case of an ~ priori connection whereby a 
legal structure cannot arise from a given social act, for example, 
possession from a promise. The determination cannot change this ~ priori 
connection as such, but it can say that in all cases it should be the 
case that promises may produce possession. If the determination is 
effective then this relationship is in fact established, but never through 
the promise alone, only after the promise and through the determination. 
Cases involving a necessary connection are different from the above which 
involved an a priori impossibility. If social act "b" by necessary 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 304-307. 2Ibid., pp. 307-12. 
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connection gives rise to legal structure "a", an effective determination 
can make it a matter of fact that social act 11 b11 gives rise to legal 
structure 11 c", without structure 11a 11 ever coming into being. Thus, 
Reinach asserts, a determination can prevent what necessarily comes from 
an act from doing so, but it cannot make arise from an act that which 
cannot so arise. The essential connection is presupposed by the 
determination in the former case and then neutralized. The essential 
connection, in such cases, still subsists, as was seen in the relation-
ship of possession and the ceding of rights to the 11 thing 11 • 1 
There are two types of essential connections; those which hold 
under all circumstances, the necessary essential connections, and those 
which hold only under certain circumstances, i.e., those which are 
neither necessary nor impossible. Reinach gives as an example of the 
first the connection whereby calor exists only as somehow united with 
extension, while an example of the second is said to be that the 
fulfillment of striving is accompanied by pleasure. Another example of 
the second is said to be that only if there has been no ceding or 
transferring of rights to 11 things 11 do all rights to "things11 spring from 
actual possession of the "thing". All necessary legal connections hold 
for positive Law only under the presupposition that there has been no 
opposing determination. In and for themselves, (rather than for positive 
Law), however, necessary connections are valid in all cases. 2 
Once it has been effectively determined that a certain legal 
structure is to result from certain social acts, then the assertion is 
correct that within a given circle of persons a given structure actually 
1Ibid., pp. 312-13. 2Ibid. , pp. 313-14. 
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exists on the ground of the performance of the particular social act. 
It is in this respect that judgmental propositions have a place in 
1 positive Law and may be correctly referred to as "true" or ''false". 
Reinach reasserts that there is no contradiction between ~ priori 
and positive legal doctrine, but rather only a divergence of the determina-
tions of positive Law from the ~ priori laws of essential connections. 
This divergence implies no invalidity of the~ priori laws; rather it 
is the case that the ~ priori laws are what first makes positive Law 
possible and comprehensible. 2 
Positive Law is said to have the task of interpretation. Thus, 
for example, positive Law associates various forms of selling and buying 
with a variety of legal effects by interpreting these forms of selling 
and buying as types of promises and transfers of possessions. Reinach 
illustrates his point by drawing from the different interpretations 
found in Roman law, the French civil code, and more recent German law. 
The interpretative function of positive Law is seen as well in its 
various determinations throughout history of what is to be regarded 
as a legal person. Slaves have often not been regarded as legal persons, 
while the development of corporate enterprise has met with the response 
from positive Law whereby corporations are treated "as if" they were 
3 legal persons. 
1
rbid. ' pp. 314-15. 2 Ibid., pp. 315-16 .. 
3
rbid., pp. 320-337. Edith Stein (.£P... cit.) discusses how and on 
what basis the State functions as a legal person. Alfred Schutz stated 
that Edith Stein's and Gerda Walther's ("Zur Ontologie der sozialen 
Gemeinschaften," Jahrbuch fllr Philosophie und ph~nomenologische Forschung, 
VI (1923), 1-158.) "naive use of the eidetic method in analyzing the 
problems of social relations, of community, and of the state led them to 
formulations of certain apodictic and purportedly aprioristic statements 
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The propositions of ~priori legal doctrine are, Reinach states, 
1 
synthetic~ priori judgments in Kant's sense. Their validity, however, 
is not to be seen in positive Law; the latter is first made possible 
only by ~ priori legal connections of essence. It is possible, Reinach 
suggests, that there are many immediately intuitable ~priori legal 
propositions which have found no objectivation in positive Law. In any 
case nothing is clearer to Reinach than the untenability of attempts to 
establish immediately intuitable connections by reference to cultural 
institutions which themselves can first be made clear and understandable 
through such connections. Synthetic ~ priori propositions should not be 
accepted at once on good faith; it is rather, Reinach insists, the 
intuition of essences on which one must rely. Pure phenomenological 
analysis alone can produce insight into essential connections which is 
2 
evident, free from doubt. 
which have contributed very much tQ discredit phenomenology among the 
social sciences," ("Husserl's importance for the social sciences" in 
Edmund Husserl: 1959-1959: Recueil commemoratif publie ~!'occasion du 
centenaire de l~ naissance du philosophe, Phaenomenologica, Vol. IV, ed. 
by H. L. Van Breda, The Hague: Hartinus Nijhoff, 1959, p. 89). It is 
rather, Schutz continued, in the constitutive phenomenology of the 
natural attitude that the empirical sciences will find their true founda-
tion, (Ibid., p. 97). 
1This statement has often been misinterpreted due to lack of 
attention to Reinach's discussion of Kant 1 s use of the terms~ priori, 
synthetic, and analytic; see KAH,GS; NU,GS; RVK,GS; Spiegelberg, PM, 
pp. 195-205; and above pp. 40-53-.- K~t's sense of synthetic;-
priori is adequate in this context because the subject is propositions 
and not the essential connections in which; according to Reinach's 
position, these propositions find their objective reference. 
2 
aGbR,GS, pp. 337-41. Theodor Elsenhans found that despite all 
protests to the contrary the phenomenological method did not exclude 
inductive empirical elements. This is a common criticism of phenomenology. 
One example put forward by Elsenhans is the legal philosophy of Reinach. 
He asserts that although Reinach emphasized the ~ priori character of 
phenomenology, the propositions which are to hold for legal structures 
exclude Husserl's distinction of the phenomenological and the empirical 
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Reinach's primary aim in the last section1 of the treatise was 
to lay to rest any tendency to confuse ~ priori legal doctrine with 
2 
"general legal doctrine" or with "natural law". In addition to a 
priori legal doctrine which, Reinach argues, founds those concepts 
and conceptual connections found in all legal systems, Reinach recog-
nizes that there is a "general legal doctrine" for each particular 
positive legal system. In this general doctrine are founded the con-
cepts and connections shared by the various disciplines of the legal 
system. The viewpoint taken towards the same social act by different 
legal disciplines can be different. General legal doctrine, however, 
unlike ~ priori legal doctrine, s dependent on positive Law. Although 
general and _§: priori legal doctrine are completely distinct, the former 
having an empirical basis, Reinach suggests that the latter may in 
insofar as they are oriented at "simple matters of fact". The fact 
that the reader must visualize the various cases in which he has made or 
received promises in order to verify the results of Reinach's analysis 
of promises is regarded as casting strong doubt over the claim that 
for the phenomenological method a single case of "exemplification" may 
be adequate to serve as a basis for grasping the essence. ("Ph~nomenologie, 
Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie," Kantstudien, XX (1915), pp. 247-249). 
Elsenhans' remarks do not take into account the distinction between 
simply remembering past experienced cases and methodological variation 
of examples. 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 341-50. 
2see ARP, pp. 23-32 for Alexander van Baeyer's remarks on the 
distinctions, often overlooked, between ~ priori legal doctrine and 
"natural law". Von Baeyer observes (Ibid., p. 27) that ~ priori laws 
are grounded in the essence of the legal structures. ! priori Law 
therefore contains only descriptive propo.;,itions, whereas "natural law" 
contains only prescriptive or normative propositions. Von Baeyer finds 
many misinterpretations of Reinach's legal philosophy to have arisen 
precisely from ignoring Reinach's distinction of the normative from the 
specifically legal. Regarding the latter, see also below, pp. 176-84. 
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1 
.certain ways first make understandable the possibility of the former. 
Reinach finds the idea of an unconditionally valid, rational 
law to be essential to any natural law theory. One error of natural 
law, Reinach asserts, :i.s to believe in the possibility of an ideal law 
for all time with unchanging content. The variability of the life 
relations on which the validity of such a proposition would depend is, 
for Reinach, adequate evidence of the impossibility of such an eternal 
ideal law. Natural law, however, searches for a sphere uninfluenced 
by positive Law and possessing eternal truth. ~ priori legal doctrine 
provides such a sphere, although not in the sense sought by natural law 
which regards ideal laws as having their ground in "a higher moral 
2 
world and life order". Natural law appears to aim at the ultimate 
obliteration of all distinctions between ideal and positive Law. Nor 
does natural law appear to regard ideal and positive Law as fundamentally 
distinct in nature, whereas for Reinach §:. prior:l Law is that which "is" 
while positive Law is enacted as that which "should be". 
t priori laws, as essential laws, subsist independent from the 
way in which any subjects conduct themselves. Although it is not the 
case that all men regard §:. priori laws as in fact obtaining, this is as 
irrelevant for them as it is for mathematical propositions. 3 It is 
1 aGbR,GS, pp. 341-44. 2rbid., p. 345. 
3J.-L. Gardies, in his first article on Reinach's Legal philosophy, 
C'Le droit, 1' 'a priori', l'imaginaire et !'experience," Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit, VII (1962), 171-197), takes with utmost seriousness 
the similarity between '§;.priori' mathematical and legal propositions. 
His two tasks are: 1) an attempt to axiomatize positive Law, as Hilbert 
axiomatized euclidian geometry, and thus an attempt to penetrate to the 
roots of the legal §:.priori; and 2) to obtain alternative sets of 
postulates, analogous to those of non-euclidian geometries, by simple 
replacement with other possible postulates, Gardies remarks that he 
finds himself in a position like that of the uncomfortable position of 
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irrelevant, Reinach asserts, whether it is ~who are the bearers of 
claims and obligations, the performers of acts, etc., or not. Any 
other adequate agent could be bearer of such acts. Legal structures 
are grounded in the essence of certain social acts, and consequently a 
priori legal propositions hold for any thinkable subject and world. 
Legal objects and laws are in no way natural; they are neither physical 
nor psychic. £l priori legal laws subsist independent of Nature, of 
human knowledge, of human organization, and above all, Reinach concludes, 
1 
of the factual development of the world. 
b) Analysis of Reinach's method for concrete analysis of problems in 
legal philosophy. 
The distinction between the moral and the legal spheres.--Reinach's 
analysis of the distinction between the moral and legal spheres presupposes 
the work done by Husserl in the development of a phenomenological theory 
of value. According to this theory there were objective values for which 
~ priori laws held. Both the values and the laws were accessible to men 
by means of value-feeling (WertfUhlen) and intuition and were regarded 
Euclid, axiomatizing euclidian geometry without knowing of the existence 
or even possibility of non-euclidian geometries. The article is of gen-
eral interest relative to the feasibility of axiomatization in the social 
sciences. In his later article ("La philosophie du droit d 'Adolf Reinach," 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, X (1965), 17-32.) Gardies expresses 
certain limited reservations about Reinach's legal philosophy. Reinach's 
protests against reduction in philosophy Gardies finds both sane and 
dangerous; his claim that legal structures are irreducible highly 
questionable (referring back to the arguments of the previous paper); .and 
his use of the Sein/Sollen distinction, in his discussion of the relations 
of ~ priori legal doctrine and positive Law, abusive. 
1aGbR,GS, pp. 345-50. The footnotes in this section have attempted 
to provide an indication of the range of critical response to Reinach's 
legal philosophy. These notes supplement the extensive notes on this 
toRic provided in Alexander von Baeyer' s dissertation, 11Adolf Reinachs . 
Phanomenologie: Untersuchungen zum VerhMltnis von ph~nomenologischer 
Forschung und Geschichtlichkeit," Faculty of Philosophy, University of 
Bern; Munich: Mikrokopie, 1969. 
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1 
as the basis on which acts of evaluation were to be grounded. Moral 
rights and duties, which it was Reinach's aim to distinguish from 
non-moral rights and obligations, were likewise ultimately founded on 
objective values. Thus, as Reinach reminds his reader, 2 it is morally 
right that an object of moral value exist and acts to bring this 
morally valuable object into existence are also morally valuable. 
Immediately intuitable essential connections (\vesenszusammenhMnge) such 
as had been described in Husserl's axiology thus subsist between the 
values of persons, acts, objects, etc., and the "rightness" of states-
of-affairs involving elements of value. 
In his analysis of the legal sphere Reinach also discovers 
essences and essential connections. Like those of the moral sphere, 
these are regarded as immutable, ~ priori, and independent of conscious-
ness. The ~ priori laws regarding the relationships of promises, claims, 
and obligations, for example, thus have a certain affinity with the 
~ priori laws of the moral sphere. A significant difference in the 
analysis of the two spheres is found in their explanations of cultural 
and historic diversity. The explanation for diversity of moral codes--
developed most completely by Scheler--is that of a progressive discovery 
of objective values, in themselves ~ priori and immutable. A hierarchy 
for evaluating the moral codes is ready-made in the value-hierarchy and 
the a priori laws of value as such. In the legal sphere, however, 
there appears to be no objective standard internal to the legal sphere 
for a comparative evaluation of two legal codes. In the very term 
"evaluation" we are thrown back to a reference to the sphere of objective 
1see above, pp. 131-34. 2 aGbR,GS, p. 183, n. 1. 
0 
178 
value. Reinach is intent in his attempt to differentiate the two 
spheres and does not knowingly allow questions of evaluation to mingle 
unrecognized amid questions of a specifically legal nature. Yet it is 
to be suspected that the labels "moral" and "legal" may be applied by 
Reinach in accordance with arbitrary distinctions rooted in his cultural 
experience rather than in immediately intuitable essential ones. The 
"good", the 11 true", the "beautiful", and the "right" are subject in 
practice to a certain degree of 11cultural shift". This shift is 
facilitated by linguistic similarities. The "right" may refer to that 
which is morally and/or legally right. "Right 11 /"wrong" in the moral 
sense, for Reinach, implies being essentially connected with an object-
ive value whose realization is desirable/non-desirable, while in the 
legal sense "right11 /"wrong" implies only being/not being in accordance 
with the fulfillment of existing claims and obligations whether these 
claims and obligations have a moral, amoral, or immoral content. 
Reinach finds both legal and moral claims and obligations or duties 
and rights to have a bearer and a content. Both may be absolute or 
relative. Moral duties and rights, however, never have their origin in 
will-directed acts, as such, nor can they be transferred to another bearer 
or be renounced. A legal claim or obligation can be transferred or renounced 
by means of a will-directed act because its origin is always some will-
directed act. Moral duties and rights always presuppose the moral value 
of some state-of-affairs. 1 Reinach attempts to clarify the difference 
between moral duty and legal obligation by pointing out that once one 
has made a promise and thus assumed a legal obligation, one has a moral 
d t t 1 . th t t f h bl' . 2 u y o rea ~ze e con en o t at o ~gat~on. The moral duty comes 
1
rbid.' pp. 181-83. 2Ibid. , pp. 183-84. 
179 
to rest on the agent on the back of the legal obligation, as a by-
product of assuming the obligation. Thus the obligation ultimately 
entails both a legal and a moral duty, the first immediately, the 
second because of the first. We argue, however, that it is not clear 
that one can be said to have an immediate moral duty to fulfill legal 
obligations, although Reinach calls this an essential law (Wesensgesetz). 
The fulfillment of obligations cannot be argued to be morally valuable 
in itself but only by reference to the value of the state-of-affairs 
which would thereby be realized. A better candidate for an essential 
law in this context would be that once one has assumed a legal obliga-
tion, and thus a legal duty to realize the content of the obligation, 
one has in addition a moral duty to decide whether the resultant 
state-of-affairs would be a morally valuable one and to act in accord-
ance with this decision. The reflective process leading to the decision 
could take into account the question of the ultimate value or disvalue 
which might result for social order, insofar as it is based on adherence 
to law, specifically from the act of neglecting or fulfilling the legal 
obligation. The point which Reinach was attempting to illustrate--that 
the moral duty and the legal obligation are not to be confused--is thus 
illustrated, though with the substitution of another "essential law" for 
the one disputed. 
The essential law--that one has a moral duty to fulfill legal 
obligations, which has been disputed above--is reiterated by Reinach in 
his critique of Schuppe, 1 indicating that Reinach's statement of. this 
proposition as an essential law was not an oversight in passing. Not 
only does Reinach restate the law but he also insists that the duty is a 
1
rbid.' pp. 225-28. 
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specifically moral one by raising the problem of a conflict between 
two "moral" duties in the case where the original legal obligation has 
an immoral content and thus entails a moral duty not to realize the 
content. In stating this essential law Reinach apparently simply 
assumes it to be immediately evident, as we cannot, that acts which are 
legally "right", i.e. , in accordance with a legal obligation, are 
morally valuable in this respect quite apart from the value or disvalue 
of their content. We, by contrast, find fulfillment of legal obliga-
tions, as such, to be of no specifically moral value in itself, but only 
by virtue of the value or disvalue of the consequences. This law, and 
the arguments made against it above, may illustrate the influence of 
cultural factors on "essential intuition" and on attempts to dispute 
its results. 
In setting forth the analysis of possession Reinach clearly 
separates questions about the "origin" and nature of possession from 
questions about its moral value. In the latter category Reinach places 
questions about the "moral rightness" of a given individual case of 
ownership under particular social and economic conditions or of the 
form (individual/collective) of possession of land and the means of pro-
duction. Reinach attempts to treat only ~ priori laws of possession, 
not questions of its moral value. The moral/legal distinction thus here 
serves to limit his subject. 
Legal ability (that ability of the person which first makes 
possible the constitution of legal-social relations) and certain 
absolute moral rights (such as the right to free development of the 
personality) are said to be grounded in the essence of the person as such 
and thus to be inseparable from that person, non-annullable. There are 
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two other classes of moral and legal rights and duties which are 
recognized to be non-transferable and non-annullable: moral ones which 
arise from situations and relationships in which the person is involved. 
and which continue as long as these situations and relationships last; 
and legal ones which may not be transferred or annulled because of an 
inability to transfer or annul them arising from the conditions of the 
social act in which they originated. Reinach observes that many moral 
rights and duties may "play a role" in positive Law. 1 Thus while 
Reinach is here clearly separating the ~priori moral and legal spheres, 
he indicates a direction whereby positive Law, which may diverge from 
the ~priori legal essential connections, may give recognition to certain 
moral rights and duties. This recognition may even take the form of 
legislation that such and such a moral right or duty shall also be a 
legal claim or obligation. 
Reinach's analysis of the relationship between positive Law and 
2 ~ priori legal propositions includes an explication of the process 
referred to above whereby moral rights and duties may influence positive 
Law. The recognized moral value of the subsistence of some state-of-
affairs--"the being-b of A"--may serve as a motive for executing a 
determination or enactment (Bestimmung) of the form "A should be b". The 
statement "A should be b" will then express the determination and, in the 
case where the intuition of value was actually objectively grounded, the 
valid judgment that an objective moral Seinsollen subsists. The moral 
Seinsollen subsists, if at all, completely independent of all consciousness 
1
rbid.' pp. 274-75. 
2This relationship is analyzed below, see pp. 185-87. 
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and all acts of judgment. The legal Seinsollen set forth in a deter-
mination, however, is dependent on that act of determination. Only 
in the case where the determination is effective does the state-of-
affairs set forth gain an objective status and then only for the given 
1 
circle of persons effected by the determination. 
In this analysis of the relationships of the moral and legal 
Seinsollen Reinach succeeded well in separating the moral and legal 
spheres. At the same time he has provided a basis for explaining the 
proces·ses whereby the legal and moral codes of a given culture may 
become strongly intertwined and mutually supporting, although he himself 
does not give such an explanation explicitly or even claim to have pro-
vided the means for doing so. 
A concrete example of the product of the intermingling of moral 
elements in a system of positive Law is treated by Reinach in the 
. 2 treatise on reflectLon. The intricacy of the relationships which 
Reinach discovers to lie beneath the practice (in German criminal law 
of the time) of using the presence or absence of reflection as a 
criterion for determining the severity of punishment, attest both to the 
validity of the claim that moral elements may in fact become so strongly 
intertwined in a legal system that they may come to defy identification 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 301-307. Reinach illustrates the distinction be-
tween the obj~tive "should-be" and the determined "should-be" by 
reference to a controversy in medieval philosophy which he formulates 
as follows: whether moral value subsists in itself (as objective states-
of-affairs) and is merely the basis for God's determinations or whether 
it is first constituted through God's free acts and_is only binding for 
all essences as a result of these acts, i.e., these effective acts of 
determination that such-and-such should-be, Ibid., p. 307, ~ 1. 
2 See above, pp. 135-39. 
c 
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as moral elements and to the fundamental significance of a theoretical 
framework--whether or not it is that used by Rein:ach--•.vhich ,.,5.11 
facilitate the differentiation of specifically moral and legal elements 
within a system of positive La~. The latter is significant, but not 
because moral elements have no valid role in positive Law; they clearly 
do have a role. However, the identification of specifically moral 
elements will contribute to more accurate analysis of legal problems 
and thus to a system of positive Law which is more self-conscious and 
therefore can become more self-consistent. 
The distinctions Reinach discovered between the moral and legal 
spheres served to: 1) limit his subject, 2) provide part of the basis 
for his analysis of the divergence of positive Law from ~ priori legal 
essential connections, and 3) provide a theoretical structure for 
analyzing contemporary legal problems which involve an intermingling of 
moral and legal elements. The ultimate test of the value of this 
particular theoretical structure for that purpose would lie in its use-
1 
fulness in clarifying such problems. 
A fundamental weakness of Reinach's general approach has been seen 
above in the dispute over whether the proposition that, 11one has a moral 
duty to fulfill legal obligations", is an essential law. The problem of 
the validity of 11 essential intuition", "eidetic intuition", is of 
course, one shared by all phenomenologists. Many disputes similar to 
the one abov~ arise in the following pages and must be considered in any 
1To be recommended to the reader who is doubtful of the significance 
of the· problem of the relationship of law and morals is Basil Mitchell' s 
Law, Morality and Religion in ! Secular Society (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967) which concerns itself with contemporary British debate of 
the problem. 
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over-all evaluation of Reinach's approach to legal philosophy. In 
this context, however, the fact that this dispute has arisen is taken 
to indicate the validity of Reinach's claim that an approach to analysis 
is needed which will make it possible to distinguish moral and legal 
1 
elements. 
Social acts. --In order to clarify the unique nature of promises Reinach 
pursues an analysis of "social acts". "Spontaneity" is the first 
characteristic identified for social acts. Intentionality and activity 
are both distinguished from spontaneity, as such, through the examination 
of examples characterized by one or the other or both but not by the 
"inner doing" of the "I" to which Reinach wishes to refer by the term 
"spontaneity". Grasping an intention to do something, forming a con-
elusion, making an assertion, asking a question, and giving an order, 
2 
are all given as examples of "spontaneous acts". Some of these 
spontaneous acts may be purely internal to the "I". Others, as in the 
case of the last three examples, require an outward form of expression. 
Some, as in the case of an order or a request, necessarily are directed 
3 
to another person. An order, moreover, by essence requires recognition. 
Reinach calls acts which are spontaneous and require recognition "social 
acts". Grasping an intention to do something is thus a spontaneous act 
but not a social act. An order is an experience of a unique type, a 
"doing" of the subject, to which recognition, intentionality, and 
1see Norberto Bobbio, L'indirizzo fenomenologico nella filosofia 
sociale ~ giuridica (Torino: Istituto giuridico della R. Universita, 
1934) p. 147, for observation that in non-phenomenological level philosophy 
the confounding of the normative with the specifically legal was common 
practice. See also above, p. 174, nt. 2. 
2 aGbR,GS, p. 189. 3Ibid., p. 190. 
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direction towards another subject are all essential. Requests, questions, 
. 1 
commands, communications, answers, etc., are all "social acts". 
The "notification function" of a social act can be fulfilled only 
2 
if the social act has an outward aspect. An assertion, as such, is 
not a communication. It is essential for the latter that the assertion 
be directed to another person to inform him of something. Orders and 
requests are closely related. Their outward expressions may use the same 
words and be differentiated only by the tone and emphasis with which 
they are spoken. The aim of a co~~unication is fulfilled when the content 
3 has become inner for the person addressed. The request and the order, 
however, aim at the execution of subsequent action by the person 
addressed, and therefore the becoming inner for the person addressed of 
the content of the order/request is only the first of a series of events 
leading to the realization of the original aim. Questions exemplify 
social acts which require a response in the form of another social act, 
that is, an answer. Reinach therefore distinguishes simple social acts 
(communications), social acts which presuppose other social acts (as 
does an answer), ·and those which point to following social acts or other 
activity (questions, requests). There are always essential connections 
between the intentional content of the inner and outer aspects of all 
h . . 1 4 aut entLc socLa acts. 
"Determinations" or "enactments" (Bestimmungen) are the last 
principal type of social act discussed by Reinach in the treatise. A 
clear understanding of what he says about determinations is an absolute 
prerequisite for a proper understanding of his view of the relationship 
lrbid., p. 191. 
3lli_£.' p. 193. 
2
Ibid., p. 192. 
4 Ibid. , p. 194. 
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of ~ priori legal doctrine and positive Law. 
Reinach points to a series of apparent contradictions of ~ priori 
legal doctrine by positive Law. The fundamental observation that only 
persons can be the bearers of rights and obligations is, for example, 
apparently disproven through the fact that positive Law recognizes 
foundations as the bearers of rights and obligations yet does not recog-
nize a twenty year old person as being one who may assume legal 
obligations. Reinach anticipates that such apparent contradictions will 
be used as grounds for objections to his claim of absolute validity for 
~ priori laws. The propositions (~Htze) of ~ priori legal doctrine 
insofar as they set forth a Being as subsisting, i.e., are grounded on 
an ~ priori legal structure independent of positive Law, are propositions 
of judgment. Positive legal propositions, however, are determinations or 
enactments, not judgments, and are not subject to classification as true 
or false. The distinction holds even in the case in which the words used 
for the expression of two propositions are identical. After the deter-
mination has been effectively made, assertions and judgments can be made, 
on the basis of this determination, that the states-of-affairs established 
by the determination subsist. Assertions which purport to be based on 
1 
determinations can be true or false, unlike the original determinations. 
Determinations and orders are both social acts. The order, how-
ever, aims at the realization of some action by another person or persons 
w~ile the determination sets forth the will that something should be the 
case. In some cases the determination may found or motivate certain 
orders. Reinach regards it as clear that the two acts, orders and 
~ 1Ibid.' pp. 296-300. 
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determinations, are fundamentally distinct. The experience, act, 
proposition, content, and effect of a determination are distinct. 
Various persons may execute the same determination "A should be b". 
The same act may be formulated in different propositions, in different 
languages. "A should be b11 is a determination when used to express an 
act of determination but a judgment when used to express the subsistence 
1 
of an objective should-be (Seinsollen). 
The analytic procedure used by Reinach--involving the examination 
of examples for essential similarities and differences--is simple and for 
his purposes efficient. A list of the essential characteristics of 
social acts in general is produced within the first three pages and a 
list of some of the characteristics by which social acts may be 
differentiated as to type in the following three pages. Whether the 
procedure has in this case provided adequate results, and whether its 
efficiency is a reflection of certain "pre-judgments" or of an "acute 
insight into essential connections", are distinct questions. The 
adequacy of the results can only be tested by their ability to stand up 
against further examination of these and other examples. The decision 
as to their adequacy will in turn probably determine whether Reinach is 
accused of "prejudging" the nature of social acts or attributed with 
"acute insight into essential connections". 
An alternative procedure would be the attempt at an exhaustive 
list of all "acts" which could be regarded as "social", followed by lists 
1Ibid., pp. 301-303. See also above, pp. 168-72. Karl Olivecrona 
notes in Law~ Fact (2nd. ed., London: Stevens and Sons, 1971), pp. 16~-
62, that K. Larenz ("Der Rechtssatz als Bestimmungssatz", Festschrift fur 
Karl Engisch ~~ 70. Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main, 1969) has adopted 
Reinach's interpretation of determinations as an explanation for the 
validity of legal facts. 
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of their similarities and differences. This process would, however, 
not only lack efficiency, but would also presuppose criteria on the 
basis of which to construct the lists. These criteria would also be 
subject to the labels "pre-judgments" and perhaps "sound general 
hypothesesn or "principles" in accordance with the success of the 
resultant lists in standing up to examination. It is not clear, however, 
what the origin of these criteria would be. Reinach, at least, makes it 
clear that he regards the characteristics of the social acts he has set 
forth to be grounded on the essential objective connections of the acts 
under examination. Given the two alternatives, that presented by 
Reinach and that which consists of forming lists and classifying members 
of the lists by means of principles whose origin is unclear, Reinach's 
gains immediate preference. Its adequacy can be challenged only through 
concrete examples--many of which appear to be open to subsumption under 
one characteristic or another through analysis as Reinach himself argues 
for a variety of examples in the course of the subsequent analysis of 
1 
various social acts. 
. 2 
J. L. Austin's suggestion in "A Plea for Excuses" that his approach 
be called "linguistic phenomenology" rather than "analytic" or "linguistic" 
philosophy has given rise to various comparisons of his work with that of 
the phenomenologists. 3 Basis for a concrete comparison, rather than a 
1see for example, the analysis of "representation", aGbR,GS, pp. 
275ff. and above, pp. 166-67. 
2Philosophical Papers, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 130. 
3
see for example, Walter Cerf, "Critical Review of How to Do Things 
~ith Words," Symposium£!!. J.L. Austin, ed. K.T. Fann, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 351-379. 
0 
189 
discussion of the possible "merging" of the two traditions, is found 
in Austin's treatment of "performatives" and Reina-ch' s treatment of 
"social acts". 
It is, in the first instance, clear that Austin did not know of 
1 
Reinach's analysis of "social acts". The first characteristics given 
for performatives, (that they do not "describe" or "report" anything, 
are not "true" or "false", and are, or are a part of, the doing of an 
action) 2 , parallel certain characteristics of Reinach's social acts. 
Nor is Austin's distinction between the performative utterance and a 
description of the performative utterance3 a new one. 
Austin foresees trouble ahead (from perjurers, bigamists, and the 
like) should the performative be taken as a true or false description 
of an inward act and therefore attempts to exclude such cases from 
further attention by claiming that he will limit the analysis of acts 
4 to the analysis of outward verbal utterances. The distinction between 
the act and the utterance is said to be simply "not in point". 5 The 
ultimate failure of this approach, however, evidently was recognized 
by Austin. Its limited point of view certainly appears to be at odds 
with the "moral" Austin suggests later, i.e., that "the total speech act 
in the total speech situation is the only ~ctual phenomenon which, in 
the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating."6 
1 ~~!£Do Things with Words, ed. J. 0. Urmson, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1965, p. 2., p. 4, p. 19. 
2Ibid. , p. 5. 
5Ibid., p. 11. 
3 . Ib1d, , p. 6, 
6 
Ibid. , p. 147. 
4
rbid., pp. 9-11. 
0 
0 
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Reinach, by contrast, also recognizing the cases such as the 
perjurer and the 11 false" promise, regards the outward verbal utterance 
as only one aspect of the whole act, although an aspect essential for 
the fulfillment of what he calls the ''notification function" of a 
social act. The agent, the person performing the verbal utterance, is 
never lost from sight in Reinach's analysis which deals with conditions 
corresponding to Austin's "infelicities" in the same terms as Reinach 
deals with the conditions of effective social acts. 
Austin does not, of course, actually succeed in excluding from 
his analysis aspects of speech acts which are not limited to the out-
ward verbal utterance. Within a few pages of making this claim, Austin 
sets forth, as one of the conditions for performatives, that appropriate 
thoughts, intentions, or feelings must be held by the persons perform-
ing them. 1 This view corresponds to Reinach's insistence that there 
.is .in the case of an actual social act (as opposed to an "apparent" or 
"conventional" social act) an essential connection between the content 
of the outward act and the inner subjective experience. There are 
numerous such points where Austin's work in the end confirms Reinach's 
conclusions, but by contrast the former shows itself to be fragmentary, 
to lack a sufficiently global approach to the speech act. The stages 
of analysis represented by How to Do Things with Words appear to fall 
from a .phenomenological point of view within the stage of concept and 
word analysis preliminary to analysis of the essences themselves. This 
is by no means to say that concept and word analysis is insignificant. 
Reinach's conclusions, based on essential intuition, are open to 
dispute, as has been seen in preceding sections. Austin's conclusions 
1Ibid.' p. 15. 
c 
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are no more final, nor did he claim that they were. One which he 
evidently did not question, however,was that to say, 111 promise 'x', 
1 but I ought not", was to defeat the promise. · This is not clear in 
the least. Surely there are few persons who have not at some time 
made such a statement and considered themselves committed by it. 
Reinach's distinction between the legal and moral spheres makes some 
of the many possible senses of such a statement clear. Once again 
Austin appears to be viewing the speech act in too limited a framework. 
Austin regards the commitment of the speaker by his promise as 
2 
a merely conventional consequence. Of illocutionary acts in general 
Austin asserts that, strictly speaking, there can be no such acts 
3 
unless the means (verbal or non-verbal) employed are conventional. 
Austin likewise observes that the locutionary act may involve conven-
tions, as in the case of doing obeisance. Austin does not, however, 
give this central theme of conventionality any thorough-going treatment. 
He does not attempt to differentiate conventions rooted in language from 
those of the social or cultural sphere. Thus he does not distinguish 
true and false statements which can be made about a "happy" performative 
utterance in accordance with the linguistic meaning of the performative 
as opposed to its social and cultural meaning. Reinach's distinction 
between what he chose to call the essential a priori connection of an 
act with certain effects (as the groundedness of claims and obligations 
in the essence of promises as acts) and the effectively determined 
connections (resulting from effective "determinations" or "enactments") 
1rbid., p. 51. 2Ibid., p. 102. 3Ibid., p. 118. 
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interchange are both concerned with some of the aspects of what Austin 
appeared to regard as "convention". 
Each of the performatives tentatively grouped by Austin into 
five classes could either take or not take the form of a "social act" 
in Reinach's sense dependent on whether the act in which it was per-
formed fulfilled the necessary criteria: spontaneity, intentionality, 
direction to another person, requirement of recognition. The fourth 
and fifth groups are most ''troublesome", as Austin observes, because 
of the ease with which they might be used as mere descriptions of our 
feelings, action, etc. Reinach eliminates this problem with such cases 
by excluding from the category of social acts all statements which are 
merely outer references to subjective experiences which could have been 
there without the outer reference--"I want to do that", or "I am afraid"--
as well as all statements referring to the social act as a whole--"I 
have given an order.". In the end the analysis of performatives and 
illocutionary forces of utterances as it is found in How to Do Things 
with Words appears to be a preliminary study demonstrating the need for 
a more global attack on the problem of how language works and what an 
11act" is. 
In Manfred Moritz', "Reflexionen zur Theorie der performativen 
Satze", the basis of the 11 conventional effects" of performatives, an 
aspect not adequately analyzed by Austin, and the distinction between 
the active and descriptive functions of identical expressions are 
1 
examined. Horitz argues that "performative expressions" are a special 
type of "active-expressions". Let us assume with Horitz that in a 
1Hanfred Moritz, "Reflexionen zur Theorie der performativen S~tze", 
author's mimeographed manuscript. 
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country L there is a "rule" whereby if person P makes the sound "Ba" in 
the presence of person R, then P must either 1) pay R lOO crowns, or 
2) be charged with paying R lOO crowns and the state-treasury 200 crowns, 
It is regarded as irrelevant whether P knows of this rule or not. "Ba" 
is said to lack all "meaning", it communicates nothing, describes 
nothing. The occurrence of "Ba'' in the situation described above does, 
however, given such a rule as above, ground the following series of judg-
ments: 1) P "ba-ed", 2) P has produced in R the expectation of being 
payed 100 crowns by P, and 3) P has "ba-ed"; not in the first sense 
(making sound "Ba"), but.in the sense of having produced a situation 
and a series of consequences. 
If P knows the rule he may use the production of the sound "Ba" 
to evoke in R the expectation of receiving lOO crowns. In fulfilling 
the conditions of the rule the action conditionally required by the rule 
becomes actually. required and P may be said to have "obligated himself": 
Moritz calls expressions like "Ba" "active expressions", that is, 
expressions whose use according to given rules brings forth certain con-
sequences. Sound sequences thus are or are not "active expressions" 
dependent on the existence or non-existence of certain rules. 
In the case where P says "I promise ... " the sound sequence 
functions both as 1) an active expression and as 2) a descriptive state-
ment. It is those active expressions which are identical in sound with 
their descriptive expression (as in the case "I promise") which, Moritz 
asserts, have been called performatives although they are but a sub-
class of active-expressions. Signatures and handshakes are examples 
of non-verbal acts which produce consequences in accordance with rules 
and are to be classified as "active-expressions". Moritz finds it to 
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be an empirical contingency whether the active and descriptive 
expressions are identical in sound or not. 
Austin's suggestion that performatives can "miscarry" may) in 
Moritz' view) easily lead to misinterpretation. It is rather only because 
there are certain rules whose conditions include these linguistic 
expressions that performatives have certain results. All conditions) 
not only the linguistic ones, must be fulfilled if the performative is 
to have those results. Moritz states clearly that these relationships 
apply to both legal and moral rules. Legal and moral rules are required 
if "active expressions", verbal or non-verbal, are to be legally and 
morally relevant. 
The framework Moritz has provided for examining the basis for 
the effects of performatives is a major advance over Austin's vague 
talk of "conventions". It follows directly from Moritz' discussion that 
the precision with which the effects of a performative can be determined 
in any given situation of social interchange will depend directly 
on the lack of ambiguity of 1) the relevant rules themselves and 2) the 
to which the conditions of these rules have been fulfilled. 
Consideration of the cases not governed by unambiguous rules, however, 
encourages renewed sympathy for Austin's grasping after "convention". 
The moral and legal spheres, the base-ball game, the circulation policy 
of a library, etc., leave large spheres of social interchange ungoverned 
by unambiguous rules save insofar as the "conventions" of language and 
culture provide these. 
Karl Olivecrona, 1 writing from a point of view close to that set 
forth by Moritz, is critical of J. L. Austin's work on performatives 
0 lLaw ~Fact (London: Stevens and Sons, 1971), pp. 233-39. 
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insofar as the latter neglected to examine the meaning of performative 
sentences and tl;~ nature of their non-psychological effects. Olivecrona 
argues that neglect of these aspects led Austin to extend (and thus 
dilute) the category of performatives "to include a number of utterances 
that are not 'supposed to give rise to any non-psychological effects", 
(for, example, "I congratulate you", "I advise you"). 
Alf Ross likewise suggests circumscribing the category of perform-
ative acts. Olivecrona quotes the following passage from Ross: 
Because a statement creates expectations, or claims and 
corresponding responsibilities, it belongs to the group of 
linguistic acts which has been called performative. If this 
concept is to be of philosophical and not only linguistic 
interest, it should in my opinion be limited to the designation 
of locutionary acts which by virtue of a social norm create 
social relations of claims, obligations, and responsibilities
1 determined in accordance with the meaning content of the act. 
Ross clearly recognizes that the category of performatives is a 
function of the social norms current in any given medium of social inter-
change. An adequate treatment of the performative as a social act in the 
broad sense--not treatment merely as an act with legal or moral effects 
in accordance with unambiguous rules--must be able to deal with all 
performatives which arise in any given social context. Reinach's 
analysis of the "social act" shows strength precisely in its lack of 
limitation to either the Austin-type emphasis on the outward verbal 
utterance· itself or to acts with "merely" legal or ritualistic effects 
in accordance with unambiguous rules or with social norms. Olivecrona 
discusses both Austin's work with performatives and Reinach's distinction 
between imperatives and determinations (Bestimmungen), but does not 
1 . Quoted ~n Ibid., p. 239 from Alf Ross, Directives and Norms 
(London, 1968). 
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mention the latter's analysis of "social acts" or connect this with 
the topic of performatives. It thus appears that the relevance of 
Reinach's analysis of "social acts" to "performatives" has gone 
unnoticed. 
c) Significance of the theories of states-of-affairs, intentionality, 
and judgments for ethics and legal philosophy. 
This section evaluates the relevance of the threefold theoretic 
structure, which was the subject of Chapters II-V, to problems in 
ethics and legal philosophy. The controversy over synthetic and 
analytic judgments--central to much of the criticism in the past of 
Reinach' s legal philosophy--is discussed. An attempt is made to clarify 
the claims and counterclaims of which much of the criticism has con-
sisted, as well as to clarify Reinach's own position and suggest ways 
in which his own claims and interpretations of their significance may 
be qualified. The nature of the states-of-affairs with which ethics 
and legal philosophy are concerned is also considered. 
The ~ priori/~ posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions.-- Reinach 
regarded the latter distinction as originally ontological, not 
epistemological, referring only secondarily to judgments about states-
of-affairs to which the distinctions pertain. "Analytic" refers to the 
connection of an essence with itself, or an essential part with the 
whole, thus retaining Kant's notion of the predicate being "contained" 
in the subject. "Synthetic" refers to the connection of a predicate 
or relation with the essences in which the predicate or relation is 
grounded (but not "contained"). In his later work Reinach shows little 
interest in "analytic" states-of-affairs. This is in accord with his 
view that essences were irreducible objective elements which could be 
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known only in connection with one another and thus only in "synthetic" 
states-of-affairs. Study of "analytic" states-of-affairs would 
coincide with, or come dangerously close to, the attempt, which Reinach 
denounced, to define essences. 
The "analytic" and "synthetic" connections, mentioned above, were 
11 
essential connections (Wesenszusammenhange), a groundedness of the 
predicate in the essence(s) (Wesen) of the subject(s). Generality and 
necessity were not regarded as criteria constitutive of the ~ priori, 
but rather, like~ priority, as themselves due to essential connections. 
The alternative to necessity and its counterpart, impossibility, was of 
course, essential possibility or contingency. An essential possibility 
may ground both an ~ priori judgment of possibility and the empirical 
states-of-affairs to which a posteriori judgments that "A is b" and "A 
is not b" refer. 
There has been a long standing controversy over the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction, complicated still further by the controversy over 
the distinction between the material ~ priori and formal ~ priori. The 
main task here is to evaluate Reinach's distinctions on the subject 
without confounding them with distinctions made by others which are 
referred to by the same popular, but not often carefully defined terms. 
A study on the subject which should be taken into account is that 
by Harald Delius. 1 Using the example of the proposition, "All color has 
extension", Delius, after extensive examination of the positions of 
luntersuchungen zur Problematik der sogenannten synthetischen 
~priori (G8ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), see pp. 310-21 
sources for the following two pages. 
S~tze 
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linguistic analysts, logical empiricists, and to a lesser extent 
phenomenologists, and of the various ways they have used the terms 
"analytic", "synthetic", "~priori", and "~posteriori", produced the 
following classification: 
"Analytic"--any proposition which is true on the basis of the 
meaning of the word-signs it contains and thus can be grasped 
as true on the basis of knowledge of these meanings alone. 
a) "formal analytic"--cases where meaning referred to above 
is formal. 
1) those of a logically valid form (All bachelors are 
bachelors). 
2) those which can be transformed into 1 by means of 
a (linguistic) substitution rule (All bachelors 
are unmarried men). 
b) "material analytic"--cases where meaning referred to 
above is material. 
1) those whose predicate belongs to connotation of 
subject, ("real-analytic"). 
2) those whose predicate belongs only to intension of 
subject, ("nominal-analytic"). 
3) those which are material-analytic, but not in sense 
of 1 or 2. 
The logical empiricists, exemplified for Delius by Carnap 1 , take "synthetic" 
to include that which does not fall under a,l or a,2 and call it "F-true" 
(truth value depends on facts) rather than "L-true". Delius finds the 
dilemma surrounding the proposition "All color is extended", which does 
not fit into either the class of synthetic ~ posteriori or ~ priori (formal) 
analytic--the two classes recognized by logical empiricists--to arise 
because this disjunction of propositions into two classes is not complete. 
More broadly speaking the subject has been and remains problematic be-
cause of the general and unqualified use made of the terminology. Delius 
observes that while the term "~ posteriori" in general indicates that a 
proposition is true only because it describes certain determinate empirical 
1Introduction to Semantics, p. 141, Def. D21-2. 
199 
relations which in fact (t~tsachlich) subsist, correspondingly it can 
'~ ~ be said of a proposition, referred to as ~ priori, that the proposition 
is indeed true, but not because the empirical fact or facts, which it 
describes, subsist. The latter case neither excludes nor implies that 
~ priori propositions are ones stating something about the formal or 
material construction (Beschaffenheit) of subsisting relations. They can 
thus be regarded as statements about the "conditions of the possibility" 
of the objects of empirical perception as such and thus as about their 
(formal) construction, or, secondly, as propositions which do not 
describe ideal empirical or essential relations which are exemplified by 
all empirical perceptible relations, and thus as propositions which state. 
something about the (formal or material) construction of these empirical 
relations. Thirdly, however, they could be propositions which stand in 
no connection to empirical relations, as is the case for all those true 
on the basis of the formal meaning of the signs from which they are 
formed. In any case it would not be the case for propositions in any of 
these three senses that they were true because certain empirical relations 
in fact subsisted. Likewise, knowledge of these a priori propositions 
would not require recourse to "experience". 
Delius shows, moreover, that the proposition, "All calor is 
extended", is not only true~ EOSteriori (it does describe certain 
empirical relations factually subsisting and to be known in this sense 
requires knowledge of these empirical relations), but also true~ priori, 
because 1) it holds in general and by necessity (referring to the Kantian 
point) and 2) the conviction that it is true does not rest on empirical 
experience, but is rather a conviction of the senselessness of reference 
0 for proof or contradiction to empirical facts. Inductive generalization 
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is in principle senseless in this case; insofar as we understand the 
proposition, and thus the meaning of the word~signs (i.e., know the 
type of non-linguistic content to which "color" refers), we also already 
know that "color11 means something of which it can be said that it is 
"extended". 
Analogously Delius argues that attempts to view the color proposition 
as analytic or synthetic are mistaken. It is rather analytic insofar as 
it is an explication of the knowledge that we already possess of what the 
word-signs in it mean, and synthetic insofar as it expresses knowledge 
about the construction of non-linguistic empirical relations that we 
can only have learned through experience. Delius concludes that the 
problems of the so-called "synthetic and ~ priori" can begin to be 
resolved only through fundamental revision of the terminology as he has 
attempted to do in the case of the color proposition. 
The question of the synthetic ~ priori is clearly still a lively 
and undecided issue in philosophy. Delius, with his observation that 
knowledge of the non-linguistic content of a proposition can make 
inductive generalization appear not only senseless but superfluous, and 
Russell, with his admission that knowledge of some general propositions 
not obtained by inference must be possible for otherwise there would be 
1 
no general propositions, imply a central role for either "synthetic a 
priori principles" or something else which fulfills the same role. 
Spiegelberg remarks that "Reinach's approach suggests at least an alter-
native to the stalemate between an empiricism unable to justify its 
principle of induction and a rationalism based on dogmatic ~ priori 
1
"Logical Atomism", in LK, p. 235. 
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principles: to go beyond the level of concepts and propositions to. 
the phenomena they mean, to explore the states-of-affairs pointed at 
1 
in their intuitively given structures." 
Reinach asserts that the propositions of a legal doctrine, 
like those of pure mathematics and pure science, are synthetic a 
judgments "in Kant's sense". Kant attempted to prove the "possibility" 
of these judgments by arguing that only through them could experience 
and the science of experience constitute themselves. Quite apart from 
the difficulties of transcendental deduction, however, Reinach finds 
Kant's position to be indefensible. Reinach claims to have intuited 
(erschaut) the propositions of ~ £riori legal doctrine with absolute 
evidence. Observation of positive Law could not produce the synthetic 
~ priori propositions of legal doctrine nor lead to any "deduction" of 
them. Attempts to establish immediately intuitable connections by 
reference to cultural institutions, which can first be clarified and under-
stood only through such connections, are regarded as untenable by Reinach. 
It is not, however, Reinach's intention that synthetic~ priori propositions 
should be accepted at once on "good faith", but that they should be subject 
2 
to thorough scrutiny. 
Reinach claims to provide no "theory", as such, of promises or 
other social acts. He instead sets forth the simple proposition, ~ ~ 
definition, that promises as such produce claims and obligations. One 
can attempt, as Reinach has done, to make this proposition intuitable 
through analysis, but to attempt to explain it has, he asserts, the same 
sense as the attempt to explain the proposition 1 x 1 = 1. Reinach 
suggests that an unphenomenologically directed philosophy faced with such 
1spiegelberg, PM, p. 201. 2 aGbR,GS, pp. 339-41. 
,. 
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fundamental problems has been led by its fear of the given, by an 
inability to grasp final intuitables and recognize them as such, to 
untenable and simply fantastic constructions. 1 
The comment that ~ priori legal propositions are synthetic "in 
Kant's sense 11 may easily mislead the critic not cognizant of Reinach's 
2 
criticism of Kant. Kant' s sense of "synthetic ~ priori" is adequate in 
this context because the immediate subject is propositions and not the 
essential connections in which, according to Reinach's position, these 
propositions find their objective reference. Reinach also asserted, in 
passing, that the synthetic ~ priori propositions actually arise from 
. 3 
the "Nature" or "essence" of the concepts in question. Whether he can 
say this and remain consistent is open to question. This comment may 
also have contributed to .the confusion surrounding many interpretations 
of Reinach's claim that the fundamental propositions of his legal 
philosophy were synthetic ~priori propositions. A remark that these 
propositions arise from the essence of the structures in question would 
appear to have been more in accordance with Reinach's over-all philosophic 
position and would render it overt in this context, as it is elsewhere, 
4 that his use of the term "concept" is not Kant's usage. 
Julius Kraft found Reinach to have been mistaken in his belief that 
"correct analytic propositions" such as those concerning the lapsing of 
claims were synthetic ~ priori propositions. Kraft remarks that although 
Reinach believed he had "intuited" these propositions they in truth were 
results of the presupposed concept "of a claim on a determinate result". 
1
rbid. ' p. 229. 
3 
aGbR,GS, p. 179. 
2
see RVK,Q.§., KAH, and above, pp. 40-53,117-2 
4 See RVK,GS, and above, pp.S0-53, 117-21. 
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The assertion that "claims and obl ions are grounded in promises as 
such", is said by Kraft to be trivial, if by "promise" is meant 11a 
bind declaration of will", but false, if only the fact of "a declara--
1 
tion of will" is meant. Reinach himself had made the latter point with 
considerable force. 
legal sphere were not themselves propositions, but rather logical 
axioms, and had no specifically legal content. He found legal 
propositions to be either: 1) analytic and ~ Eriori, or 2) empirical, and 
therefore rejected Reinach's claim that there are synthetic~ ~riori 
propositions. Riezler argues, in connection with Reinach's comment 
that he is using Kant's sense of the synthetic~ Eriori, that the subject, 
"claim", in the proposition concerning the fulfillment of the service 
s lling the end of the claim, is in no way augmented by the predicate. 
ler finds the proposition whereby promises ground claims and obl 
tions to be either~ priori and analytic, "an empty tautology", or 
indefensible, unfounded. 2 
Hans P. Neisser likewise remarks that the proposition that a 
claim expires when it is fulfilled is analytic rather than synthetic a 
Neisser asserts that there is no eidetic necessity involved in 
3 
.this case. Poulantzas regards all supposed ~ priori eidetic character-
istics of phenomenological ~ priori legal propositions as reducible to 
1 11 Julius Kraft, "Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der phanomenologischen 
Rechtsphilosophie, 11 Kantstudien, XXXI (1926), 286-96. 
2Erwin Riezler, "Apriorisches im Recht," Archiv fUr Rechts-
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, XVII (1924), 264-84. 
3Hans P. Neisser, "The Phenomenological Approach in Social Science," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological XX (1959-60), 198-212. 
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1 Simple tautologies. All of these critics appear to have failed to 
recognize that Reinach, going beyond Kant's position, had argued that 
both "analytic" and "synthetic" are originally ontological terms and 
refer in the primary instance to two types of ~ priori essential 
connections. Their criticism therefore misses its mark. 
Reinach clearly regarded the ~ priori essential connections which 
were the subject of his legal propositions as synthetic connections, not 
2 purely formal ones. There is good reason for not regarding legal 
propositions of the type set forth by Reinach as ~ priori as sheerly 
formal and analytic, although this has often been denied. Their negation 
would not produce a logical contradiction for the original statement could 
not be deduced from any set of the concepts and propositions of pure 
meanings. This, however, leaves at least two directions open for a 
different interpretation of the significance of these "~ priori essential 
connections" as they are constituted for us in propositions than was given 
by Reinach. The set of propositions believed to be based on the adequate 
intuition of essential connections can be regarded as·a set of "axioms". 
An alteration in this set of "axioms" necessarily alters the synthetic 
propositions .which can be subsequently intuited without falling into 
contradiction with any analytic propositions deducible from the original 
set of synthetic propositions. 
1Nicos Ar. Poulantzas, ''Notes sur la ph~nom~nologie et l'existentialisme 
juridiques," Archives de Philosophie du Droit, VIII (1963), 213-35. 
2The significance of this view of the nature of the connections 
can be placed in a different light by comparing ~ 12riori legal propositions 
with mathematical propositions. It has been argued both that the latter 
are intuited and that they are deduced (and analytic). Both intuition 
and deduction appear to play a significant role for the working mathema-
tician. One ~say "2 + 3 = O" and still proceed to do arithmetic, 
however unfamiliar, just as positive Law has at times said "A slave is 
not a person". 
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The second alternative is to assume that the sphere of pure 
meanings is fixed (though they may not have all been "discovered" by 
any one consciousness or culture) and thus all analytic propositions 
are timeless and at least potentially deducible even though they may 
not all have been constituted for a consciousness. In conjunction with 
this sphere of pure meanings.~ than~ set of synthetic propositions 
may be possible where no set contradicts analytic propositions 
deducible from the sub-set of the sphere of pure meanings related to 
that given set of synthetic propositions though one sub-set may, from 
a more global point of view, "contradict" another. This view is 
supported by Frege's comments 1 on the interplay of the synthetic and 
analytic, of intuition and deduction in the establishment of new 
definitions (i.e., the discovery of previously unconstituted meanings). 
This latter direction may be in accordance with the suggestion by 
Professor Spiegelberg that Reinach's essential connections be regarded 
as "essential tendencies". 2 
The nature of the set of synthetic propositions operant in both 
ethics and legal philosophy is influenced by the experience of the person 
or persons formulating them. Experience will: 1) produce greater aware-
ness of some aspects of the sphere of pure meanings, and 2) provide the 
motivation to formulate synthetic propositions relative to the same sphere 
of ideal meanings. There can be no question that the nature of Reinach's 
legal propositions was influenced by his experience in both these senses. 
The second alternative suggested can, as a more global view is 
1Gottlob Frege, The Foundations 
Austin (2nd rev. ed., Harper Torchbooks, 
1960)' pp. 3-4, pp. 102-103. 
2
spiegelberg, PM, p. 205. 
Arithmetic, translated by J. L. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 
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taken, have as a sub-set the first alternative if, instead of 
arbitrarily altering one of the given list of axioms, intuition of 
a synthetic proposition and the attempt to then deduce it leads to the 
"discovery11 /"positing" of a "new11 axiom. In a similar vein Russell 
remarked about pure mathematics that: 
some of the premises are much less obvious than some of their 
consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their 
consequences. This will be found to be always the case when 
a science is arranged as a deductive system. It is not the 
logically simplest propositions of the system that are the 
most obvious or that provide the chief part of our reasons 
for believing in the system.l 
Legal and ethical states-Qi-affairs. --Ethics is regarded by Reinach as 
being divided into two spheres, that of moral rightness pertaining to 
states-of-affairs and of moral values pertaining to persons, acts, etc. 
The morality of the existence of the conduct of a person (i.e., the 
morality of a state-of-affairs) may be right in itself or by virtue of 
other connected states-of-affairs. The connections between these two 
spheres are said to be essential and immediately intuitable ones. The 
existence of an object, i.e., a state-of-affairs, is morally right when 
the object is morally valuable. The contrary state-of-affairs, under 
the same circumstances, is not morally right. The realization of a 
morally right state-of-affairs is morally valuable, its neglect not 
valuable, etc. These statements will sound familiar to those who have 
. 2 
read Husserl and Scheler. What suggests itself, however, within this 
111Logical-Atomism", 1924, in LK, p. 325. 
2Alois Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen, dargestellt 
anhand seiner Vorlesungsmanuskripte, Phaenomenologica, VII (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). See also Ideen I, p. 197 on Sachverhalt and 
Wertverhal t. 
Max Scheler, Der [~rmalismus in der Ethik und die materiale 
Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, 
ed. Maria Scheler, 4th ed., in Gesammelte Werke (Bern: Francke), II (1954). 
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c·ontext, is that the systemization of formal axiology and the logic 
of ethical statements can be facilitated by taking their immediate sub-
jects to be states-of-affairs of various degrees. 
If the notion of ethical states-of-affairs is to be made useful, 
however, it must be given a. more thorough theoretical development. 
Lacking that development reference to ethical states-of-affairs by 
Reinach functions primarily as a shorthand for the claim that there are 
objective ethical essential ~ priori connections. If the nature of 
ethical states-of-affairs and their logic1 were clarified the theory 
could serve a useful function for rendering general ethical discussion 
more precise. This would also be the case for the truncated form where 
the objects were contingent ethical states-of-affairs, i.e., empirical 
states-of-affairs concerning ends and means to ends. 
Reinach's legal philosophy is written primarily about necessary 
es~ential connections with the result that the terminology of ''states-of-
affairs" almost completely falls away. The determinations of positive 
Law, however, have reference to contingent states-of-affairs. The con-
tent of determinations can include only what can and cannot be, what can 
have a beginning and an end in time. 2 The strict distinction between the 
ideal and the empirical, the ~priori and the contingent, found in the 
theory of states-of-affairs is exploited by Reinach in the context of 
his legal philosophy. In his concern with the objective subsistence of 
a ~~~ essential connections Reinach does not give enough attention 
above p. 55, and article by R. M. Chisholm, '~he Defeat of 
Good and Evil, 11 Proceedings and Addresses £!. ~ American Philosophical 
Association, XLII (1969), 21-38, for remarks on the problems of the 
logic of states-of-affairs. 
p. 306, 
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to the influence on his conclusions and his estimate of their signifi-
cance of: 1) the range of his experience of possible legal structures, 
and 2) the extent of his acquaintance with the sphere of ideal meanings. 
In the latter connection it is useful to consider the distinction 
between the itself and the possibility of its exempli£ ication. 
It is clear for the areas of ethics and legal philosophy that 
ultimately phenomenology must regard ~priori propositions, believed to 
be grounded on the "self-givenness" of objective states-of-affairs, as 
"axioms'' of a sort. The problems of evidence, illusion, and error 
could thereby be given the recognition they warrant without following 
the more drastic tack of abandoning the phenomenological method of 
philosophizing and what it has uniquely to offer. The hypothetical 
nature of essential ~priori connections from a theory of knowledge 
point of view--not to be detached from any philosophy created by human 
beings for human beings--does not appear to be deniable. 
The threefold theory of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and 
judgments, the subject of Chapters II-IV above, has a central role in 
Reinach's ethics and legal philosophy. As was the case in Reinach's 
theoretical discussion of that threefold theory itself the aspect of 
intentionality is given the least thorough development. In all general 
respects problems surround the same fundamental issues for both the 
threefold theory and ethics and legal philosophy. The nature of objec-
tive a essential connections and the evidence with which they may 
be grasped must be regarded as controversial in all cases. This issue is 
fundamental and the response to it will effect the whole of the resultant 
theoretical position. 
c 
c 
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d) Evaluation of Reinach's legal philosophy. 
The principal qualification of Reinach's legal philosophy in this 
chapter was the suggestion that propositions, whose objective referents. 
are believed to be essential ~ priori legal connections, be regarded as 
"axioms" of some sort. This response to the inability of phenomenology 
to verify the results of essential intuition does not point to an 
abandonment of what phenomenology uniquely has to offer, but rather 
is an attempt to strengthen the whole by admitting a qualification of 
one of its principal claims. Even if for "agnostic" reasons the 
propositions referring to the ~priori essential connections which Reinach 
discovered for legal structures are regarded as "axioms'', study of them 
will, as Reinach claimed: 1) help to clarify the history of positive Law, 
and 2) render the structure of positive Law more understandable insofar 
as it is regarded as presupposing the structure of the ~ priori legal 
sphere. It will also provide a basis for analyzing the relation of 
specific positive legal relationships to the whole fabric of social inter-
change and institutions. 1 
Reinach' s analysis of ''de terminations" and of the distinction 
between the moral and legal spheres are, like his analysis of social acts, 
of intrinsic interest apart from their relation to his legal philosophy 
as a whole. The "social act" is shown to be fundamental to social inter-
change, legal and non-legal, the latter being a label which may vary 
in its applicability in accordance with changes in positive Law. The 
analysis of the social act is of key importance in providing a basis for 
1 
See aGbR,GS, p. 174 and pp. 156-57 above. 
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the analysis, mentioned above, of the relation of specific positive 
legal structures to the whole fabric of social interchange. 
The comparison above of the remarks of Austin, Moritz, Olivecrona, 
Ross, and Reinach on "performatives" and "social acts" indicates that 
Reinach's treatment of the social act has not been taken into account 
in the literature dealing with performatives. The comparison may be 
useful in overcoming limitations in the points of view of all of these 
approaches and in affirming the existence of a concrete range of common 
problems for the practitioners of the analytic and phenomenological 
approaches. Further analysis of performatives should consider more fully 
their basis in "conventions", particularly problematic being those 
"conventions" which clearly have their roots in a specific culture and 
social structure, but do not qualify as "unambiguous rules". Austin's 
work suggests the need for a fuller study of the "total speech act". 
This might be assisted by consideration of Reinach's treatment of 
social acts, of meinen, and of the constitution of assertable judgments. 
Certain of the limitations in Reinach's results are likewise the result 
of the limitation of his experience of various legal and social forms and 
assumptions. 
Reinach's analysis of "determinations" or "enactments" (Bestimmungen) 
as social acts which, when effectively enacted, constitute valid positive 
Law for a given circle of persons, is a significant attempt to clarify 
the social basis for the validity of positive Law. The analysis of the 
social act of determination is also useful for attempts to clarify: 
1) the divergence of positive Law from ~ priori essential legal connections, 
2) the processes by which positive Law may be modified (legal history), and 
c 
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3) the social foundations of distinct co-existing legal systems 
(comparative law). If propositions referring to~ priori essential 
legal connections are regarded as sets of "axioms", then determinations -
may be regarded as indicating which sub-set of possible "axioms"/"mean-
ings" is to be used for social interchange. Reinach regarded the role 
of determinations to consist of negating ~ priori legal structures and 
creating legal structures excluded by ~ priori connections. 1 The 
difference is important on ontological and epistemological grounds, but 
in relation to the practical analysis of positive Law has no noticeable 
impact.· 
Reinach's analysis of the distinction between the moral and legal 
spheres and the two corresponding types of states-of-affairs which 
"should be"--those grounded on "objective !!. priori moral essential 
connections" and those dependent on the enactment of effective determina-
tions--is of fundamental significance. 2 Although issue was taken3 with 
certain of the specific results of Reinach's essential intuition of 
distinction cannot be said to be abusive as Gardies4 has found, but 
only subject to further examination and qualification. Treatment of a 
Rriori moral and legal essential connections as they are constituted in 
propositions as "axioms" may be expected to introduce a degree of con-
fusion and uncertainty perhaps unappealing in comparison with Reinach's 
own work. Apart from these questions, however, it is argued here as above, 
1 
aGbR,GS, pp. 307-12. 
2see above, pp. 176-84. 3 See above, pp. 178-80. 
4J. -L. Gardies, "La philosophie du droit d 1 Adolf Reinach," Archives 
de Philosophie du Droit, X (1965), 17-32. 
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that some theoretic structure is needed for the analysis of contemporary 
legal problems which involve an intermingling of moral and legal elements. 
Reinach recognized this need and attempted to meet it to some degree 
both in his legal philosophy and in his analysis of the basis for the 
use of "reflection" as a criterion in criminal law. 
The analysis of the influence of moral laws and values on positive 
Law and on the process by which the latter comes to diverge from ~ £riori 
Law supports the view of both positive Law and moral norms and codes as only 
two among many related aspects of social interchange. By implication 
positive Law cannot be adequately studied in isolation from these other 
aspects. This realization is important both for the history of Law and 
for comparative Law. 
The criticism in the literature of Reinach's synthetic ~priori 
propositions as either analytic or unfounded misses its mark because of 
the different senses in which the term "concept" has been used by the 
critics and by Reinach. Reinach's claim that analytic and synthetic 
~ priori propositions are both grounded on objective ~ priori essential 
connections is overlooked. The results of Reinach's use of essential 
intuition are open to dispute but the ground (objective essential 
connections) claimed for these results is at least clear. In the next 
chapter Reinach's methods of philosophizing and his results as a whole 
will be found to share many of the strengths and weaknesses of his legal 
pl:l.ilosophy. 
c 
c 
Chapter VI 
General Evaluation of Reinach's Work 
At the time of Reinach's death his philosophic work was by no 
means completed and the form it ultimately would have taken is a matter 
of conjecture. The preceding chapters have not been concerned with pur-
suing such speculative questions, and this final chapter represents 
instead an attempt to identify what is of present interest and lasting 
value in Reinach's work in the form in which he left it. An overview 
is given of the strengths and weaknesses of his philosophical position 
as they have been revealed in Chapters I to V. Some of the extensions 
and qualifications of his position, which have been suggested in response 
to specific weaknesses in that position, are reviewed. The attempt has 
been made in all such cases to formulate extensions and qualifications 
which are in accordance with the spirit of Reinach's intention. 
Reinach regarded phenomenology not as a system of statements 
and truths but primarily as a method of philosophizing. The aim in the 
face of any philosophic problem was to learn to~. to discover, the 
essential characteristics of the subject, rather than to circumscribe 
it in definitions. Reduction and construction were rejected in favor of 
analysis of the essential nature of objectivity as self-given. Analysis 
of the meaning of words and concepts was only a first step towards this 
analysis of the essential characteristics of objectivity. This emphasis 
213 
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on seeing, discovery, openness to the self-givenness of objectivity, 
is a key aspect of Reinach's approach to philosophic problems. Its 
value is self-evident insofar as his use of it gave rise to new and 
fundamental distinctions through analysis. Its use, however, presup-
poses certain ontological and epistemological assumptions. Qualification 
of the latter entails regarding the results of intuition of self-given 
objectivity in a different light. This question is considered below. 
Reinach found the essential nature of objectivity to be revealed 
in essential laws.· Essential laws, unlike any facts or factual connec-
tions about which sensible perception gives us information, were, 
according to Reinach, ~ priori, objective, and thus one of the most 
important subjects in philosophy. Knowledge of final a priori connections 
was to be grounded on the intuition of these a priori connections them-
selves. Knowing--only one of many possible intentional relations to 
objectivity--has a precise meaning for Reinach. Knowledge is not 
knowledge in Reinach's sense unless it has a discursive form--that such-
and-such is so-and-so. This form reflects not the framing of a 
definition but rather the adequate intuition of objective connections. 
Thus we perceive objects, feel them, take pleasure in them, but, strictly 
speaking, never know them. Knowledge can be only of states-£L-affairs. 
We can know "that an object is so-and-so." States-of-affairs are thus 
regarded as being of fundamental importance for philosophy simply by virtue 
of their being that of which knowledge, in the precise sense, is possible. 
The distinction between the empirical and the ~ priori is, for 
Reinach, an ontological one, grounded in the distinction between necessary 
and contingent states-of-affairs, and applied to knowledge and judgments 
which have intentional reference to states-of-affairs only secondarily. 
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The ~ priority, generality, and necessity, pertaining to a necessary 
state-of-affairs are all regarded as deriving from the essential connec-
tion, the groundedness of the "predicate111 in the essence(s) of the 
subject-object(s). Just as, strictly speaking, we cannot know an 
object, so we cannot know an essence. The objective correlates of 
knowledge of the essential nature of objectivity are connections between 
essences (synthetic) or of an essence with itself or an essential part 
with a whole (analytic). The latter receive little attention from 
Reinach. This is probably due in large measure to his view that essences 
are irreducible objective elements which can be known only in connection 
with one another and thus only in "synthetic" states-of-affairs. Study 
of analytic states-of-affairs would coincide with, or come dangerously 
close to the attempt, denounced by Reinach, to "define" essences. 
The role attributed by Reinach to ~tates-of-affairs, particularly 
those which are synthetic, is thus clearly a fundamental one. His analysis 
of states-of-affairs therefore warrants the most careful consideration in 
any evaluation of his work as a whole, as well as being of intrinsic 
interest. The view that objective and constituted states-of-affairs are 
that of which we have knowledge and that which we believe and assert to 
be the case, respectively, is paralleled by Russell's claim that belief 
2 is not of objects, but rather "that so and so, etc.," and by his analysis 
3 
of molecular propositions as truth functions of atomic facts. This 
1This unfortunate usage, found also in LI, (see p. 581), contributes 
to misunderstanding of Reinach's position by blurring the distinction be-
tween the nature of propositions and the nature of objectivities. Confusion 
on this point is related to misunderstanding of Reinach's use of the terms 
"concept", "analytic", and "synthetic", and tends to occur in the litera-
ture whenever Reinach's criticism of Kant in RVK,GS and KAH,GS is not 
taken into account. See above, pp. 201-204. -- --
2LK, p. 220. 
3LK, p. 287. See above p. 52, nt. 3, 57, nt. 2, 58, nt. 1, pp. 63-5, 
p. 68, nt. 2 and P· 7-3, nt. 2, for comparison of aspects of the work of 
Reinach and Russell. 
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parallel and others indicate that there existed a basis for dialogue 
0 between logical atomism and early phenomenology on common problems. 
Contemporary philosophy which directs itself to an analysis of "states-
of-affairs" or "facts" and prepositional entities would profit from a 
consideration of Reinach's work on states-of-affairs and the theory of 
judgments. 
It was established in Chapter II that the term "state-of-affairs" 
was not originated by Reinach and that he made no claims in this regard, 
but rather made careful note of its previous uses. Reinach did, however, 
vastly enrich the concept through careful analysis. The theory of 
states-of-affairs is the most fully developed aspect of the threefold 
theoretic structure with which Reinach approached the problem of the 
relationship of consciousness and being. This fact, given the incomplete 
form of his work, only confirms that his own philosophic practice actually 
reflected the relationships of "founding" and "foundedness" which he 
argued for in theory. Reinach's work on states-of-affairs (and the theory 
of judgments) has been, relatively speaking, neglected in the literature. 
The preceding chapters have attempted to avoid this tendency, not merely 
in reaction to the literature, however, but as the result of the view that 
Reinach's philosophic position can be adequately understood and evaluated 
only as a whole. His legal philosophy, ethical discussions, and the 
later analysis of premonitions and religious experience must be seen as 
the result of approaching the analysis of problematic forms of practical 
judgments and experiences with the threefold theoretic structure dis-
cussed in Chapters II to IV. The value ultimately attributed to this 
theoretic structure is likely greatly enhanced by its successful applica-
tion not merely to the ideal sphere but rather to these problematic forms 
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of practical judgments and experiences as well. The analysis of the 
latter is, in any case, not to be adequately understood without an 
understanding of Reinach' s theoretic position established in his analysi-s 
of states-of-affairs, intentionality, and judgments. This is clear from 
confusions in the literature dealing with his legal philosophy. 
Like Stump£ and Husserl, Reinach regarded the sphere of the 
objective to include, but be greater than, that of the real. Both real 
and ideal existents were regarded as objective. Reinach thus avoided 
both an unmitigated realism, for which all objectivities are real, and an 
idealism in which consciousness creates and sustains its objects in 
existence. The question concerning the ontological status of ideal 
objects and objectivities is resolved in part by Reinach by claiming a 
mode of being for ideal entities which is not existence in the sense of 
real being, but "ideal existence". Here, as is almost always the case, 
Reinach is concerned with objects (GegenstMnde, not Objekte) and 
objectiviiies under the aspect of being the transcendent correlates of a 
grasping act, an intentional act. He argues for the ideal existence of 
ideal objectivities by maintaining that though they are not real parti-
cular objects they are not "nothing" because we can make 11valid 11 positive 
and negative statements about them. The latter statement together with 
Reinach's claim that knowing, by essence, involves discovery rather than 
construction or creation of its object, implies at the very least some 
strong form of independence from consciousness for ideal objects and 
objectivities. The argument, problematic insofar as it appears to pre-
suppose a correspondence between the structures of thought, language, and 
objectivity, echoes in Reinach's rejection of the denial of the objective 
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subsistence of states-of-affairs in general. Reinach finds such a 
denial to be in accordance with the "contrary-to-sense position of 
absolute scepticism in the theory of knowledge!'' The subsistence of 
negative states-of-affairs, independent from consciousness, is simply 
1 
asserted by Reinach. Had he provided an argument in this latter case 
it would presumably have been either or both of those referred to above. 
The assumption that the structures of thought and language 
correspond to the structure of objectivity is fundamental for Reinach's 
work. This assumption has no ultimate defense. It is rather a common-
sense point of view closely akin to an "act of faith." In the absence 
of counter-examples or other evidence that the assumption is defective 
it remains a sound philosophic point of view so long as its status as 
an assumption is not forgotten. Closely related to this assumption is 
Reinach's non-traditional use of"~ priori" as an ontological term. 
Acts of knowing and judgments are regarded as "~ priori" only by virtue 
of their reference to an objective ~ priori connection. In the ideal case 
the correspondence theory is regarded as holding in its strict form. 
It is clear that Reinach claims an objective ground for judgments 
about objectivities other than real individuals. How one has 
of non-real objectivities must be regarded as a closely related but dis-
tinct issue. Central to Reinach's view of both ontological relationships 
and the processes by which we come to know them is the notion of levels 
of "founding" and "foundedness." To each unbounded set of individual 
real and ideal entities there is said to correspond a general ideal 
objectivity. We have argued that to each of the general qualities as well 
there corresponds an unbounded set of real particular qualities. The 
p. 104. 
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0 general ideal entities and qualities are not to be regarded as consist-ing of the unbounded set to which they correspond; presumably there are 
general ideal entities such as "unicorn" and "round square" even though. 
each of these correspond to an empty set of individuals, in fact and by 
necessity, respectively. The separation of general and individual retains 
the order of "founded" and "founding." 
Each entity and quality, real or ideal, has an essence. Connec-
tions between the relevant essences correspond to each and every real or 
ideal connection of real and ideal entities and qualities. Like essences, 
essential connections are not said to "exist," "to be, 11 or "to exist 
ideally." Reinach assigns no specific label to the "mode of being" of 
essences or of essential connect.ions. The whole essential connection, 
including the essences connected, is said, however,to found a state-of-
affairs that in turn subsists or does not subsist. Relationships of 
,;founding" and "foundedness" are here, as elsewhere in Reinach' s treatment 
of ontological and epistemological questions, more crucial and clearer than 
the labels assigned to various modes of being. Drawing upon Husserl's dis-
1 cussion of the ideality of categorial forms · we have argued that the 
connection is the objective correlate of the ideal "relational being," 
expressed in predication. 
To know is not to know an object, but that the object is so-and-
so. Knowledge about essences, general entities and qualities, real and 
ideal individuals and particular qualities is thus obtained only through 
knowledge of the objective connections, states-of-affairs, and facts, 
into which these objective elements enter. Yet more precisely it is 
1 See LI, pp. 780-84. 
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1 
states-of-affairs which. are known and thus only mediately can facts, 
to which there may correspond many states-of-affairs, and essential 
connections, which ground states-of-affairs, be known. 
Concepts and constituted states-of-affairs are the means by which 
we think and talk about objects and the objective states-of-affairs into 
which these objects enter as elements. General objectivities (including, 
we argue, qualities) and objective states-of-affairs lie at one level 
removed from the individual objects and facts. It is no coincidence that 
general concepts and constituted states-of-affairs likewise lie at one 
level removed from self-given individual objectivities and facts. There 
are many such parallels in the structures of intentionality, objectivity, 
and judgments. Not an idealist, not a sceptic, Reinach regarded evident 
knowledge as grounded in the self-givenness of objectivity. Parallels 
in structure such as those found above both result from Reinach's view 
of the nature of evident knowledge and, once established, ser.ve to sustain 
and explicate that same view. 
If the implications of Reinach's comments to the effect that 
objects and essences are, strictly speaking, known only as elements of 
states-of-affairs and essential connections, are to be fully drawn, then 
it must be argued that concepts of "unitary entities" such as nlion," 
"rose," etc., are logical abbreviations whose full objective referent is 
not s{mply an unbounded set of particular objects falling under that con-
cept as Reinach suggests, but rather an unbounded set of particular 
objects falling under that concept insofar as they are "subject" elements 
of objective states-of-affairs. Likewise in response to Reinach's 
lsee above, p. 62, on Reinach's use of the term "fact" (in the 
sense of Tatbestand, not Tatsache). 
--
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unanswered question about general qualities1 we have suggested that con-
cepts of general qualities (redness, squareness, evenness, etc.) are 
logical abbreviations whose full referents are the unbounded sets of 
particular qualities falling under those concepts respectively insofar 
as they are the "predicate" elements of objective states-of-affairs. 
Like ideal objects and objectivities, general qualities may be said to 
2 
"exist ideally". 
A key characteristic of states-of-affairs in relation to the 
theory of judgments is that states-of-affairs, unlike objects or 
qualities, can take on negation, thus providing a referent for negative 
judgments of the form, "It is the case that A is not b." Going beyond 
Reinach's position we have argued that phrases referring to negative 
states-of-affairs have a role similar to that which Reinach attributed 
to concepts. Concepts were said to set forth the uni.versality of 
objectivity under which a particular object was to be grasped. In the 
case of reference to objective negative states-of-affairs we find the 
universality of objectivity involved to be set forth by means of the 
negation of some constituted positive state-of-affairs. The objective 
negative state-of-affairs, such as the 11not-being-b of A," may be then 
referred to in a judgment, not by a concept, but by a phrase of the form 
"that A is not b." A self-sufficient assertion can be made about this 
objective negative state-of-affairs, such as--"It is the case that A is 
not b," or, as is seen above, a phrase referring to the objective 
negative state-of-affairs may perform the function, within a more complex 
lRVK,GS, p. 55. 2 See above, p. 77. 
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statement, of a "negative concept". There can be no negative concepts, 
as such, for concepts refer to unbounded sets of particular objects and 
we accept Reinach's view that there are no negative objects. Analogous!~, 
we ~rgue that there are no negative qualities. Only misunderstanding 
results when Reinach's view of concepts as derivative and secondary, 
serving only to set forth the universality of objectivity under which a 
particular is to be grasped, is forgotten. 
Reinach's theory of judgments presupposes his theory of states-of-
affairs, states-of-affairs being the intentional correlates of acts of 
knowing and that which is evident and ~ priori in the primary sense. 
Historically the negative judgment had been one of the more problematic 
furms of judgment and serves as the main focus for much of Reinach's work 
on the theory of judgments. In the process of his analysis Reinach clearly 
rejects the claims that negativity is not objective, that judgments are 
affirmations or denials, and that judgments refer to objects, as well as 
Brentano's divergence from the correspondence theory. The differences 
between their two positions are all ultimately grounded in their distinct 
ontological assumptions. 
Almost all of the distinctions Reinach made with regard to various 
types of judgments and propositions, the nature of the evidence for them, 
the logic required by them, and the processes by which they are formulated 
and constituted as judgments and potential assertions, respectively, are 
said to be grounded in the nature of the objective states-of-affairs to 
which they refer. Strictly speaking, this entails regarding all epistemo-
logical and logical terms as primarily ontological. In the ideal case 
this would irideed hold true. It was seen, however, from the articles on 
0 
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reflection, motion, premonitions, and religious experience, all of which 
lead to an enrichment of Reinach's theory of judgments, that in actual 
practice outside a restricted ideal sphere this view represents only an 
ideal limit to be approached to some degree. 
Reinach's claim that the laws of traditional logic are actually 
founded in the laws of states-of-affairs can be supported only if an overt 
claim is also made, as Reinach does not, that the full objective referent 
of a judgment, whether an assertion or a conviction, is not simply the 
state-of-affairs but the state-of-affairs together with its subsistence 
or non-subsistence. Only in this way is it possible to maintain that a 
distinct objective referent corresponds to each of the four types of 
judgments identified by Reinach for the case of convictions. It is also 
necessary to supplement Reinach's view that the laws of states-of-affairs 
are the foundation of most of the traditional logical laws governing 
propositions and judgments by asserting that many states-of-affairs--
especially those which take on modalities in the range between the necessary 
and the impossible, and states-of-affairs of values--actually require a 
many-valued logic. This view is in fundamental agreement with Reinach's 
central point: that the laws of logic must be grounded in the nature of 
the subject matter, the objective states-of-affairs to which propositions 
refer. 
Although Reinach made much of the characteristic of states-of-
affairs whereby they, unlike objects, take on negation and modalities, he 
did not state in any explicit way the basis for this difference between 
objects and states-of-affairs or clarify adequately how states-of-affairs 
take on negation. Drawing upon Husserl's discussion of the ideality of 
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categorial forms 1 we have interpreted this difference between states-of-
affairs and objects as being grounded in the fact that, while the 
subsistence of states-of-affairs--like the existence of an object--is in 
no way included in the concep·t, State-of-Affairs, or in the concepts of 
individual states-of-affairs, the relational being expressed in 
predication--often in the copula--is not independent of the state-of-affairs 
but is founded in the objective connection of the elements of an objective 
state-of-affairs. Negation of an objective state-of-affairs is thus a 
negation of this objective connection, the "relational being". Relational 
being is the ideal objective correlate of the categorial form "being" in 
the copulative sense. In a judgment it is precisely this categorial 
"being" and thus the whole constituted state-of-affairs which can be 
negated. 
The negation of causal judgments--judgments referring to an empirical 
non-essential relation of two states-of-affairs--left unclarified by Reinach, 
may be regarded as a case where the necessity qualifying the predicate 
(the causal necessity) is ''pushed away". This argument is analogous to 
Reinach's analysis of the use of the term "not" in "the car was not driven 
fast" as the "pushing away" of a non-essential element. Either this or 
some similar explanr.1tion must be applied to the "negation" of causal 
relations for these are relations of two states-of-affairs, whereas the 
negation function effects only an individual state-of-affairs. An alter-
native explanation of the negation of causal judgments and the empirical 
relations of the states-of-affairs to which they refer is given by regard-
ing the negation of the constituted causal relation as a negation of the 
1 See LI, pp. 780-84. 
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necessity of the subsistence of the state-of-affairs, not a negation of 
the state-of-affairs. 1 It is clear that relations of objective states-
of-affairs and constituted states-of-affairs of higher-order require much 
further analysis than is actually provided in Reinach's work. 
The theory of intentionality presents a serious area of problems 
for the threefold theory. This theory must carry the burden of clarifying 
the relationship of consciousness to being, of acts of knowing to states-
of-affairs, and therefore requires a fuller development than it is overtly 
given in Reinach's work. Reinach accepted much of Husserl's work on 
this topic, introducing distinctions only as these were motivated by 
analysis. The division of judgments into "assertions'' and "convictions" 
and the accompanying analysis of the former as speech-acts involving 
functions and acts of meaning (Meinen), the latter as grounded on represen-
tation and acts of knowing, are instances of significant and far-ranging 
distinctions being motivated by such analysis. 
Comparison of the "and"-function and the negation function points 
to an important difference between many objective and constituted states-
of-affairs. Negative states-of-affairs are said to subsist with the same 
objectivity as positive states-of-affairs. A negative objective state-
of-affairs belongs to the same ontological level as a positive objective 
state-of-affairs. An objective negative state-of-affairs is not a negated 
positive objective state-of-affairs. Correspondence between a constituted 
negative state-of-affairs and an objective negative state-of-affairs 
requires that the negation function be performed only in constituting a 
state-of-affairs whose objective correlate is a negative state-of-affairs. 
1 See above, pp. 65-67. 
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In the case of the "and"-function the objective correlate is not a single 
state-of-affairs, but two or more distinct states-of-affairs. The con-
stituted state-of-affairs involving an "and"-function, unlike that 
involving the negation function, is thus synthetic although Reinach has 
not made this distinction overt. Correspondence requires that the "and"-
function be performed only when its use, resulting in the constitution 
of a higher-order state-of-affairs, is grounded in the states-of-affairs 
forming the objective correlate. 
1 It has been argued above that though Reinach's claim that states-
of-affairs, as they are constituted for meaning (Meinen) in assertions, 
must be in accordance with determinate laws of constitution may appear to 
be an argument that the structure of language used to refer to states-of-
affairs corresponds in a simple one-to-one relation to the structure of 
the objective states-of-affairs referred to, this is not the case. 
Reinach's analysis of the distinctions between meaning (Meinen) and know-
ing, assertions and convictions, and the roles of functions and represen-
tation, respectively, must be seen not as arguments for a "grammatical" 
objective structure but rather as a response to the problem of analyzing 
the leap from the sphere of the objective, to thought, and finally to 
language. Reinach argues that the structure of each is "founded" on that 
of the previous, but avoids a simplistic image or picture analogy. The 
radical distinction between the natures of objectivity and consciousness 
is instead recognized in his analysis of the constitutive activities of 
consciousness while at the same time, without contradiction, a corres-
pondence of structure in the sense of "foundedness 11 and "founding" is 
claimed for the ideal case. 
c 
1 See p. 58, above. 
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Reinach's division of the sphere of judgments into convictions 
and assertions was an original approach to the problem of the nature of 
judgments. His distinction between acts, like representation and mean- -
ing, in·which we grasp an object in "having" or "aiming" and those 
experiences like convictions, striving, expectations, etc., in which we 
"take a position to somethingH, is a highly useful one. Convictions, 
as analyzed by Reinach, can take on a rich variety of forms in reference 
to an identical state-of-affairs in virtue of being "position-takings". 
Ideally the sphere of assertions should include a similar variety. 
Reinach's theory of assertions is too restricted, however, to provide a 
solution to this general problem without making certain extensions. 
1 One extension to Reinach's theory of assertions proposed above 
is that instead of limiting the sphere of assertions to those based on 
"positive convictions" as Reinach does, disbelief that, "A is b", be 
regarded as equivalent to the immediately assertable belief that "it 
is not the case that A is b". We have argued that without this extension 
the sphere of assertions is unrealistically impoverished2 and may in 
. 3 
certain cases produce erroneous assert1ons. 
It appears feasible as well to extend Reinach's discussion of 
the constitution of states-of-affairs in and for meaning, which he limited 
to the objects of positive convictions, for statements of all forms. It 
may be presumed that he did not choose to do this because it lay outside 
the sphere of his set problem. 
The distinctions Reinach made regarding meaning (Meinen), in his 
sense, appear to have been the product of his attempt to provide an analysis 
of the relationship between language and intentionality. In respect to 
1 See pp. 103-104, above. 
3see above, p. 121, nt. 2. 
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the analysis of meaning (Meinen), in Reinach's precise sense, claims 
for the originality of his analysis are scarcely disputable. The 
work of Brentano, Marty, and Husserl from this period, however, also 
contains many passages relevant to the problem of the relationship of 
language and intentionality. The problem in its general form was a 
contemporary one, not first discovered by Reinach. 
In the sketchy form in which Reinach allowed the distinctions 
between meaning and representation to remain it has been difficult to 
evaluate them fully. A far more detailed discussion than is provided by 
Reinach of the complex of intentional processes required from the stage 
of sense perception to the stage of making an assertion would be desirable. 
The distinctions he did develop with respect to intentionality are con-
sistent, however, with the view he presented in more general terms of 
the over-all process of forming a judgment, achieving an insight and 
taking a position. It must be recognized that the functions are of the 
greatest importance for his theoretical position: they are the means by 
which negation, conjunction, disjunction, causal relations, and deductive 
relations, can be grounded in objectivity and yet be constituted for 
consciousness in forms which theoretically correspond strictly to the 
elements and connections of objectivity. 
1 Reinach asserted that no intentional act passes to any objectivity 
unless on both sides necessary "ordering connections" (Zuordnungs-
verh~ltnisse) are present as a result of the subsistence of essential 
connections between the consciousness that formulates judgments and the 
objectivity to which these judgments refer. This claim requires 
0 1 NU,GS, p. 77. 
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qualification,for the relationship would hold, presumably, only for 
__,1 
the case of the correct judgment and rests on the assumption that con-
sciousness is somehow capable of formulating "ordering connections" 
which do indeed correspond to those of objectivity. The validity of 
this assumption reduces to the question of whether the "ordering 
connections" of constituted states-of-affairs, which form the content 
of our judgments, actually correspond to those of objectivity. The 
occurrence of erroneous judgments, which also involve "intentional acts" 
passing to "objectivity", gives the lie to the above flat statement and 
suggests instead that all authentic judgments, correct or not, are the 
result of the belief that the "ordering connections" of the constituted 
state-of-affairs correspond to those of the objectivity referred to by 
the judgment. 
The examination in Chapters Ill and IV, above, of the nature 
and basis of our knowledge of positive and negative states-of-affairs of 
different modalities and types of evidence supports the view that there 
are significant differences between the range of antic connections in 
themselves and what the knowing subject may be said to know of these 
antic connections. Reinach tends to neglect to make these latter dis-
tinctions although the aspects of the article on reflection dealing 
with intellectual reflection do significantly enrich the theory of judg-
ments beyond the overly simplified form in which it is found in the 
article on negative judgments. 
1 Reinach's position has been supplemented above by observing that 
impossibility, possibility, probability, and necessity belong to the same 
1 See pp. 68-69. 
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category--it may still be called modality--just as negation in general 
belongs to one category although the implications of the laws stating 
its relationships are weaker for states-of-affairs containing non-
essential connections than for those containing essential connections. 
From the point of view of the knowing subject it is important to be able 
to distinguish empirical states-of-affairs from ~ priori states-of-
affairs, non-essential connections from essential ones, for the epis-
temological implications of the laws stating the relationships regarding 
both modality and negation are not the same for all states-of-affairs. 1 
Greater emphasis must be given than Reinach does to the distinctions 
between objective states-of-affairs and our possible knowledge, immediate 
or mediate, of those objective states-of-affairs. 
Religious experience2 and premonitions are analyzed by Reinach 
in terms of the threefold theoretic structure developed in his earlier 
work. It is clear that religious "position-takings", although "subjective" 
and not verifiable by any demonstrations, may still be the basis of con-
victions as discussed by Reinach in the article on negative judgments. 
Likewise premonitions, in which a state-of-affairs is grasped, correctly 
or incorrectly, as subsisting, are a source of knowledge in what Reinach 
calls the "wide" sense and thus are not ungrounded convictions but rather 
that which may, validly or not, ground convictions. Reinach emphasizes 
that the strength and inner certainty of a conviction grounded on a 
lsee above, pp. 69-72. 
2The treatise on the philosophy of religion was left in an incom-
plete form. For this reason we have chosen to treat only those issues 
which bear a clear relation to Reinach's other work, such as 
epistemological questions and his method of analysis, but not, for example, 
the qualities of the Absolute. 
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premonition--an act in which we grasp, or believe we grasp, a state-of-
affairs as subsisting--is in no way inferior to one grounded on acts of 
knowing in the traditional sense. In his attempt to analyze the subjects 
of the later writings, Reinach's theories of knowledge and judgments 
appear to have become enriched in response to the very demands of their 
subjects. It becomes clear that there are many more significant types 
of judgments not conforming to the ideal cases dealt with in his earlier 
work than was earlier apparent. In the works in which the threefold 
theory is applied to the analysis of concrete problems a direction may 
indeed be seen towards the introduction of qualifications of his epistemo-
logical position. It would be purely speculative to ask whether these 
would have corresponded to those qualifications suggested in the preceding 
chapters. Nor is it to be forgotten that Reinach had always maintained 
a strict distinction between the natures of the ~ priori .and empirical 
spheres. Given this distinction it is only to be expected that the 
epistemological claims he might make for the ideal and real spheres would 
be different. 
Evidence and self-givenness require further analysis than they 
were given by Reinach. Reinach did remark on the severe limitations on 
evidence, as well as. observing that only states-of-affairs containing 
essential connections can be grasped as necessary with indisputable 
evidence, that there is no final evidence for claims of real existence, 
that judgments involving immediate evidence are rare, and that the pro-
cess of practical reflection is theoretically infinite. In addition 
Reinach makes a variety of distinctions concerning mediate and immediate 
evidence, positive and negative evidence, evidence for claims of real 
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existence, evidence of existential possibility, and evidence for empirical 
1 knowledge. He asserts that the attempt at a clear and articulate 
grasping of objects is open to all the possibilities of illusion that 
any knowledge involves. 2 It has been argued above3 that Reinach also 
implied that there is no necessity for essential (ontic) connections to 
be given to us in our intuition of an objectivity. 
The lack of any criteria for determining when an objectivity has 
been grasped with adequate self-givenness--a process which may be 
influenced by interest, experience, and unexamined pre-judgments, as 
Reinach was by no means unaware, also indicates a need for further examina-
tion of the questions of evidence and sel£-givenness. It is likewise 
argued above4 that insofar as the intuition of essences and essential 
connections in any way presupposes other less adequate forms of givenness, 
such as the perception of real objects, the insight gained through 
intuition becomes hypothetical. More precisely, the degree of evidence 
of the least adequate form of givenness presupposed by the process would 
become the greatest degree of evidence which could be claimed for the 
result of intuition. 
It has been shown above that Reinach was concerned with epistemo-
logical issues in all of his writings. The role which he recognized to 
be in fact often performed by "subjective" experiences--grounding beliefs, 
convictions, assertibns, feeling-states, position-takings of the will, 
strivings, and by extension influencing the whole range of practical and 
intellectual position-takings,--was a significant one. He was not so 
lsee above, pp.89-91, pp.l21-134. 
2UP,GS, p. 405, See also NU,GS, 
3 See above, p. 91. 
p. 90, nt. 1 and p. 91 above. 
4 
See above, pp.91-92, and pp. 93-94. 
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naive as to assert that these "subjective" sources of knowledge in the 
wide sense could be demonstrate . or proven to have real objective 
correlates or to have these in adequate self-givenness--resort to 
attempts at "demonstration" or "proof" in the case of ultimates was 
indeed a course whose validity he strongly denied. He was at the same 
time, however, not afraid of attempting to grasp the essence of these 
experiences, as he occasionally accused non-phenomenologists of being, 
or of admitting the significance of the role they may play in the personal, 
practical, emotional, social, intellectual, and religious spheres of 
human experience. Reinach's response to the problem of grounding syn-
thetic propositions--the intuition of objective connections--does appear 
to provide a viable alternative to strict rationalism and ungrounded 
. i 1 . d . 1 emp~r ea ~n uct~on. It is difficult to read Reinach's work with care 
and in the end find his epistemological point of view naive in the simple 
pejorative sense. The point of view is far more the common-sense one 
of proceeding painstakingly with analysis of the given and its modes of 
being given (having already rejected scepticism and psychologism) in 
constant awareness of the high possibility of illusion and error. 
The article on reflection as well as the short pieces on premoni-
tions and rel ious experience revealed Reinach's ability to bring 
distinctions on the theoretical level to bear on problems of the practical 
sphere without descending into dogmatism. The gulf between the ideal and 
real realms is not lessened thereby, but it is seen that the results of 
his analysis of the ideal realm can be utilized to provide a theoretic 
framework for critical examination of some of the most problematic issues 
1see, Spiegelberg, PM, p. 201. 
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and types of judgment found in the practical sphere. 
The analysis of intellectual and practical reflection is also 
of interest, however, quite independent from its demonstration of the 
successful application of Reinach's threefold theoretic structure to 
problems of the concrete sphere. Many of the issues involved have been 
the subject of contemporary debate in connection with the question of 
capital punishment. The article likewise provides analysis of a 
particular instance where normative elements are intertwined with a 
1 
system of positive Law almost to the point of defying recognition. The 
intricacy of the relationships Reinach discovered beneath the practice 
(in German criminal law of the time) of using the presence or absence of 
reflection as a criterion for determining the severity of punishment, 
attest both to the validity of the claim that moral elements may in fact 
become so strongly intertwined in a legal system that they may come to 
defy identification as moral elements and to the fundamental significance 
of a theoretical framework--whether or not it is that used by Reinach--
which will facilitate the differentiation of specifically moral and legal 
1 . h' f ' ' L 2 e ements w1t 1n a system o pos1t1ve aw. The latter is significant, but 
not because moral elements have no valid role in positive Law; they 
clearly do have a role. However, the identification of specifically moral 
elements will contribute to a more accurate analysis of legal problems 
and thus to a system of positive Law which is more self-conscious and 
therefore can become more self-consistent. 
1
see above, pp. 135-38. 
2Reinach's analysis of the two corresponding types of states-of-
affairs which "should-be11 --those groun,ded on "objective !!. priori moral 
essential connections" and those dependent on the enactment of effective 
determinations--is central to his approach to this problem; see above, 
pp. 176-83, p. 174, nt. 2. 
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Reinach's analysis in his legal philosophy of the influence of 
moral laws and values on positive Law and on the process by which the 
latter comes to diverge from ~ priori Law supports the view that both 
positive Law and moral norms and codes are only two among many closely 
related aspects of social interchange. By implication positive Law 
cannot be adequately studied in isolation from the context of social 
interchange as a whole. This realization is important both for the 
history of Law and for comparative Law. Its implications for the social 
sciences in general are likewise worthy of consideration. 
Reinach found the ultimate foundation for the constitution of 
legal-social relations to be the legal ability of the person. This 
legal ability is not further reducible but rather has its final origin 
in the legal person as such. Nor is this legal ability, which documents 
itself in "social acts" and their legal effects, transferable. Insofar 
as it is grounded in the essence of the legal person as such, it is 
inseparable from that essence. 1 The "social act" is shown in turn by 
Reinach to be fundamental to social interchange, legal and non-legal, 
the latter being a label which may vary in its applicability in accord-
ance with the positive laws in effect. The analysis of the social act 
is of key importance insofar as it provides a basis for the analysis 
of the relation of sp~cific positive legal structures to the fabric of 
social interchange. 
Reinach's analysis of the ilsocial act" has been found to show its 
strength precisely in its lack of limitation to either the Austin-type 
emphasis on the outward verbal utterance itself or to acts with "merely" 
1 See, aGbR,GS, p. 274. 
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legal or ritualistic effects in accordance with unambiguous rules or 
with social norms. An adequate treatment of the performative as a 
social act in the broad sense--not treatment merely as an act with legal· 
or moral effects in accordance with unambiguous rules--must be able to 
deal with all performatives which arise in any given social context. 
Further analysis of performatives should therefore consider more fully 
their basis in "conventions", particularly problematic being those 
"conventions" which clearly have their roots in a specific culture and 
social structure, but do not qualify as ''unambiguous rules". Olivecrona 
discusses both Austin's work with performatives and Reinach's distinctions 
between imperatives and determinations (Bestimmungen), but does not 
mention the latter's analysis of "social acts" or connect this with the 
topic of performatives. It appears that the relevance of Reinach's 
analysis of "social acts" to performatives has gone unnoticed. 
Reinach's analysis of "determinations" or "enactments" (Bestimmungen) 
as social acts which, when effectively enacted, constitute valid positive 
Law for a given circle of persons, is a significant attempt to clarify 
the social basis for the validity of positive Law. 1 The analysis of 
"determinations", like those of the distinction between the moral and 
legal spheres and of social acts, is thus of intrinsic interest apart 
from its relation to Reinach's legal philosophy as a whole. The analysis 
of the social act of determination is also useful for attempts to clarify: 
1) the divergence of positive Law from ~ priori essential legal connec-
tions, 2) the processes by which positive Law may be modified (legal 
1see above, p. 187, nt. 1. K. Larenz has, for example, adopted 
Reinach's interpretation of determinations as an explanation for the 
validity of legal facts. 
--
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history), and 3) the social foundations of distinct co-existing legal 
systems (comparative Law). 
Ignorance of Reinach's criticism of Kant and Reinach's particular 
use of the terms "concept" and "synthetic ,e. priori" has led to mis-
interpretation1 of Reinach's legal philosophy with the result that much 
of the criticism of the latter has missed its mark. Strong reservations 
2 
were expressed above about the implications of reference within a legal 
system to the notion of "the essence of a person's personality" as 
revealed in "ability to feel value". 
The disputes above3 regarding certain of the results of essential 
intuition found in Reinach 1 s legal and religious philosophy all presumably 
illustrate the influence of cultural factors on both essential intuition 
and attempts to evaluate its results. The results of essential intuition 
in general have, of course, always been open to question. In those 
spheres of experience, however, such as religion, law, ethics, and inter-
personal relationships, where cultural differences have their broadest 
significance, essential intuition must be used with particular care. 
Cultural differences may well also effect an individual's perception of the 
physical aspects of his environment as is illustrated by the now well-
known examples of color perception and development of many linguistic 
distinctions for aspects of phenomena of importance for given cultural 
4 groups. It is clear that pre-judgment of what is truly essential easily 
1see above, pp. 201-204. 
3 See, pp. 178-80, p. 141. 
2 See, pp. 137-39. 
4
see, Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, ~Reality, edited 
by John B. Carrell (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1967). 
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arises when experience of diverse cultural forms and practices is 
limited. 
The specific internal criticisms in the preceding chapters of 
the results of Reinach's analysis have led to the formulation of 
numerous qualifications and extensions of his position. Although these 
qualifications and extensions are not complete or final, they do indicate 
that it is apparently possible to resolve the problems at which criticism 
was directed while remaining within the theoretical framework set forth 
by Reinach. Problems have been found, however, to surround certain 
more fundamental issues for both the threefold theory and Reinach's 
application of it to ethics and legal philosophy. It has therefore 
been asserted that the nature of objective ~ priori connections and the 
evidence with which they may be grasped must be regarded as controversial 
in all cases. 
it has been argued above that phenomenology must regard the final 
validity of its ~priori propositions, believed to be grounded on the 
11 self-givenness" of objective states-of-affairs, as open to question. 
The "hypothetical nature" of our knowledge of essential ~ priori 
connections does not appear to be deniable. It is one matter to maintain 
essential connections but quite another 
to claim that we have final knowledge of what they are. Admitting a 
qualification of one of its principal claims will strengthen phenomenology 
as a whole. The problems of evidence, illusion, error, and pre-judgment, 
as well as those problems which reflect the gulf between the ideal and 
empirical spheres, could thereby be given the recognition they warrant 
--
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without following the more drastic tack of abandoning the phenomenological 
method of philosophizing and what it has uniquely to offer. 
The introduction of this fundamental qualification, whereby the · 
final validity of ~ priori propositions, believed to be grounded on the 
"self-givenness" of objective states-of-affairs, is regarded as open to 
question, need not be regarded as utterly alien to Reinach's approach 
to ultimate philosophic questions. It is but one step, although a 
crucial one, beyond his insistence on the thorough scrutiny of essential 
connections and is in part a response to Reinach's own remarks on the 
many problems surrounding the issue of evidence. This qualification, 
moreover, in no way detracts from that which is of particular and lasting 
value in Reinach's work: the emphasis on "seeing", on being open to, the 
objective connections of the "given"; the analysis of knowledge as being 
ultimately grounded on necessary and possible ~ priori essential connec-
tions (WesenszusammenhMnge) and essential laws (Wesengesetze); the 
analysis of ontological and intentional relations in terms of levels of 
"founding'' and "foundedness"; and the insightful application of the 
theoretic framework, developed through analysis of the ideal sphere, to 
problematic practical issues and types of judgment, as, for example, in 
his analysis of "social acts", "determinations", and the distinctions 
between specifically moral and legal elements within a system of positive 
Law. Each of these aspects of Reinach's work number among those which 
are of intrinsic philosophic value and therefore remain objects of 
contemporary interest. 
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Appendix I 
An Evaluation of the Two English Translations of Reinach's 
1914 Lecture, nUber Phl:inomenologie" 
1 The translation entitled "What is Phenomenology?" , by Derek Kelly, 
should not have been published. The style of presentation is far less 
straight-forward than that of the original. This might seem to be a mis-
guided criticism in the light of the translator's assertion that his basic 
aim was "to present an English text that is as readable as possible". It 
is, of course, fortunate that preferences in literary style differ; how-
ever, given the fact that part of Reinach's appeal as a lecturer was the 
directness of his delivery and the brilliant clarity of the examples he 
gave, it is most unfortunate that the translation obscured this aspect of 
the lecture. 
The translator's footnotes are for the most part either vague or 
incorrect. But the final and key fault of the translation is found in its 
complete alteration of the meaning of the text at point after point. 
Occasionally this results from stylistic changes and the use of vocabulary 
with a slightly different tone from that used in the original, (examples 
of this can be seen in the first paragraph of the translation). Often, 
however, the cause seems to have been total misreading of the German text. 
For example: on pag.e 243 Kelly translates "die vielen anderen Versuche", 
"the many other attempts", as "the four other attempts"; on page 241 he 
renders "ist eine Philosophie more geometrico beim Worte genommen ein 
absoluter Widersinn", or "a philosophy in the geometrical style (~ 
geometrico) is, when taken literally, an absolute self-contradiction", 
as "philosophy has taken the ~ geometrico in a completely different 
sense"; and on page 245 he translates "Nun ... sehen Sie die Verwirrung, die 
das Verbleiben in den Zeichen angerichtet hat", or "now consider the error 
occasioned by remaining at the level of signs", as "now look at the con-
fusion produced by the remaining symbols". In short, the translation by 
Derek Kelly is unreliable and not to be recommended. 
The translation entitled "Concerning Phenomenology" 2 , by Dallas Willard, 
is quite good in all respects and should be useful to the general reader and 
student. A few comments about the translation can be added in the form of 
footnotes. On page 195, line 17, it would be clearer to say, "but rather 
by essence belongs to the 1 11 • 3 Throughout the lecture it is perhaps best to 
1Philosophical Forum, I (Winter, 1968) '· 231-256. 
2Personalist, L (1969), 194-221. 
3This and subsequent references are to the Willard translation, (Ibid.). 
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render "ich" as "I" rather than as "ego". The distinction between "mean" 
(meinen) and "intend" (top of page 196) should be retained in accordance 
with Reinach's discussion of meinen in the work on negative judgments. 
In line 16, page 196, Gesinnungen would be better translated as 
"dispositions" rather than as "convictions". The last sentence of the 
second paragraph on page 203 should be rendered more literally as "But 
here the distance from any material content is especially clear." 
The discussion of ordinal and cardinal numbers involves problems of 
terminology, (see pages 205-209). First of all, where the word "group" 
or "groups" is used in this context one should read "set" or "sets". The 
other problem arises from Reinach's purposeful use of Anzahl and Zahl. 
The translator has chosen to render both as "number" although Anzahl 
carries with it the sense of number as quantity. Until the end of the 
first paragraph on page 207 it is the Anzahl which Reinach is examining. 
Unlike the translator, Reinach does not explicitly identify the Anzahl 
with the cardinal until the beginning of the third paragraph on page 208. 
It is characteristic of Reinach's style of presentation not to introduce 
a new notion or distinction until it has been motivated by analysis. 
The key sentence, pages 208-209, should be translated: ''Is anyone indeed 
so far gone as to wish to derive the cardinal numbers from the ordinal 
numbers, i.e. to derive the Anzahlen from a mode of designation which 
already presupposes the Anzahlen as a presupposition?" The reader should 
also be aware that the translator makes no distinction between Wesen and 
Wesenheit, Gegenstand and Objekt, or Fakta and Sachen. 
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Appendix II 
On the Phenomenology of Premonitions1 
In my half sleep rings the talk of men who rest during a fire pause 
in the batteries. A young officer had fallen the day before; shortly 
before the ride from which he never returned, he had, as he otherwise 
never did, given his orderly the trunk key, put his papers in order, and 
written a farewell letter. He had therefore had a premonition of his. 
death. Other stories are added to this one. One was remarkably dis-
gruntled and sad before the shell hit him; another had made his testa-
ment; indeed it is reported of many that they had said directly before 
their deaths that they would not be alive the next day. None of the 
common soldiers doubted that there are premonitions which let us foresee 
the future with certainty. 
A young sergeant breaks into the conversation. I hear him as he--
a bit condescendingly--explains, how little there is to premonitions as 
such. Certainly everyone conjectures before a dangerous undertaking that 
he perhaps or probably will be killed. Should this conjecture be ful-
filled, then it will pass as a mysterious premonition; should it not be 
fulfilled, then no one will remember it. No, there are no premonitions; 
only rational calculations, which prove true with more or less probability, 
are possible. Ever more scientific is the small sergeant and ever more 
silent it becomes around him. Premonitions are matters of mood. When I 
am sad and ill-humored the world appears gloomy to me and misfortune seems 
to lie ahead. Perhaps such a misfortune actually occurs. Then the 
number of mysterious premonitions is increased by one. Or it doesn't 
occur, and then no one talks of the affair. Should anyone wonder that the 
actualizations of dismal dispositions are especially frequent in war? . For 
this reason there are many "premonitions" in this time, therefore also the 
greater number of these premonitions before Verdun or at the Somme, than 
at any quiet point on the front. It is sad enough that one yet believes 
in such things in our time. Who could oppose these words flung out with 
the power of higher education and rational enlightenment? Taken back, the 
soldiers are silent. And it may indeed be a minute before their spokesman 
begins a new story about a cousin who not only spoke but also wrote of his 
death. However, that is a reply not sufficient as a scientific claim to 
the preceding instruction. Shrugg his shoulders the young sergeant 
turns away. 
In me, however, a world rises up, which for a long, long time was 
submerged in the all else stifling activity of soldiers at war, What are 
!English translation of "Zur Phl:inomenologie der Ahnungen, 11 from 
"Aufzeichnungen, 26 Juli 1916 - 3 Oktober 1917." Typewritten manuscript 
presumably compiled by Anna Reinach from Reinach's papers. Nachlass 
Adolf Reinach. An edition of this unpublished German text is presented 
below, see pp. 245-47. 
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"premonitions" actually? That they are justified in themselves has just 
now been denied. And the argument had advanced to the assertion that 
there were no premonitions at all. Now that to be sure was a quite 
unscientific blunder by the scientific sergeant: to dispute the parti-
cular essence of a structure whose essence he had nevertheless just 
recognized in that he denies its inner truth and attempts to genetically 
explain its frequent occurrence. But we won't discredit him for that 
\vhich is found often enough in yet more scientific people than he. 
Hhether premonitions in themselves have authority and truth, I am 
not able to say; cannot possibly say before I know what that actually is 
by its essence: a premonition. I do not know yet. But already there awakes 
in me the desire of the phenomenologist to bring forth a structure from the 
wealth of the appearances, to seize it, to submerge oneself in it and thus 
now to obtain the intuitive essence (anschaulichen Wesen)--acknowledged 
previously only in accordance with the meaning of the word--by itself. 
I. 
However necessarily any premonition as such requires a related 
content--a "premonited" as such--just so far is the boundary of the here 
possible content drawn. Premonitions can refer not only to the temporal 
or even only to the future. Within a scientific study a premonition of 
the result can occur to me; here, obviously extra-temporal, is formed--a 
more or less determinate proposition (Satz) or state-of-affairs--the 
related content of the premonition. But not this premonition-content, 
which, as identical, also could be the content of a judgment or of a fear, 
rather the premonition as such--not the noematic, but the "noetic" side, 
to speak with Husserl,--presents the actual problem. If we avail ourselves 
of the division, in itself quite limited but sufficient for our ends, 
of the mental world (seelischen Welt) into the "spheres of feeling, will, 
and thought", then, since the pr~ition is certainly no willing, one 
will only be able to be undecided as to whether it could not be claimed 
perhaps to be a feeling. Indeed, it appears to have a good sense to speak 
of felt (gefUhlsmMssigen) premonitions, indeed of the aspect of being 
felt (GefUhlsm~ssigkeit) of any premonition. ·Yet it is immediately clear, 
that the premonition--for instance of a future event--is no feeling-state 
(GefUhl), like joy or sadness, no state-of-being-of the I, no finding itself 
so or so of the I. Far more the premonition adds something new to the 
whole wealth of knowledge--in the widest sense of knowledge; here the sub-
ject appears to grasp by means of the premonition, no matter whether 
correctly or incorrectly, something out of the flow of future occurrences 
which was not accessible to him before. What is meant by the words, 
'aspect of being felt of the premonition', only a deeper going dissection 
can explain. But already here we are permitted to include the premonition--
like everything which allows certain states-of-affairs to appear to the subject 
as subsisting now or in the future or in general--in the area of knowledge 
and therefore of thought, in the sense of that three-way division. In 
clear contrast with the premonition of future destiny is the dismay which 
as a feeling-state springs from this foreseeing grasping, as does all 
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striving and resistance, willing and not-willing, which is rooted in this 
feeling (FUhlen) and knowing. 
Certainly "knowing" is taken here in the widest sense; in a narrower 
and proper sense one can indeed oppose premonition and knowing to one 
another. Thus after this first superficial orientation closer determina-
tions are indispensable. In this sphere we make the fundamental and far-
reaching distinction between grounding and grounded structures. I have 
already pursued knowing in the narrower sense in an earlier essay (MUnch. 
Philos. Abhandl., "Zum negativen Urteil"). If we take knowing in the 
strict meaning as the act in which a state-of-affairs comes to givenness 
for us, in which it shines forth for us and the corresponding proposition 
(Satz) is understood by us, then the conviction which develops for us on 
the ground of this understanding distinguishes itself in all clearness from 
the state-of-affairs. We refer to the first as knowing, the second as 
judgment (in one of the many possible meanings of this expression). With-
out closer dissection both contrast with one another clearly enough, if 
one considers that the case of knowing concerns a punctual temporal act 
which cannot endure more or less, whereas we can live in a conviction as 
long as we like, and that furthermore a set of convictions often come to 
life in us without grounding themselves in an act of knowing or at any 
time having been grounded. Observed from this point there is no doubt that 
we have to class premonitions with the grounding structures, not with the 
grounded ones--i.e., those which by their essence are open to a grounding. 
Through premonitions we grasp--or we believe to grasp--the previously 
hidden. And in premonition a conviction also can be grounded, which in 
strength and inner certainty need be in no way inferior to the conviction 
based upon knowing. From the premonition of near death arises the certain 
conviction of having to die soon. 
As knowing and foreseeing stand on the same level in this relation, 
then just thereby will the task of setting forth the fundamental difference 
of the two be all the more urgent. 
c 
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Zur PhMnomenologie der Ahnungen1 
In meinen Halbschlaf hinein t8nt das GesprMch der Leute, die wHhren~ 
einer Feuerpause an den GeschUtzen lagern. Ein junger Offizier ist den 
Tag zuvor gefallen; kurz vor dem Ritt, von dem er nicht mehr zuruckkam, 
hatte er, was er sonst nie tat, den KofferschlUssel seinem Burschen gegeben, 
hatte seine Papiere geordnet und einen Abschiedsbrief geschrieben. Er 
hatte also seinen Tod geahnt. An diese Geschichte knUpfen sich andere. 
Da ist einer merkwUrdig verstimmt und traurig gewesen, bevor ihn die 
Granate traf; ein anderer hat sein Testament gernacht; von vielen gar wird 
erzl:lhlt, sie hMtten es direkt vorher gesagt, dass sie den kornrnenden Tag 
nicht rnehr erleben wllrden. Keiner der Landser zweifelte daran, dass 
es Ahnungen giebt, die uns KUnftiges mit Sicherheit voraussehen lassen. 
Da rnischt sich ein junger Vicewachtrneister ins GesprMch. Ich h8re 
ihn, wie er - ein bisschen von oben herab - auseinandersetzt, wie wenig 
es rnit solchen Ahnungen auf sich habe. Gewiss verrnutet jeder vor einem 
gefMhtlichen Unternehrnen, class er vielleicht oder wahrscheinlich urnkornmen 
werde. ErfUllt sich diese Verrnutung, so wird sie als geheirnnisvolle Ahnung 
ausgegeben; erfUllt sie sich nicht, so erinnert sich niernand daran. Nein, 
es gibt keine Ahnungen, nur vernUnftige Berechnungen sind rn8glich, die sich 
rnit mehr oder rninderer Wahrscheinlichkeit bestMtigen. Immer 
wissenschaftlicher wird der kleine Wachtrneister und imrner stiller wird es 
.urn ihn herum: Ahnungen sind Stimmungssache. Wenn ich traurig und 
missgelaunt bin, erscheint mir die Welt dUster und UnglUck scheint rnir 
bevorzustehen. Vielleicht geschieht ein solches UnglUck wirklich. Dann 
wird die Anzahl geheimnisvoller Ahnungen urn eine vermehrt. Oder es 
geschieht nicht, dann redet kein Mensch von der Sache. Dass die 
Verwirklichungen trUber Stimmungen im Kriege besonders hl:luf sind, wen 
sollte das wundern? Darum die vielen 11Ahnungen 11 in dieser Zeit, darum 
auch die gr8ssere Anzahl dieser Ahnungen vor Verdun oder an der Somme, 
als an irgend einem stillen Punkte der Front. Traurig genug, dass 
man in unserer Zeit noch an solche Dinge glaubt. Wer kUnnte diesen mit 
der Kraft der hUheren Bildung und vernUnftigen AufklMrung heraus 
geschleuderten Worten widerstehen? Betroffen schweigen die Landser still. 
Und wohl eine Minute dauert es, bis ihr WortfUhrer eine neue Geschichte 
beginnt von einem Vetter, der seinen Tod nicht nur vorausgesagt, sondern 
auch vorausgeschrieben habe. Aber das ist keine wissenschaftlichen 
Ansprllchen genUgende Erwiderung auf die vorangehende Belehrung. Achsel-
zuckend wendet sich der junge Vorgesetzte ab. 
In mir aber steigt eine Welt auf, die seit langem, langem versunken 
ist in der alles andere erstickenden TMtigkeit des Soldaten im Kriege. Was 
sind das eigentlich "Ahnungen"? Dass sie in sich berechtigt sind, ist 
soeben bestritten worden. Und die Bestreitung hat sich bis zu der 
Behauptung gesteigert, es gMbe Uberhaupt keine Ahnungen. Das ist nun 
lnated Embagneux, 26 Juli 1916; from "Aufzeichnungen, 26 Juli 1916 -
3 Oktober 1917." Unpublished typewritten manuscript presumably compiled 
by Anna Reinach from Reinach's papers. Nachlass Adolf Reinach. Obvious 
errors in punctuation and spelling occurring in the transcription have 
been corrected. 
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freilich ein recht unwissenschaftlicher Missgriff des wissenschaftlichen 
Vicewachtmeisters gewesen: Das Eigenwesen eines Gebildes zu bestreiten, 
dessen Wesen er doch eben dadurch, dass er seine innere Wahrheit leugnet 
und sein hMufiges Auftreten genetisch zu erklHren sucht, anerkannt hat. 
Aber rechnen wir ihm nicht an, was sich bei noch wissenschaftlicheren 
Leuten wie ihm hMufig genug findet. 
Ob Ahnungen Recht und Wahrheit in sich tragen, das vermag ich nicht 
zu sagen; kann es unmBglich sagen, bevor ich weiss, was das eigentlich 
seinem Wesen nach ist: eine Ahnung. Noch weiss ich es nicht. Aber 
schon erwacht in mir die Begierde des PhMnomenologen, aus der FUlle der 
Erscheinungen ein Gebilde herauszuheben, es festzuhalten, sich in es zu 
versenken und damit das, was bisher nur der Wortbedeutung nach bekannt 
war, nunmehr dem anschaulichen Wesen nach sich zu erringen. 
I. 
So notwendig jede Ahnung als solche eines Beziehungsgehaltes bedarf -
eines "Geahnten11 als solchen - so weit ist die Grenze des hier inhaltlich 
MBglichen gezogen. Nicht etwa nur auf Zeitliches oder gar nur auf 
ZukUnftiges kHnnen sich Ahnungen beziehen. Es kann mir innerhalb einer 
wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung die Ahnung des Resultates aufsteigen, 
hier bildet offenbar Ausserzeitliches - ein mehr oder minder bestimmter 
Satz oder Sachverhalt - den Beziehungsgehalt der Ahnungen. Aber nicht 
dieser Ahnungsgehalt, der als identischer auch Gehalt eines Urteils oder 
einer BefUrchtung sein kHnnte, sondern die Ahnung als solche - nicht die 
noematische, sondern die 11noetische" Seite, urn mit Husserl zu reden, -
stellt das eigentliche Problem dar. Bedienen wir uns der an sich recht 
unzureichenden fUr unsere Zwecke aber genUgenden Einteilung der seelischen 
Welt in die 11Ftlhlens- Wollens- und Denksphl:fre", so wird man, da die 
Ahnung gewiss keine Wollung ist, nur darin schwanken kBnnen, ob sie nicht 
etwa als ein Ftlhlen in Anspruch genommen werden kBnnte. Es scheint ja einen 
guten Sinn zu haben, von gefUhlsmMssigen Ahnungen,ja Uberhaupt von der 
GefUhlsmMssigkeit jeder Ahnung zu reden. Immerhin ist ohne weiteres klar, 
class die Ahnung - etwa von einem kUnftigen Ereignis - kein GefUhl ist, 
wie Freude oder Trauer, keine IchzustMndlichkeit, kein sich so oder 
anders Befinden des Ich. Vielmehr fUgt die Ahnung dem Gesamtwissensschatze -
im weitesten Sinne des Wissens gesprochen - etwas Neues hinzu; das Subjekt 
scheint hier, mit Recht oder Unrecht sei dahingestellt, vermittelst der 
Ahnung etwas aus dem Flusse kUnftiger Begebenheiten zu erfassen, was ihm vorher 
nicht zugMnglich war. Was mit dem Worte GefUhlsmMssigkeit der Ahnung 
gemeint ist, kann erst eine tiefergehende Zergliederung aufklMren. Schon 
hier aber dUrfen wir die Ahnung, wie alles, was gewisse Sachverhalte dem 
Subjekte als jetzt oder kUnftig oder llberhaupt bestehend erscheinen 1/:fsst, 
dem Gebiete des Wissens und damit des Denkens im Sinne jener Dreiteilung 
zurechnen. Deutlich hebt sich von der Ahnung kUnftigen Geschickes das 
Entsetzen ab, welches aus diesem ahnenden Erfassen als GefUhl entspringt, 
und alles Streben und Widerstreben, Wollen und Nicht-wollen, welches in 
diesem FUhlen und Wissen wurzelt. 
Freilich 11Wissen11 ist hier im weitesten Sinne genommen, in einem 
engeren und eigentlichen kann man ja Ahnung und Wissen einander entgegen-
setzen. So sind nach dieser ersten oberflMchlichen Orientierung nHhere 
Bestimmungen unerltlsslich. Wir machen in dieser SphMre den grundsMtzlichen 
und weittragenden Unterschied zwischen grUndenden und gegrUndeten Gebilden. 
c 
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FUr das Wissen im engeren Sinn habe ich ihn schon in einer frUheren 
Arbeit ausgefUhrt (MUnch. Philos. Abhandl., "Zum negativen Urteil"). 
Nehmen wir das Erkennen in strenger Bedeutung als den Akt, in dem uns 
ein Sachverhalt zur Gegebenheit kommt, in dem er uns aufleuchtet 
und der entsprechende Satz von uns eingesehen wird, so scheidet sich 
davon in aller Klarheit die Ueberzeugung vom Sachverhalt, die uns auf 
Grund dieses Einsehens erwMchst. Wir bezeichnen das erste als Erkennen, 
das zweite als Urteil (in einem der vielen m~glichen Bedeutungen dieses 
Ausdruckes). Beide heben sich auch ohne nMhere Zergliederung deutlich 
genug von einander ab, wenn man bedenkt, dass es sich bei dem Erkennen 
urn einen zeitlich punktuellen Akt handelt, der nicht mehr oder minder 
lang dauern kann, wHhrend wir in einer Ueberzeugung beliebig lang 
leben kBnnen, und dass ferner eine Menge von Ueberzeugungen in uns 
lebendig zu werden pflegen, ohne class sie sich in einem Akte des 
Erkennens grUnden oder jemals gegrUndet haben. Von hier aus betrachtet 
ist kein Zweifel, class wir Ahnungen zu den grUndenden, nicht zu den 
gegrUndeten - d. h. , zu den ihrem Wesen nach einer GrUndung zugHnglichen -
Gebilden zu rechnen haben. Durch die Ahnungen erfassen wir - oder 
glauben wir zu erfassen - vorher Verborgenes. Und es kann auch im 
Ahnen eine Ueberzeugung grtlnden, die an StMrke und innerer Sicherheit 
der sich auf ein Erkennen sttltzenden Ueberzeugung nichts nachzugeben 
braucht. Aus der Ahnung des nahen Todes erwHchst die sichere 
Ueberzeugung, bald sterben zu mtlssen. 
Stehen in dieser Beziehung Erkennen und Ahnen auf gleicher Stufe, 
so wird eben dadurch die Aufgabe urn so dringender, die grundsMtzliche 
Verschiedenheit beider aufzuzeigen. 
c 
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"Fragment of a treatise on the philosophy of religion"1 
Section 2: Structure of Experience 
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One could ask, whether in our experience (Erlebnis), which indeed 
quite certainly includes knowledge (Erkenntnis), there is knowledge of 
~ priori or empirical character. Or whether a knowledge of a third 
and perhaps quite unique type is present here. If we take ~ priori 
states-of-affairs2 as such, for which the predication through the sub-
ject according to its essence (Wesen) is required, and which therefore 
thereby becomes known, so that we sink ourselves in the essence of the 
subject, then there is no ~priori knowledge here. But, on the other 
hand, also no empirical knowledge, for it concerns no contingent and 
temporally changeable matter of fact. Here two different intersecting 
distinctions must be separated. 
We separate explicit and experience-immanent knowledge. Thus the 
enjoyment of a work of art is not knowledge, but forms the foundation 
for and releases from out of itself the knowledge that a picture is 
beautiful. However, one could ask oneself here, whether the knowledge, 
"it is beautiful", does not have its own intuitive foundation 
(Anschauungsgrundlage). To be judged quite differently, on the other 
hand, is a perception in relation to a knowledge of actuality 
(Wirklichkeitserkenntnis) insofar as the latter must always refer back 
to the perception for its verification. There is, after all, even in 
the perception a taking-as-real, though not an actual knowledge. Quite 
otherwise is the taking-as-reality (Wirklichkeitsnehmung) in feeling-
oneself-sheltered in God; logically speaking the former is the 
presupposition for the latter. However, no one would draw a logical 
conclusion from this. It is rather immanently contained in the sense of 
the experience (Erlebnissinne) itself. Here we must separate two aspects: 
on the one side the knowledge of the being-sheltered and on the other 
side the knowledge of the being-there (Dasein) of God, i.e., an immediate 
and a mediate immanent knowledge. The experiences of thankfulness and 
love contain only a mediate knowledge; as position-takings they are in 
a certain sense derivative experiences. 
I experience my absolute dependence on God. Insofar as I myself am 
concerned with this experienced relation, the state-of-affairs does not 
stand before me, rather I myself experience myself in this relation, 
which then naturally cannot be objective for me. In this manner, also, 
if I perceive an object, the corresponding relation between perception 
and object is not objective to me. Then comes, however, immediately a 
difference: in perceiving there comes to me, through reflection on it, 
the knowledge that "I perceive11 • In the experience of dependence I find 
myself dependent, without reflection being necessary, which indeed also 
could lead only to the knowledge that I feel myself dependent ... 
lEnglish translation of the two unpublished sections of "BruchstUck 
einer religionsphilosophischen AusfUhrung," 28 Sept. -3 Okt. 1917. An 
edition of the unpublished German text is presented below, see pp. 250-51. 
For text of Section 1 see GS, pp. xxxi-xxxvi. 
2see above, pp. 39-40, on states-of-affairs (Sachverhalte). 
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Section 3: Sceptical Reflections 
He, who has partaken of such an experience, may be raised above 
all necessities and doubts of life, he may experience a reversal 
and change in himself which is comparable with no other event of his 
life, he may have obtained a firm direction which now makes all steps 
of his life firm and certain--but what has occurred beyond this pure 
individual event in the being-there (Dasein) of an individual? 
Especially, to what extent is true knowledge furthered, how can such 
a subjective experience claim validity for the individual or even for 
all men in general? So many doubts will make themselves felt to the 
present positions of most men with regard to the theory of knowledge, 
there will be so much rejection from the very beginning, that one 
will hardly take upon oneself the trouble to formulate the deliberations 
exactly ... 
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"BruchstUck. einer religionsphilosophischen AusfUhrung" 1 
2. Struktur des Erlebnisses 
Man k.Unnte fragen, ob in unserem Erlebnis, das doch ganz gewiss 
eine Erkenntnis einschliesst, Erkenntnis apriori oder empirischen 
Charakters vorliegt. Oder ob hier eine Erkenntnis dritter und 
vielleicht ganz eigener Art vorhanden ist. Nehmen wir apriorische 
Sachverhalte als solche an, bei denen die PrMdikation durch das Subjek.t 
seinem Wesen nach gefordert ist, und die daher dadurch erkannt werden, 
dass wir uns in das Wesen des Subjek.ts vertiefen, so liegt hier keine 
apriorische Erkenntnis vor. Andererseits aber auch k.eine empirische, da 
es sich urn keine zufMllige und zeitlich verMnderliche Tatsache handelt. 
Es mUssen hier zwei verschiedene, sich kreuzende Unterschiede getrennt 
werden. 
Wir scheiden explizite und erlebnis-immanente Erkenntnisse. So 
ist das Geniessen eines Kunstwerkes keine Erkenntnis, bildet aber die 
Grundlage fUr und entlHsst aus sich heraus die Erkenntnis, dass ein 
Bild schUn ist. Allerdings, hier k.Unnte man sich fragen, hat die 
Erkenntnis 11 es ist schl:3n" nicht ihre eigene Anschauungsgrundlage. 
Anders ist wohl eine Wahrnehmung im VerhHltnis zu einer Wirklichkeits-
erkenntnis zu beurteilen, insofern diese zu ihrer BestHtigung immer 
wieder auf die Wahrnehmung zurUckgreifen muss. Immerhin liegt auch in 
der Wahrnehmung noch ein fUr-Wirk.lich-Nehmen, wenn auch nicht eigentlich 
Erk.enntnis. Ganz anders liegt in dem sich GeborgenfUhlen in Gott die 
Wirklichk.eitsnehmung, logisch gesprochen wHre sie Voraussetzung dafUr. 
Aber den logischen Schluss wird kein Mensch ziehen. Sie liegt vielmehr 
im Erlebnissinne selbst immanent enthalten. Zweierlei mUssen wir 
hierbei trennen: einerseits die Erkenntnis des Geborgenseins und dann 
die Erkenntnis des Daseins Gottes, d.h. eine unmittelbar und eine 
mittelbar immanente Erkenntnis. Den Erlebnissen der Dankbark.eit und 
Liebe wohnt nur eine mittelbare Erk.enntnis inne; sie sind in gewissem 
Sinne als Stellungsnahmen derivate Erlebnisse, 
Ich erlebe meine absolute AbhHngigk.eit von Gott. Insofern ich selbst 
an dieser erlebten Beziehung beteiligt bin, steht der Sachverhalt nicht 
vor mir, sondern ich selbst erlebe mich in dieser Beziehung, die dann mir 
natUrlich nicht gegenstHndlich sein kann. In dieser Weise ist mir auch, 
wenn ich einen Gegenstand wahrnehme, das entsprechende VerhMltnis 
zwischen Wahrnehmung und Gegenstand nicht gegenstMndlich. Dann k.ommt 
allerdings sofort ein Unterschied: Bei der Wahrnehmung erwMchst mir durch 
Reflexion auf sie die Erkenntnis 11 ich nehme wahr". Im AbhHngigk.eitserlebnis 
finde ich mich abhMngig, ohne dass eine Reflexion nUtig wMre, die ja auch 
nur zur Erkenntnis fUhren k.Unnte, class ich mich abhMngig fUhle, .. 
1 
An edition of the unpublished sections from "BruchstUck einer 
religionsphilosophischen AusfUhrung," 28 Sept. - 3 Ok.t. 1917, in 
"Aufzeichnungen, 26 Juli - 3 Oktober 1917," Nachlass Adolf Reinach. 
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3. Skeptische Erw!:igungen 
Wer eines solchen Erlebnisses teilhaftig geworden ist, der mag 
hinUbergehoben werden Uber alle Ntlte und Zweifel des Lebens, er mag 
eine Umkehrung und Wandlung in sich erfahren, die mit keinem anderen 
Ereignis seines Lebens vergleichbar ist, er mag eine feste Richtung 
erhalten haben, die nunmehr alle Schritte seines Lebens fest und 
sicher macht - aber was ist Uber dies·rein individuelle Geschehen im 
Dasein eines Einzelnen hinaus geschehen? Inwiefern insbesondere ist 
wahre Erkenntnis gefBrdert, wie kann ein solches subjektives Erlebnis 
GUltigkeit beanspruchen fUr den Einzelnen oder gar fUr alle Menschen 
Uberhaupt? Soviel Zweifel werden sich bei der heutigen erkenntnis-
m!:issigen Einstellung der meisten Menschen regen, soviel Abweisung von 
vornherein, dass man sich kaum die Mllhe nehmen wird, die Bedenken genau 
zu formulieren ............... . 
0 
Appendix IV 
1 
"Adolf Reinach", by Edmund Husserl 
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German philosophy has sustained a severe loss through Adolf 
Reinach's early death. He was, of course, yet in the process of 
development when the war broke out and he, full of enthusiasm, 
marched off as a volunteer to satisfy the duty to the fatherland. 
However, the first essays had already given evidence of the independ-
ence and power of his mind as well as of the seriousness of his 
scientific striving, which only the most fundamental research could 
satisfy. Whoever was close to him, whoever learned to treasure his 
philosophic manner in scientific conversation, whoever had observed 
the scope of his studies, the intensity and diversity of his interests, 
might have been amazed that he decided to publish so slowly. How 
easily he grasped lines of thought developed verbally or in writ , 
how quickly he recognized the principal difficulties and saw the most 
remote consequences. And what a wealth of brilliant ideas were at 
his disposal in any deliberation. But how he restrained this aptitude 
which seemed to press towards fast and excellent production. He 
wanted to draw only from the deepest sources, he wanted to perform only 
lasting valuable work. He succeeded in doing so precisely by means of 
this wise caution. The writings which he authored since his doctorate, 
(the last of which appeared in his thirtieth year), are not great in 
number and scope, but each one is rich in concentrated thought content 
and worthy of the most fundamental study. His first work2 was 
specifically influenced by Th. Lipps to whom he owed his first philo-
sophic training. Yet already as a student in Munich he was open to the 
influence of the new phenomenology and joined the group of this 
important researcher's highly talented students who opposed his3 
psychologism from the standpoint of my "Logical Investigations". Reinach 
did not follow the changes which Lipps made in his writings after 1901 
as a result of this opposition, however much Reinach also knew to value 
their wealth of valuable ideas. He was one of the first who was able to 
fully comprehend the peculiar sense of the new phenomenological method 
and to see its philosophical import. The phenomenological manner of 
thought and research were soon second nature to him and never henceforth 
did the conviction, so very pleasing to him, fall into doubt, of having 
reached the true continent of philosophy and to now know himself, as 
researcher, to be surrounded by an infinite horizon of possible and, for 
a rigorous scientific philosophy, decisive discoveries. Thus his 
G~ttingen writings breathe a completely new spirit and at the same time 
manifest his efforts to dedicate himself to clearly bounded problems 
and through taking the work in hand to make the ultimate foundation fruitful. 
1This is the first English translation of an article entitled '~dolf 
Reinach," by Edmund Husserl, which appeared in Kantstudien, XXIII (1919), 
147-49. 
2" Uber Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht (MUnchener 
Doktordissertation, 1905). 
3Lipps', (Trans. note). 
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Only one of Reinach's treatises is historical. Its subject is: 
"Kant's Interpretation of the Humeian Problem", (Zeitschrift i· Philos u. 
philos. Kritik, Bd. 141; 1908).1 It deserves most serious attention. 
For me, at that time, the sinking into the sense (Sinn) of the knowledge 
(Erkenntnis) about "relations of ideas" and the insight that Kant's 
interpretation of them as analytic judgments was a misunderstanding, were 
decisive on the way to pure phenomenology. Reinach, on the other hand, 
as an accomplished phenomenologist proceeding to the study of Kant, 
noted the Kantian misunderstanding immediately and devoted an instructive 
investigation to it. 
The first of Reinach's systematic-phenomenological works, "On the 
Theory of Negative Judgments,"--an honorary gift for his earlier philosophy 
teacher2--treats difficult problems of the general theory of judgments in 
extraordinarily sharp thinking ways. It makes the original attempt of 
carrying out a phenomenological distinction between "conviction" and 
"assertion" and, in connection with this, of enriching the doctrine of 
the negative judgment through a series of phenomenological distinctions. 
--Very important and, it seems, little known studies then appeared in 
1912/13 in the Zeitschrift f. Philos. ~· philos. Kr., Bd. 148 and 149 
under the title: "Reflection; its ethical and legal meaning." The purely 
phenomenological analysis of the essences of theoretical ("intellectual") 
and practical ("voluntary") reflection leads Reinach in different 
directions to fine and meaningful distinctions in the areas of the 
intellectual and emotionally-practical acts and situations; the results 
are then made ethically and legally useable. Of the same maturity and 
solidity, is finally the by far most significant and at the same time most 
rich in scope of Reinach's works, "The~ priori Foundations of Civil Law," 
which, as co-editor of my "Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie u. ph~nomenologische 
Forschung," he presented in the first volume (1913).3 It offers, as 
opposed to all legal philosophical outlines of the present, as of the 
past, a completely new type of attempt to actualize on the basis of pure 
phenomenology the long despised idea of an !!_ priori legal doctrine. With 
singular sharp thinking Reinach draws a great diversity of "!! priori" 
truths which lie at the base of all real and imaginable law, into the 
1 of day; and he shows they are !!_ priori exactly in the sense that 
the primitive arithmetic or logical axioms are, and thus like them, are 
graspable by insight as truths valid in general without exception, prior 
to all experience (Erfahrung). These ~priori legal propositions, as 
for example, that a claim expires through fulfillment, that a possession 
through transfer passes from one person to the other, express nothing 
less than "determinations" (arbitrary stipulations, that something should 
be) as do all propositions of positive law. All such positive legal 
determinations indeed already presuppose concepts, as, for example, 
claim, obligation, possession, transfer, etc., concepts which are therefore 
!!_priori in the face of positive law. Reinach's ~priori legal 
1The date of publication was 1911, not 1908, (Trans. note). 
2Vgl. "MUnchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Th. Lipps zu seinem 60, 
Geburtstag gewidmet von frUheren SchUlern, Leipzig, 1911." 
3In the following I repeat the analysis I gave in the "Nachruf" in 
the Frankfurter Zeitung, 6 Dec. 1917. 
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propositions are therefore nothing other than expressions of unconditioned 
valid !!_priori legal truths, which are grounded purely in the sense con-
tained in these concepts (Sinnesgehalt dieser Begriffe) and accordingly, 
in contrast to positive-legal stipulations, are themselves !!_priori.--
That which is fully original in this piece of work, masterly from every 
point of view, consists in the knowledge that this !!. priori belonging 
to the unique essence of any law in general, is to be sharply distinguished 
from another !!. priori that refers to all laws by means of norms of 
evaluation: for all law can and must be placed under the idea of "correct 
law"--"correct" from the standpoint of morality or some objective 
expediency. The development of this idea led to a quite distinct ~priori 
discipline, but one which aims at the realization of the fundamentally 
mistaken ideal of a ''natural law" as little as Reinach' s ~ priori legal 
doctrine. For it can set forth only formal legal norms from which a 
positive law is to be pressed out as little as objective scientific truth 
is to be from formal logic.-MNo one, who is interested in a rigorously 
scientific legal philosophy, in a final clarification of the fundamental 
concepts constitutive for the idea of positive law in general (a 
clarification, which obviously is to be accomplished only through 
phenomenological submersion in the pure essence of consciousness of law), 
will be able to overlook this pioneering work of Reinach. For me it is 
beyond doubt that it will give the name of its author a lasting place in 
the history of legal philosophy. 
In the last years before the war Reinach was concerned with funda-
mental problems of general ontology and, concerning the essence of move-
ment in particular, he believed he had established decisive phenomenological 
insights. There is the hope that valuable pieces from his incomplete 
literary drafts can be made accessible to the public. In the war itself 
he devoted his powers with never failing willingness to the fatherland. 
But his religious disposition was too deeply afflicted by the monstrous 
war experiences for him not to have had to venture an attempt at the 
time of a relatively quiet service at the front to develop his conception 
of the world (Weltanschauung) in the philosophy of religion. I understand 
that he in fact made his way to a clarity satisfying to him: the enemy 
bullet struck one who was composed, fully in agreement with himself and 
God. 
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